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ABSTRACT
This thesis aims at working out a politics out of the thought of Deleuze and 
Guattari. The angle taken on this question is ontological. Politics is inseparable from 
ontology. Every ontology is political and every politics is itself an ontology. The 
reciprocal relation between ontology and politics has been here identified as the 
question of their ‘parallelism’. This parallelism of the ontological and the political is 
first to be found in Spinoza’s thought. Spinoza can only write an ethics and a politics 
on the basis of his analysis of substance. In this analysis the thesis of ‘parallelism’ 
occupies a central position. Spinoza’s theory of the univocity of being rests on this 
principle. This project is rehabilitated by Deleuze and Guattari in their own 
philosophy as a form of radical materialism. This form of philosophy guided by the 
principle of ‘parallelism’ has here been called: ontological materialism. Thus, not 
only is it impossible to understand their politics without grasping their ontology, but 
the complexities of it will only be understood after a study of Spinoza’s ontology 
itself. For these purposes the thesis has been divided into two parts. The first part 
concerns Spinoza’s thought. The second, concentrates on Deleuze and Guattari’s 
Capitalisme et schizophrénie The analysis will concentrate on the passage from the 
first to the second volume as a translation of the continuities at the ontological level 
but also on the shifts that from this level necessarily occasion a movement in their 
conception of politics. This research along the Spinozist lines of the ontology of 
Deleuze and Guattari allows for their politics to be read as an ethics. In the final 
outcome the activity of philosophy itself is an ethics.
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INTRODUCTION
The principal idea behind this thesis is that no political theory has a substantial 
basis without a fully worked out and elaborated ontology. This view is quite opposed 
to the general conception of politics. In liberal theory, for example, political theory is 
not grounded in ontology but in anthropology. For instance, social contract theory is 
unthinkable without its reference to some generalised theory of human nature whether 
this one is seen as being basically one of co-operation and sociability, as is the case in 
the work of Rousseau, or as basically competitive, as in Hobbes.
This research approaches this relation between ontology and politics through 
the work of Deleuze and Guattari. Its originality lies in its effort to demonstrate that 
one can obtain a rigorous political theory from the specific form of their ontological 
materialism. Not that this means that one might find there a fully worked out political 
program, rather, as it is postulated by this thesis itself, descriptions of desire and 
production, machinic assemblages, and so on, themselves internally produce a 
politics.
This project itself is the result of research already achieved in an MA. The title 
of this MA was: ‘Deleuze and Guattari: from Universal History to Universal 
Cosmology’. In this research it was argued that one could make a distinction between 
the two volumes of Capitalisme et schizophrénie. L 'Anti-Oedipe was demonstrated to 
be still a part of a Hegelian and Marxist conception of history in which capitalism is
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designated as a universal truth and thus history as exhibiting teleological finality: 
capitalism is the death of every society and thus the end of history. In Mille Plateaux, 
on the contrary, there is no appeal to a universal history, rather history is conceived of 
as non-linear and contingent. Moreover, the parallelism between the social and the 
psyche that was at the centre of L 'Anti-Oedipe is consigned only to one or two 
chapters in Mille Plateaux, human history is part of a general cosmology.
The first description of this research at Ph D. level proposed a deeper 
investigation of this difference between L Anti-Oedipe and Mille Plateaux by 
returning to Marx and Hegel, and thereby to see how far ontological materialism is 
indebted, so to speak, to dialectical materialism. However, this present thesis changed 
the reference from Marx and Hegel to Spinoza. The reason for this change is that one 
can only explain the materialist ontology of Capitalisme et schizophrénie positively 
through a detailed and in depth analysis of Spinoza’s metaphysics. The return to 
Hegel and Marx, on the other hand, was a negative project. In the end it could have 
only shown what materialist ontology is not rather than what it is. Only through 
Deleuze and Guattari’s Spinozism can one grasp the ontology that underlies their 
work and from this obtain the thesis of the direct translation of this ontology into a 
politics.
Thus, this thesis has been divided into two parts. The first part has to do with 
Spinoza explicitly and the second part concerns itself primarily with Deleuze and 
Guattari’s Capitalisme et schizophrénie. The theme that guides the continuity between 
the first and second part of this thesis is the ‘parallelism’ of the ontological and the 
political, or in Spinoza’s vocabulary, that of substance and ethics. The idea of the 
univocity of being in Spinoza is rehabilitated by Deleuze and Guattari’s project of the 
affirmation of pure immanence. For them being is horizontality. All appeal to
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transcendence is a vestige of theological reasoning The anomaly of Spinoza in the 
history o f Western thought is the rigorous nature of his immanent explanation of 
being in the relation between substance to attributes and modes. The language of 
Spinoza, with its rigorous reasoning and vocabulary, can act as guide or ruler of the 
interpretation of Deleuze and Guattari’s immanent explanations which tend to be 
more, stylistically speaking, playful and exaggerated.
Thus, this thesis means to demonstrate the proximity of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy to that of Spinoza’s through the thesis of the ‘parallelism’ 
between the political and the ontological. What do we mean when we say that two 
things are parallel? This relation can be described in the simplest of terms as follows: 
‘On peut appeler « parallèles », en effet deux choses ou deux séries de choses qui sont 
dans un rapport constant, tel qu’il n’y ait rien dans l’une qui n’ait dans l’autre un 
correspondant, toute causalité réelle entre les deux se trouvant exclue.’1 However, 
following Deleuze’s warnings about this first sense of the term as it was coined by 
Leibniz, two further formulas lend to it the stronger use Spinoza makes of it. ‘Spinoza 
donne deux autres formules qui prolongent la première: identité de connexion ou 
égalité de principe, identité d'être ou unité ontologique,’2 It is from within this second 
added sense of the term that the works of Spinoza, and Deleuze and Guattari will be 
interpreted. The thesis of ‘parallelism’ forms a line of affinity between these three 
thinkers. Furthermore, beyond the philosophy of these three thinkers there is an 
alternative history of ontology that founds itself in the thesis of ‘parallelism’: 
materialist ontology This thought does not stand outside classical ontology but is an 
offshoot of the ontological tradition itself. Insofar as it belongs to this tradition certain 
specific traits belong to it. In the briefest of ways it can be characterised as follows:
1 G.Deleuze. Spinoza et te problème de /'expression. (Paris: Minuit, 1968), pp.94-5.
2 Ibid.
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every materialist ontology denies any pre-constituted structure of being or any 
teleological order of existence and instead unravels itself in a strictly immanent 
discourse where only a constitutive conception of practice can serve as foundation.3 It 
is within this line of affinity that this PhD wishes to find its own place. This is, in a 
certain sense, a philological project, but one that does not have as its ultimate aim 
merely the dry, and tedious exposition of different thinkers so as to discover apparent 
similarities and differences. Its aim is the philosophical idea that a properly thought 
out politics requires and demands an ontology. Without ontology politics is merely an 
ideology. What gives Deleuze and Guattari’s politics such a hardness and consistency, 
which stands in such opposition to much of the vacuity of current political theory 
where political aims and descriptions appear to be left to mere whim and opinion, is 
its foundation in a materialist ontology. It is an interpretation of being as productive 
that gives to a politics of liberation its counterblow against, on the one hand, the 
smugness of bourgeois triumphalism, and on the other hand, the nihilism of defeated 
and crushed radicalism. The parallelism of the political and the ontological is the most 
important lesson Deleuze and Guattari have learnt from Spinoza. The alternative to 
capitalism is desiring production which is nothing else than the conjunction of the 
ontological and the political.
3 The term •materialist ontology' was set out in this thesis prior to becoming aware that it is employed 
and defined by M.Hardt. Not unsurprisingly, given the proximity o f terrain and inspiratioa he docs so 
in very similar terms to ours in the sense of what has already been said and in that it is a part or sideline 
of the ontological tradition itself to which also belong Lucretius. Marx and Nietzsche. He further, 
demarcates Deleuze’s position from a Heideggerian return to being. See: M.Hardt. An Apprenticeship 
in Philosophy, Gilles Deleuze, (London: UCL Press. 1993), p.xiii. The differences between 
Heidegger’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s work on ontology will not be treated in this thesis but it is 
nonetheless a key issue with regards to the definition of the contemporary task of philosophy. This task 
as defined by materialist ontology centres around the problem of constitution and represents a critique 
of the phenomenological position. For an excellent analysis and debate of this question see: E.AUiez,
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Part I : Spinoza
The thought of Spinoza has never ceased to be alive since its first inception in 
1677. Every century has awakened to a different and new figure of Spinoza. Thus, 
throughout time his thought has been given many different interpretations. For 
example in the XVIIIth century the image that predominates is that of the atheist 
rationalist, in XIXth century it is the more mystical, religious and pantheist readings 
that abound until the XXth century when we finally see emerge the figure of Spinoza 
as the « revolutionary». It seems that every time philosophers have occupied 
themselves with Spinoza it is never a case of a ‘return’ but of a re-beginning. Despite 
the position of marginality Spinoza and his thought have endured with regards to 
society, as when he was excommunicated from his Jewish community, and to 
academia for his work was hardly commented or taught before our century, his 
philosophy has proven to have an amazing potential o f renewal.4 Thus, even if we 
place ourselves within one same period of time or country we still find a great 
diversity of readings.5 Yet, it is in the context of the various readings that flourished 
in France after the 1960’s that Deleuze’s own interpretation, and thus this thesis, find 
their place. Deleuze’s reading o f Spinoza was mainly inspired and confronted to the 
readings of Bergson, Alquie, Gueroult, Moreau, as his forbearers, and of Althusser, 
Macherey, Matheron, Balibar, Tosel and Negri as his contemporaries.6 It is amongst
De l'impossiblité de ta phénoménologie. Sur la philosophie française contemporaine, (Paris: Vrin. 
1995).
4 For a discussion on the rejection of Spinoza from his Jewish community and the question of 
censorship linked lo marranism see: I.S.Révah, Des marranes à Spinoza, (Paris: Vrin. 1995.
5 For a detailed account of Spinoza's reception in different countries such as Italy. Soviet Union. 
Germany, England. France in the XXth century as well as its relation to marxism, psychoanalysis and 
the sionists see: edited by Olivier Bloch. Spinoza au XXéme siècle. (Paris: puf. 1993).
6 For a good description of the relations amongst French academics’ work on Spinoza around this time 
see: edited by W.Montag & T.Stolze. The New Spinoza. (Minneapolis. London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997).
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them that Deleuze’s own interpretation marked its originality and gained recognition 
within the line of spinozist studies. To a certain extent the affinities with the last 
group of philosophers are greater for there is a certain Marxist horizon that links them 
together. However, their work is unthinkable without that of their peers. All these 
thinkers in France around that time compose a milieu breading certain readings of 
Spinoza and where Deleuze’s must be included. Therefore, this first part has been 
divided into two sections. The first section is an interpretation of Spinoza’s Ethics and 
Political Treatise. The second section concentrates on Deleuze and Negri’s reading of 
Spinoza.
The first chapter of this section on Spinoza’s Ethics and Political Treatise, 
although it tries to detach itself from an overtly deleuzian reading, does find its milieu 
in those same thinkers that compose the world of Deleuze’s reading. Other 
interpretations such as Russel’s or Popper’s in the English speaking world have not 
been taken into account, neither have the readings of Leo Strauss or the sionists. This 
thesis is not an exegesis of the works on Spinoza but attempts to determine what a 
materialist ontology would entail in terms of its link to the spinoz/.v/ ontology of 
Deleuze and Guattari. For, the philosophy that is produced in Capitalisme et 
schizophrénie has three voices: Deleuze, Guattari and Spinoza. One cannot 
understand this work, without having read in depth the work of Spinoza and the 
‘parallelism’ that lies at the heart of this system. In this first chapter, however, the 
terms of the ‘parallelism’ are returned to their original vocabulary of substance and 
ethics, and the guiding theme is the idea of the univocity of being.
In this section, Spinoza’s two works are analysed through the threefold 
distinction of being, expression and ethics. But what is fundamentally repeated in this 
work is the identity of the ontological and the political. Spinoza can write an
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ontological work called Ethics because there is no difference of kind in his theory 
between ontological investigation and ethics. Spinoza’s analysis of affects can only be 
understood through his theory of substance. Equally, Spinoza’s politics or theory of 
natural rights must be understood in connection to his analysis of substance and 
affects, that is to say, his politics is inconceivable without his ethics.
In the second section of this part (chapter II o f the thesis) is established the 
thesis of ‘parallelism’ as it is developed in Deleuze and Negri’s reading of Spinoza. 
Both thinkers demonstrate in their own way the thesis o f  ‘parallelism’ as being central 
to Spinoza’s thought and to their project of a radical materialism. In this chapter it is 
argued that each of them approaches the parallelism o f the ontological and political 
orders differently. Deleuze demonstrates this parallelism from the side of ontology 
whereas Negri does so from the side of the political. The point of contrasting their 
work is not to oppose them for they are in many ways very close to each other. The 
extent of their proximity can be measured not only through their approaches to 
Spinoza but also in Negri’s most recent work with Hardt wherein the thought of 
Spinoza and of Deleuze and Guattari’s are cardinal to their project. Rather, precisely 
because of their proximity, it is meant to bring out the singularity of Deleuze’s 
interpretation of Spinoza.
Part II : Deleuze and Guattari
This part is divided into three chapters. Three main tasks are outlined in this 
part. First, prove the centrality of Spinoza to Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology and 
project of Capitalisme et schizophrenic. Secondly, address through a very careful 
reading of the latter work, the basis for the subtle differences between the first and
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second volume, that is to say, between L ’Anti-Oedipe and Mille Plateaux. Lastly, 
explicate the notion of ‘practice’ from the perspective of materialist ontology itself.
The third chapter of this thesis uses the threefold distinction that had already 
been at work in the analysis of Spinoza’s thought in order to illuminate the 
complexity of the ontology of L Anti-Oedipe. Thus, the application of the schema of 
being, expression and ethics corresponds to the analysis of desire, production and 
schizoanalysis respectively. The three terms invoke in their order the ontological, the 
epistemological or critical, and the political. Yet, it must be remembered at all times 
that, what is properly political in this type of thought is the articulation of these three 
terms in a relation of perfect continuity. This has its basis and foundation in Spinoza’s 
rigorous immanent materialist ontology. Deleuze and Guattari are spinozists insofar as 
they apply Spinoza’s concepts to a different field. This field is the analysis of desire 
and its repression in the axiomatics of capitalism. Let us be clear, that this difference 
does not entail on their part a critique or distancing from Spinoza, as though their 
project were meant to be an improvement on his. Here philosophy cannot be thought 
in terms of progress, rather it is a transformation or translation of his language into 
their political experiment.
The fourth chapter treats the passage from L Anti-Oedipe to Mille Plateaux. 
Thus, it first of all translates the ontological terms of the first to those of the second in 
order to establish the continuities between them. The ontological language of L Anti- 
Oedipe of desire, production and schizoanalysis is translated into that of abstract 
machine, machinic assemblage and plane of consistency of Mille Plateaux However, 
the aim will also be to show the differences between their ontologies. The materialist 
ontology of L Anti-Oedipe is much closer to the historical analysis of the parallelism 
of the social and the psyche which, as has already been pointed out, is a fundamental
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Hegelian Marxist reading of history. In Mille plateaux, on the contrary, this 
materialism extends beyond the mere analysis of human societies through all the 
different strata. In this sense one could argue that the latter book is closer to the spirit 
of Spinoza than the former.
Likewise, it is possible to analyse the different possibilities of a politics given 
in the two volumes. In the first, in the analysis of the difference between subject- 
groups and subjected groups, one can discern in the background a latent concept of 
‘class consciousness’ where the schizophrenic has usurped the proletariat as the 
vehicle for revolution. In Mille Plateaux, on the contrary, there is no clear 
commitment to political groups or groupings. Thus, it is perhaps better to speak here 
of an ethics rather than a politics. Once more, this volume seems closer to Spinoza 
than the first. Ethics, in Spinoza, is the objective or even imperative to augment one’s 
power to act and to think, that is to say, of our puissance. In Mille Plateaux, ethics is a 
matter of becomings and following lines of flight that completely break free from all 
the determinations that decrease or freeze our power to act and our power to think. 
Becomings and lines of flight are synonyms of augmentation in our puissance.
The work of the French sociologist Gabriel Tarde is also examined in this 
same chapter. His work on micro-sociology helps understand Deleuze and Guattari’s 
notion of micro-politics in particular due to the subtle shift it represents with regards 
to their notion of schizoanalysis in L 'Anti-Oedipe. From this work the notions o f the 
molecular and molar, and of the outside that were already present in the first volume 
can be brought to another level, one that moves their project somewhat closer to its 
immanent ends. Thus, this chapter can close with a definition o f ‘micro-politics’ that 
moves away from the still too anthropomorphic sphere of schizoanalysis into the more 
impersonal, but nevertheless revolutionary, forces of the infinitesimal
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The fifth and final chapter treats of the question o f ‘practice’. The movement 
from thought to practice has usually taken the shape of a process of self-justification 
and legitimisation. Within this process, or this image of thought, the passage from 
thought to practice, to politics, is regarded as being obvious. The activity of 
philosophy as redefined by Deleuze, on the other hand, is precisely to think about this 
image of thought and supply its critique. This is ‘thinking philosophically about the 
political’, or it is philosophy’s ‘political vocation’.7 It is precisely because of this 
vocation of theirs that Deleuze and Guattari name the critical, creative and 
revolutionary forces of thought a ‘war machine’ and that they effectuate a radical 
critique of the State and its forms through their notion of ‘apparatus of capture’. Thus, 
the middle section o f  this chapter analyses the relation between the war machine and 
the State Apparatus o f Capture.
The heart o f this chapter centres on the notion of ‘becoming’. This notion cuts 
through all binary distinctions and oppositional thinking. Becomings and 
multiplicities constitute the basis on which ‘practice’ is reinterpreted ontologically as 
the only stuff micro-politics is made of. The question of micro-politics hinges on a 
becoming-minoritarian. This means to think minorities out of their standard political 
representation. Defined as a zone of indeterminacy the immanent limit of becoming is 
a becoming impersonal. In a manner, which is closest to spinozist ethics, the subject 
becomes a door to the forces of the impersonal and only persists in its relation to them 
through life and through death, as the absolute affirmation of life.
Both quotes are citations from Paul Patton, Deleuze and the political, (London and New York. 
Routledge. 2000), pp. 1, 3. In this work, with which this thesis shares many traits in common, Patton 
presents Deleuze and Guattari’s contribution to political philosophy by giving to What is Philosophy? a 
position of absolute centrality. Despite our proximity to Patton's work, this thesis does not focus on 
this text. However, it is on this terrain that the discussion of the present thesis could find its own 
prolongation. It does indeed point to one possible way of continuing the project here began.
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Chapter I
Spinoza’s three expressions:
the ontological, the ethical and the political
Ideally a reading of Spinoza should follow the order of his publications. As is 
well known, the writing of the Ethics was interrupted by the publication of the 
Theological-Political Treatise'. However, this thesis will only analyse the Ethics and 
the Political Treatise and will only refer to this work of Spinoza. Thus, this chapter 
will follow the order of the books in the Ethics. Lastly, it will consider his Political 
Treatise. Spinoza’s last political writings were drafted once the Ethics had already 
been concluded, yet, they remained uncompleted due to Spinoza’s untimely death 
Book I of the Ethics describes an ontology of substance in which being is understood 
as singular, immanent, and univocal, and in terms of infinite productivity. In book II of 
the Ethics, Spinoza attacks Cartesian dualism in terms of the essential compatibility of 1
1 Negri gives a central role to the genesis of the TTP. Spinoza’s interruption of the writing of the E 
alters what he is to write in books III, IV and V of the E, he argues. The TTP does not simply 
represent a parenthesis in Spinoza's work. This interruption is in fact a refoundation of it. This 
produces the two layers of the E. One of the altitudes of metaphysical speculation of books 1 and II. 
The other, after having concerned itself with the reality of historical mystification and genesis of 
institutions, of bodies and affects. See: T.Negri. L Anomalie sauvage, puissance et pouvoir chez 
Spinoza, (Paris: puf, 1982), pp. 161-63. Despite the importance Negri gives to a study of the TTP he 
also argues in his other book on Spinoza for a rupture between the TP and the TTP  if we undertake a 
political analysis of his work as for example when we concentrate on the notion of democracy See: 
T.Negri. Spinoza subversif. (Paris: Kimé, 1994). pp.40-41, 60-63.
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the body and the mind in one substance, and begins an analysis of the affections of the 
body. This is then interrupted by the political writings of the Theologico-Political 
Treatise where Spinoza develops two fundamental arguments. One, for the utter 
separation of theology and philosophy.2 And the other, for a politics based on natural 
right where this one is interpreted in terms of power rather than in terms of reason.3 
This emphasis on praxis or practical thought at the end of the Theologico-Political 
Treatise, feeds back into the project of the Ethics. Thus, parts III, IV and V of that 
work focus upon: the distinction between affects and affections, conatus, composition 
and decomposition of bodies in relation to other bodies, and finally, the organization of 
the State. Thus, Spinoza’s own itinerary moves from an ontological analysis to a 
political one, where the political content emerges from the ontological definitions, and 
it is not thought in contradistinction to them. Finally, in the Political Treatise we have 
the suggestion, and it is only a suggestion due to Spinoza’s untimely death, that the 
absolute State is democracy. We shall see in the following chapter that this is very 
important to Negri’s political understanding of Spinoza’s philosophy.
: Sec: B. Spinoza. Traité Théologico-Politique, (Paris: Flammarion. 1965), Préface, p.25, Ch. XIV. 
3 Ibid., Préfacé, p 26, Ch. XVI.
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I. The Ontology of Substance
As M. Allendesalazar Olaso suggests, perhaps the best way to find a path 
through the first book of the Ethics is turning to its appendix.4 The first paragraph 
gives a complete summary of Spinoza’s definition of God as follows:
I have now explained the nature and properties of God: that he 
necessarily exists, that he is one alone, that he is and acts solely from 
the necessity of his own nature, that he is the free cause of all things 
and how so, that all things are in God and are so dependent on him 
that they can neither be nor be conceived without him, and lastly, 
that all things have been predetermined by God, not from his free will 
or absolute pleasure, but from the absolute nature o f God, his infinite 
power.5
We shall therefore use this quotation as a guide to our interpretation.
4 M. Allendesalazar Olaso, Spinoza, filosofia, pasiones y  politico, (Madrid: Alianza Editorial. 1988), 
pp.44-56.
5 B.Spinoza, Ethics, trans. by Samule Shirley. (Cambridge : Hackett publishing co., 1992), p. 57.
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"that he necessarily exists"
The origin of substance as a philosophical concept is to be found in Aristotle. 
The simplest definition of this word is that substance is that which can exist 
independently.6 For Aristotle, there were many substances, horse, dog, Socrates, and 
so on.7 For Descartes, there are only three substances that have independent existence, 
and that is thought, extension and divine substance.8 Spinoza’s endeavour is to show 
that from the independence of substance it necessarily follows that there can only be 
one substance and that this substance must exist. This substance is God, and thought 
and extension are merely two of its infinite attributes. Descartes can make a distinction 
between divine substance and the substances of thought and extension because he still 
thinks of God in terms of transcendence, that is to say, there remains with Descartes an 
absolute difference between God and his creatures.9 For Spinoza this difference is not 
epistemological but ontological. Spinoza’s argument would be that this difference, if it 
is seen as an external difference, would imply something other than God, and thus 
would undermine the absolute independence of substance itself.10
The absolute independence of substance also demonstrates that it must 
necessarily exist. If substance did not exist autonomously then its existence would 
have to be caused by something else otherwise it would mean its non-existence. This 
would imply that there would have to be something other than substance, thus,
6 Aristotle, Metaphysics in The Works o f  Aristotle, (Oxford: 1910-52). For a discussion on the 
originality of this question at the time it was first enunciated in relation to the foundation of the new 
science of ontology see: P.Aubenquc, Le problème de l'être chez Aristote. (Paris: puf. 1997), Ch. I.
Op. Cit., Metaphysics.
8 R.Descartes. Méditations métaphysiques, (Paris, puf. 1988).
9 Ibid., méditation troisième, pp. 53-80.
10 Op. Cit., Ethics, definition 6, Book 1. p. 31.
1.1 Substance must necessarily exist -
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likewise, its independence would be annulled. The cause of the existence of substance 
therefore must be immanent. Thus, the proof of proposition 7: “existence belongs to 
the nature of substance.” (P7 El). If substance cannot be produced by anything else, 
for this would deny the definition of substance itself (def. 3 El), then substance must be 
self-caused. The very nature of substance, its essence, therefore necessarily involves 
its existence, following from the definition of substance. To understand the moves 
within this argument, one must grasp that Spinoza is ridding philosophy o f any 
transcendence.11 What is must exist, for if it did not, then something else must exist 
which causes it not to exist. There can be no such “other” without there being more 
than one substance. Thus, Spinoza must show that it makes no sense to speak o f  there 
being two or more substances.12
" ‘La méthode de Spinoza n’est ni abstraite ni analogique (...) S’il faut en fin donner un nom à cette 
méthode, comme à la théorie sous-jacente, on y reconnaîtra facilment la grande tradition de 
l’univocité. Nous croyons que la philosophie de Spinoza reste en partie inintelligible, si l'on n 'y  voit 
pas une lutte constante contre les trois notions d ’equivocitè, d'éminence et d'analogie.’G.Deleuze. 
Spinoza et le problème d'expression, (Paris: Minuit. 1968), p.40. Expressionism in Philosophy: 
Spinoza, (New York: Zone Books. 1992), p.48.
12 Op. Cit., Ethics, proof P5 El, p.33 and proof P13 El, p.39.
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1.2 There can only be one substance -
“that he  is a lone”
The belief that there is more than one substance arises from a confusion of 
attributes with substance itself.13 Thus, an attribute is taken to be a substance rather 
than the expression of substance. Thus, the names given to God, as Spinoza indicates, 
are confused with the substance of God itself.14 If an attribute were another substance, 
then there would be something independent of substance itself. But if substance is 
absolute then there can be nothing other than it.15 Thus, all attributes must express the 
same substance. Nor should it be thought that these attributes divide substance into 
different spheres o f being.16 If a part was a substance, then it would have to be infinite 
and self-caused. But there could not be more than one substance that is infinite and 
self-caused.17 It would be absurd to say that there were two infinities.18 Likewise, it 
makes no sense to think of a part distinct o f the whole, for this would mean there
13 Ibid. P4 El, p.33.
14 As M.Hardt points oui. Deleuze’s reading of univocity in Spinoza is based on this shift of the 
traditional way of linking the attributes of God to divine names into the problematic of divine 
expression where the attribute is given a more active role. See: M.Hardt, An Apprenticeship in 
Philosophy, Gilles Deleuze, (London: UCL Press. 1993), p.63. In a completely different, opposite 
context, the work of Leo Strauss sees in Spinoza’s new sense of the attribute in his study of the TTP 
the keystone for a defence of liberalism. See: L.Strauss. Spinoza s Critique o f Religion, (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1965.
15 Confusions arise from this sort of position. For example with Descartes when pure intellect appears 
twice under a different form: once as the essence of thinking substance and another time as a mode of 
this substance. The consequences of such confusion also lead to the conclusion that there is no other 
reality than a geometrical one outside of intellect. Thus, Gucroult defends cartesian substance by 
drawing a distinction between the genetic procedures arising from the cogito to those arising from the 
direct intuition of the ideas of things. See: M.Gueroult. Descartes selon I 'ordre des raisons. I  L ’ante 
et Dieu, (Paris: Aubier, 1968), pp.76-118.
16 Although. Gueroult believes Spinoza's concept of attribute is stolen from Descartes, he concedes to 
Spinoza to be closer to Euclide’s Elements in the rigor of his definitions. Thus, there is no confusion 
in Spinoza between attributes, modes and substance as we may find in Descartes. This is due to the 
fact that there is only one substance which is a thought that finds its inspiration in the scholastics. 
Even if the question of its unity becomes the new site of complexities this one seems to stand clearer 
from confusions. See: M.Gueroult, Spinoza I  -  Dieu, (Paris: Aubier, 1968), pp. 107-169.
17 Ibid., p. 166.
18 Op. Cit., Ethics, sch. P15 El, pp.40-43.
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could be a whole without parts (proof, P12 El). Attributes, for example Descartes’ 
thought and extension, should not be considered as separate substances, but as 
immanent to the one substance Otherwise, they would have independent existence. 
But only one substance can be self-caused and all other attributes or individual things 
(in Spinoza’s terminology modes), must have their cause in it. Something must either 
be conceived in itself, and only one thing can be conceived in this manner, or it must be 
conceived through another thing. To treat attributes or modes as separate things is to 
fall into the error of thinking that they can be conceived in themselves. An attribute is 
an expression of substance and a mode is the manner in which an attribute expresses 
itself. But in this expression there are no divisions within being Substance is not 
higher than its attributes or modes nor are the modes and attributes lower to substance 
Rather, modes and attributes are immanent to substance, and the cause of substance 
itself is internal. Thus, again we can see that Spinoza’s project is to think being 
without any appeal to transcendence. What is, is God, but God is nothing more than 
what is in its infinite complexity.19
19 P.Macherey in his analysis of Proposition 11 of Book I argues that its importance is not that it 
introduces the concept of God but that the reference to the name of God is that: 'elle revèle ainsi que 
ce sur quoi on avait raisonné depuis le commencement n’était autre que “Dieu”, ce qui siginifie 
réciproquement que Dieu n’est lui même rien d’autre que ce dont il a été question dès le départ, à 
savoir la nature des choses considérée dans la plénitude de son envergure globale telle que celle-ci est 
définie par le rapport de la substance à ses attributs.’P.Macherey. Introduction à l'Ethique de Spinoza. 
La première partie, ta nature des choses, (Paris: puf. 1998). pp.99-100. [Thus, it reveals that what we 
had been reasoning about from the beginning was nothing other than God which reciprocally means 
that God himself is nothing other than what it has always been about, that is to say, the nature of 
things considered in the plenitude of its global breadth inasmuch as this one is defined by the relation 
of substance to its attributes.
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1.3 Substance is infinite -
“that he is and acts solely from the necessity o f his own nature, 
and that he is the free cause o f  all things and how so ”
Since God is the most perfect thing, since only one substance can be maximally 
perfect, it follows from this definition that it has infinite properties: “From the necessity 
of the divine nature there must follow infinite things in infinite ways” (P I6 El). One 
way of defining the infinite is in relation to the finite. Thus, the infinite is seen merely 
as the negation of the finite, the negation of determinations or limits. Spinoza rather 
understands the finite as limitation. Thus, something is finite when it can be limited by 
something else of its own kind: “A thing is said to be finite in its own kind (in suo 
genere finita) when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature.”(Def.2 El) 
He does not understand, however, the infinite in terms of an opposition to the finite, 
that is to say, as something negative 20 In other words, God as opposed to his 
creatures. Rather, the infinite is to be understood as the productivity of being.21 The 
infinite is not opposed to the finite rather a finite thing is an expression of the infinite 
causality of God’s power. Here, substance or God is to be understood as an efficient 
cause: “God is the efficient cause of all things that can come within the scope of 
infinite intellect.” (cor. 1P16 El). Efficient causality is to be distinguished from
30 It is not as though substance (God) was infinite and the modes (creatures) were finite. Modes are 
both finite and infinite. There is a relation of symmetry between substance and the modes See: Op. 
Cit. Spinoza. I  -  Dieu, pp.58-64,
21 From Proposition 15 El, the axiomatic character is somewhat left behind and its rational 
implications through a properly causal deduction begins. The deduction that follows from the 
affirmation that all things are in God develops the schema of productivity or power (puissance) 
insofar as these have their principle in God itself. God’s creation, thus has nothing to do with the 
traditional sense that is given to creation. The scholastics' categories of "natura naturans” and "natura
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teleology. The power of God is not to be conceived as being outside of those things 
that it causes to exist since this would mean that they would be other than God.22 This, 
in turn, would mean that there would be more than one substance, and this contradicts 
the proof that there is only one substance. Thus, creation, or to use a non-theological 
language, attributes and modes, are the expression of God’s infinite power and are not 
opposed to it, or distant from it. God is not something transcendent, but is the self- 
expression of immanence in its infinite productivity, natura naturans. All things flow 
from the necessity of God’s nature, but they should not be seen as a limitation. For if 
it were a limitation then this would be a constraint on God’s power. But, what could 
constrain this power but another infinity or perfection? And, the existence of two 
infinite perfections does not make any sense, or it is absurd, as Spinoza likes saying.
naturata” help explain this productivity of being or productive ontology in Spinoza's thought. See: 
Op. Cit., (Macherey 1998), pp. 135-38.
Infinite intellect is not to be understood in the traditional way as predetermining or teleological. 
God creates out of necessity but this one is a free necessity that expresses itself in creating. Macherey 
explains this by further referring to the TTP. See: Op. Cit. (Macherey 1998), pp. 154-159.
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1.4 Substance is immanent -
“that all things are in God and are so dependent on him 
that they can never be nor be conceived without him ”
Spinoza’s concept of substance not only implies a notion o f being as infinite 
productivity, but also that being is material. Materialism, here, should not be confused 
with a mechanistic view of matter, since this very conception of matter has its source 
in Descartes’ mistaken dualism of thought and extension. Rather, Spinoza’s 
materialism lies in the fact of his commitment to an immanent and internal causality.23 
The distinction between spirit and matter has its origin in the anterior concept of a 
transcendent God, for spirit can only be distinguished from matter because God and 
man, who is the image of God, is separate from nature. The opposition between spirit 
and matter is merely a faint echo of the theological opposition between God and his 
creatures. But, if the cause of being is internal to being itself, then there can be no 
absolute distinction in terms of being between a cause and its effect. Rather, the effect 
is immanent to the cause and thus, as Spinoza writes, “whatever is, is in God and 
nothing can be nor be conceived without God.” (PI5 El). God is nature and nature is 
God: Detts sive natura. In other words, infinite productive being is nature, or nature is 
infinite productivity. The immanence of God means that the only distinction that can 
be drawn out can no longer be that between the creator and its creatures. Here, 
Spinoza is against the whole theological tradition which cannot think of God, except as 
some kind of transcendence. But, any distinction must be drawn out from within nature
21 For a lengthy discussion on where to situate Spinoza's materialism see: A.Tosel, Du matiriatisme 
de Spinoza, (Paris: Kimd, 1994). pp. 128-132.
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itself. Nature would then be distinguished into production (natura naturata) and 
producibility (natura naturans):
by natura naturans we must understand that which is in itself and is 
conceived through itself that is , the attributes of substance that 
express eternal and infinite essence; or God insofar as he is 
considered as a free cause. By Natura naturata I understand all that 
follows from the necessity of God’s nature, that is from the necessity 
of each one of God’s attributes; or all the modes of God’s attributes 
insofar as they are considered things which are in God and can 
neither be nor be conceived without God. (sch.P29 El)
From all this it follows that God must be the immanent cause of all things and 
not the transitive cause: “God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things” 
(PI 8 El). Of course, this follows once one accepts the singularity of substance. For, 
the only causality that coheres with the notion of a single substance, is an immanent or 
efficient causality.24 Final causality, for example, implies a split between cause and 
effect which itself contradicts the univocal nature of being.25
24 For a long discussion of God as efficient causality see: Op. Cit., M.Gueroult. Spinoza. /  Dieu. 
pp.298-299.
25 Doctrine according to which there is a finality in the world that is superposed to efficient cuasality: 
Dictionnaire de la langue philosophique. (Paris: puf. 1992), p.716.
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1.5 Substance’s absolute productivity •
"that all things have been predetermined by God, 
not from his free will or absolute pleasure, 
but from the absolute nature o f  God, his infinite power.
Only God exists from the necessity of his nature, therefore the existence of 
anything else is dependent on an external cause, and this is itself dependent on an 
external cause, and so on. In the end, all these causes have their existence only 
because of the first cause. Again, it must be stressed that this causality is to be 
understood as an immanent causality. Thus, the first cause is not external to the other 
causes rather these causes have their existence in the first cause. In this manner we can 
say that everything has its being in God. In terms of Spinoza’s terminology individual 
things “are nothing but affections of the attributes of God, that is, modes wherein the 
attributes o f God find expression in a definite and determinate way.” (cor. P25 El) 
From this it follows that, nothing in existence can be contingent since everything 
depends upon the necessity of God’s nature. If something was contingent then it 
would not follow from God’s nature and this would mean that there was more than 
one substance which contradicts the univocity of being. Free will, therefore, even 
God’s free will, is an illusion of the human imagination. We must not confuse the 
infinity of God’s power with some form of capriciousness. Free will and the intellect, 
which have been considered as absolutes by other philosophers such as Descartes for 
example, must on the contrary be thought of as modes of the attribute of thought. The 
attribute of thought itself expresses the eternal and infinite essence of substance. Thus, 
God cannot be said to have created the world from an act of freedom, since this would
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be to confuse a mode with an essence. One way of thinking of this is that by implying 
that God acts from free will we insert a difference between nature and God. In other 
words, God could have created nature with a different final cause.
For Spinoza, on the contrary, nature is the expression of God, not distinct from 
God. Thus, nature follows from the necessity of God’s nature. Thus, what is 
produced by God in its infinity could not be otherwise than it is: “Things could not 
have been produced by God in any other way or in any other order than it is the case.” 
(P33 El). Since there is no distinction between God’s essence and the productivity of 
being, then God’s essence must be his very power, and whatever can be conceived 
within this infinite power must exist. It is important, as we will see in what follows, in 
the movement from the ontology of substance to politics, that in Spinoza’s system 
being is thought of in terms o f power, and that this power is understood in terms of an 
immanent causality. There is no vertical dimension within Spinoza’s thought rather 
being is to be understood as an infinite complexity, an infinite productivity without 
finality. This notion of being as singular, immanent, univocal and, above all, as 
productive, seems to us absolutely essential to understanding the later project of 
Deleuze and Guattari, and their elaboration of a productive desire in Anti-Oedipus and 
a “machinic assemblage” in Mille Plateaux.
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II. Epistemological Parallelism
Spinoza’s anti-Cartesianism extends not only to the critique of God as an 
extrinsic substance opposed to creation that consists of the two substances: mind, 
property of man alone, and substance extension, property of the universe in general. It 
also extends to this very opposition between the human species on the one hand (as a 
thinking thing), and the rest of the material universe. What is particularly striking is 
that the moment in which the philosophy of subjectivity is born in Cartesian 
metaphysics, although in the particular case of Descartes God still has a distinctive 
place, there emerges in Spinoza’s work, almost immediately, a critique of the centrality 
of the subject. This is the reason why in our own age which might be characterized as 
post-Subject, that is to say, where the Kantian and phenomenological paradigm in 
which the subject is the first starting point is increasingly being questioned, many have 
turned to Spinoza to help them elaborate this critique. We might characterise 
Spinoza’s thought, in the most forward manner, as the abolition of all transcendencies 
within metaphysics for the sake of a plane of immanence. One side of this process is 
the annihilation of the distance between the activity of God and the product of this 
activity, that is to say, it is the abolition o f any transcendence of being. In the case of 
Spinoza, this leads to a materialist ontology in which an immanent God is 
indistinguishable from Nature itself. The other side of this project is the abolition of 
the distance between the mind and the body. It is the abolition of the transcendence of 
the mind, or the soul, in relation to Nature whereby the subject occupies the position
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of the God of old. In this section of the first part, I wish to analyse the union of the 
mind to the body as it is explained and described in book II of the Ethics.
In Cartesian dualism the human being is conceived of as being made up of two 
absolutely distinct substances, mind and matter. Mind is conceived of as being whole, 
active, and free. Matter as being passive, and utterly determined by the mind. In this 
sense, the body of a human being is utterly inanimate until it is animated by the soul. 
The body is purely a mechanical apparatus. As everybody knows there are great 
problems with this model.26 If the mind and the body are absolutely distinct substances 
it is impossible to see how they could communicate, and Descartes tries to resolve this 
problem by the implausible recourse to the “pineal gland”.27
There are two ways in which Spinoza overcomes this dualism. One is through 
an ontological argument and the other through an epistemological argument. The 
ontological argument should already be familiar to us from the first section o f this part. 
Descartes’ problems arise because he views extension and thought as two different 
substances, rather than as attributes of one and the same substance. For Spinoza, there 
is only one substance that, as we have seen, is singular and indivisible. The body and 
the mind are merely modal existences of the attributes thought and extension that are 
only two attributes, the only ones human beings can perceive, of the infinite attributes 
of infinite substance. The human being is not an exceptional being in relation to the
26 The mind is defined as indivisible and the body as divisible. Thus, the first problem is to confuse 
these two orders since this would be to fall into error and the second would be to give absolute priority 
to one of the orders. See: M.Gueroult. Descartes selon t'ordre des raisons. 11, L'áme et te corps. 
(Paris: Aubier. 1968), p. 126. Spinoza’s critique of Descartes attacks this double problem.
2 Of course. Descartes’ problem is not only to demonstrate the union of the mind and the body but its 
substantial character. He does so in his Physics with the notion of the ‘pineal gland’. However, this 
new enquiry on human biology points to a different sort of truth that has nothing to do with the truth 
of geometry and physics, nor with pure understanding. It has to do with the clear and distinct aspect, 
or quality this organ can produce. Thus, to the enquiry concerning the truth of the understanding will 
follow an enquiry concerning the truth of lived experience. See: Ibid. pp. 123-156.
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universe, but is merely an element, or to use Spinoza’s language, a conjunction of two 
modes within an interrelated whole.
To say that the human being is merely one part of a whole is not to say that it is 
merely a material element within a material whole, for this would be to confuse 
substance with one of its attributes, namely, matter or extension. Thus, Spinoza, 
unlike some contemporary thinkers, does not solve Cartesian dualism by simply 
asserting that there are only material processes, that is to say, “brain activity”. Part II 
of the Ethics is concerned with the parallelism between the mind and the body and 
precisely not with their confusion, and it is this parallelism that we need to investigate.
The attributes thought and extension should be considered as two autonomous 
orders. This is because in Spinoza’s system one attribute cannot be used to explain 
another attribute. The sphere of extension forms an autonomous chain of cause and 
effect, and likewise the sphere of thought forms an autonomous chain of cause and 
effect: “when things have nothing in common, one cannot be the cause of the 
other.”(P3 El)). It is this parallelism which Descartes mistranlates as a dualism and 
thereby asserts the privilege of one order over the other, in other words, the capacity 
for the soul to determine the body. Spinoza, on the contrary, does not translate the 
independence of attributes into a transcendence. From the viewpoint of substance, the 
autonomous series of causes and effects of extension, and the autonomous series of 
cause and effect o f thought, are expressions of the same substance. Thus, thought and 
extension are equal: “The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and 
connection of things.” (P7 Eli). Everything depends on how we interpret “same as” in 
the above quotation. Thought and extension are the same substance perceived under 
different attributes. In the same way a mode of extension, that is to say a body, and a 
mode of thought, that is to say an idea, are one and the same thing but merely
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expressed in two different ways. Here Spinoza is combating the philosophical view 
that ideas belong to a different sphere of being than objects, or vice versa. Ideas and 
objects are merely the modes in which the attributes express themselves in expressing 
one and the same substance. An idea of a table is not different from a table, in the 
sense o f an ontological difference rather the difference is immanent to being in the 
ways that being can be expressed. Spinoza explains this by saying that in God, God’s 
intellect and the objects of that intellect, are identical. Thus, the circle which exists as 
an object and the idea of that circle are the same thing merely expressed through 
different attributes: “a circle existing in nature and the idea of the existing circle -which 
is also in God- are one and the same thing, explicating the different attributes.” (sch.Vl 
Ell). This equality of the order of things and the order of ideas should not be confused 
with a unity. Spinoza is not arguing that the body is the mind, or the mind is the body, 
for this would be to confuse attributes with substances. Rather, the body is a 
completely different expression of substance just as the mind is. This is anti-Cartesian 
because on the one hand the body is seen as being independent of the mind, and at the 
same time it is also equal to the mind. The independence rests upon the autonomy of 
attributes and their equality upon the univocity of being.
Until now we have only been discussing the mind and body from the viewpoint 
of the attributes of extension and thought. This only makes sense of the ontological 
parallelism but does not quite explain epistemological parallelism. What we must 
realise is that part II of the Ethics concerns essentially the definition o f the human 
mind. It is here that the epistemological parallelism is significant.28 What is the human 
mind? The human mind contains ideas of things: “that which constitutes the actual
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being o f the human mind is basically nothing else but the idea of an individual actually 
existing thing.” (P ll Eli). The parallelism occurs because Spinoza argues that if 
anything changes in the object of the idea then the idea will also change. In other 
words, any changes that occur in the body, modes of extension, also change the idea of 
that body: “whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the human mind is 
bound to be perceived by the human mind.” (P12 Eli). The parallelism between the 
object and the idea of the object is therefore mediated by the mind. Or, if one prefers, 
the conjunction between the object and the idea is actualised in the human mind.29 
Thus, for Spinoza, the union of the mind and body exist to the extent in which the 
body is an object of the human mind: “man consists of mind and body, and the human 
body exists according as we sense it.” (cor. P13 Eli). If the human mind is nothing but 
the body as object of that mind, then for Spinoza the only way to understand the mind 
is to understand its object. In other words, to understand the mind one must 
understand the body, and the more one understands the body, the more one 
understands the mind. This is quite opposite to Descartes who argues that 
understanding is only possible through the clear and distinct ideas of the mind, and that 
the body is only a source of untruth and falsity. For Spinoza, on the other hand, there 
is a parallelism between the complexity of the body and the excellence of the human 
mind: “I will make this general assertion that in proportion as a body is more apt than 
other bodies to act or be acted upon simultaneously in many different ways, so is its 
mind more apt than other minds to perceive many things simultaneously.” (sch.P13 
Eli). This is why for Spinoza the study of the human mind requires a physics of the
28 Deleuze will argue that this epistemological parallelism is secondary in relation to the ontological 
parallelism. See G.Deleuze, Spinoza et te problème de l ’expression. (Paris : Minuit, 1968), pp. 99- 
113. We shall discuss this later in the second part of this chapter.
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body .30 This physics of the body essentially understands it in terms of motion, rest and 
speed, in which individual things are made up of different bodies having causal 
relationships between them. Thus, Spinoza defines the human body as “composed of 
very many individual parts of different natures, each of which is extremely complex ” 
(post. 1 Eli).
Spinoza, however, does not just think that the human mind is composed of 
complex ideas whose objects are themselves complex, in this case the complexity of 
the human body and its relations to other bodies. He believes that ideas do not only 
have actually existing things as their object, but that an idea can have another idea as 
its object. This means that the mind can have itself as an idea. Spinoza argues that 
there exists the same parallelism between the idea of the mind and the mind itself, as 
there exists between the mind and the body: “the idea of the mind is united to the mind 
in the same way as the mind is united to the body.” (P21 Eli). The proof for the 
parallelism between the mind and the body is that the body is the object of the mind, 
the mind being the mediating term. In the same way, Spinoza argues that the idea of 
the mind must also be united to its object, which in this case is the mind itself. Any 
dualism is avoided by arguing that the idea of the body and the body itself do not 
belong to different spheres of being in the same way as the idea of the mind and the 
mind itself do not belong to different spheres of being. Thus, for Spinoza there are not 
three kinds of reality such as thing, idea and self-consciousness, but one and the same 
reality which is merely expressed in different ways. Thus, the thing is merely the 
expression of substance through the attribute of extension, and the idea, substance
29 For a long discussion of mind or consciousness in Spinoza see chapter V on the essence of man in: 
M.Gueroult, Spinoza II -  L ’âme, (Paris: Aubier, 1974). For his analysis of P12 as necessirily linked to 
P36 of El. see in the same book: Ibid., pp. 131-32.
30 For an interesting interpretation of Spinoza's physics in the context of feminist reading see: Moira 
Gatens, Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality, (New York: Routledge. 1996).
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expressed through the attribute thought. In the case of the idea of the mind, the 
parallelism is slightly different, in that both the idea and the idea of the mind are 
expressed through the same attribute thought: “the idea of the mind and the mind itself 
are one and the same thing, conceived under one and the same attribute, namely 
thought.” (sch.P21 Eli).
Corresponding to these two relations, the relation between the idea to the 
object, and the idea to the idea, there are two kinds of knowledge. The first type of 
knowledge is the mind’s perception of the body: “the mind does not know itself except 
insofar as it perceives ideas o f affections of the body.” (P23 Eli). This knowledge, 
Spinoza argues, does not involve adequate knowledge, and thus, is only a confused 
and distorted idea of the body: “I say expressly that the mind does not have an 
adequate knowledge, but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge o f itself, its own 
body, and external bodies.” (sch.P29 Eli). The problem, then, for Spinoza, is how we 
move from inadequate to adequate knowledge, the latter being the second type of 
knowledge.
Like Descartes, Spinoza does not have a correspondence theory of truth but 
sees truth as adequation, that is to say in terms of clarity. The difference between 
Spinoza and Descartes, is that Descartes’ concept of the “clear and distinct” is merely 
a representation of ideas, whereas for Spinoza to know something is to know its cause, 
and therefore, adequate knowledge is knowledge of the cause of ideas. To know 
something is to know what causes our ideas, which goes back to our power to think. 
To have an adequate idea is to know the links of causes and effects that produce that 
idea. A confused idea is merely an idea that is ignorant of its causes: “when we gaze at 
the sun, we see it as some two hundred feet distance from us. The error does not 
consist in simply seeing the sun in this way but in the fact that, while we do so, we are
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not aware of the true distance and the cause of our seeing it so.” (scA.P34 Eli). The 
error here is not a failure of an idea to correspond to an exterior thing, which will be a 
correspondence theory of truth, but the failure to recognise the true cause of an 
adequate idea of the distance. This cause itself is an idea. We must underline again 
the fact that the order of ideas is autonomous for Spinoza. A correspondence theory 
of truth, and all the problems involved in that theory is dependent upon a dualist 
metaphysics. Spinoza’s specific stance is to ask the question of how can this 
autonomous reading become an adequate form of knowledge? This relates to the 
ability and power each of us has to think. How to produce adequate ideas, therefore, 
becomes an ethical question. How does one increase one’s power to think?
Due to the ontological parallelism we have already discussed we realise that the 
power to think is dependent on relations between bodies. The power of the human 
mind is in proportion to the complexity of the relations in which a body finds itself: 
“the human mind is capable of perceiving a great many things, and this capacity will 
vary in proportion to the variety of states which its body can assume.” (PI4 Eli). 
Thus, for Spinoza, there is a direct correlation between the power to think and the 
power to act. In this manner, the ontological and epistemological problems of dualism 
and their overcoming in a radical immanence directly flow into the question of bodies 
which is the topic of the third part of the Ethics. This question is as much a political 
question as an ontological one and thus it should not surprise us that Spinoza turns to 
writing the Theological-Political Treatise before he goes to finish the Ethics.
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III. The Power of Bodies
One of the best ways to understand Spinoza’s thought is by seeing its 
opposition to Cartesian metaphysics. This is because Cartesian metaphysics exhibits a 
double dualism, where it posits two kinds of transcendence. The first kind of 
transcendence, which is sometimes lost in the interpretation of Descartes because of 
the mistaken belief that he has broken with any theological prejudices, is the absolute 
separation between God and his creation. One should not forget that Descartes’ 
project of subjective constitution of objective being is completely dependent on the 
transcendence of God’s essence, in other words, his infinite being, which is opposed to 
man’s finite being. Spinoza, on the other hand, places man, as any other mode of 
Nature, within infinite being. The second kind of transcendence, which is present in 
Descartes’ metaphysics, is the split between man’s being and the rest of material nature 
including his own body. This split corresponds to Descartes’ division between the 
substances of extension and thought. Thus, in reality, for Descartes, there are three 
kinds of substance: God, thought and extension. Spinoza argues that extension and 
thought are not independent substances but attributes o f substance, and that they are 
only two of the infinite attributes of substance, since perfection, that is to say God, 
knows no limits. Descartes’ division between extension and thought rests upon this 
theological prejudice: that man has a special place as the image of God within Nature. 
Or, as Spinoza puts it in the preface to book III of the Ethics, “they appear to go so far 
as to consider man in Nature as a kingdom within a kingdom.”
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This “apartness” of man is given an ethical slant by Descartes in his theory of 
the passions. Since the soul is seen as being outside of Nature and, thus, as higher to 
Nature, the passions of the body are seen as being under its control. Emotions are 
therefore only seen as something negative, or as a lack within being as such.31 For 
Spinoza, on the contrary, man is a mode of the attributes thought and extension that 
express one and the same substance, which is God or Nature. Thus, man is not 
different from other modes essentially but only in matter of degree.
Nature is to be seen in terms of God’s power. Thus, every individual thing is 
to be interpreted as an expression of this power. Every individual thing has power to 
the extent in which it preserves its own being. Spinoza calls this self-preservation 
conatus. With respect to every individual thing, including the human individual, 
conatus belongs to the body’s power to act: “each thing, insofar as it is in itself, 
endeavours to persist in its own being” (P6 EIII). A being is nothing else but this 
persistence: “the conatus with which each thing endeavours to persist in its own being 
is nothing but the actual existence of the thing itself’ (P7 EIII). What is important to 
underline in Spinoza’s account, is that this persistence is not to be understood in terms 
of a rational mind which is abstracted from Nature itself. The power to act is as much 
an expression of what the body can do as what the mind can think: “nobody as yet has 
determined all the body’s capabilities: that is, nobody as yet has learned from 
experience what the body can and cannot do.” (sch. P2 EIII). Thus, what Spinoza is 
interested in book III of the Ethics is the analysis of the body’s power to act. What 
power to act means here, in terms of the body, is not spontaneity but the ability of the 
body to be affected. To be affected in such a way as to increase its power or to be 
affected in such a way as to decrease its power. Of course, the parallelism which is
31 See: R.Descartes. Les passions de l 'âme. Première partie, (Paris: puf, 1988), Art. 17 onwards.
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instituted in part II of the Ethics means that, to the extent that the body’s power to act 
is decreased or increased so too the mind’s power to think is decreased or increased: 
“whatsoever increases or diminishes, assists or checks, the power of activity of a body, 
the idea of the said thing increases or diminishes, assists or checks the power of 
thought of our mind.” (P li EIII). The existence of affects in our mind are called 
affections by Spinoza. There are two kinds of affections: passive and active affections. 
Passive affections have their cause externally. To the extent in which a passive 
affection leads to a greater state of perfection, then, it belongs to the emotions of 
pleasure, and to the extent to which it leads to a lesser state of perfection, then, it 
belongs to the emotions of pain. Perfection means, here, reality. That which has 
greater degrees of reality has greater degrees of perfection.32 Reality is the power to 
exist, which he calls the power to act. Painful passive affections thus decrease my 
power to act whereas cheerful or pleasurable passive affections increase my power to 
act.33
Spinoza is very realistic concerning the possibilities of pain or sadness, or joy 
or pleasure for a human life. This is because the body cannot be seen as being a 
sovereign element in relation to other bodies. Rather, the affections of a body decrease 
and increase in relation to other bodies that are the result of fortuitous encounters. 
This means that we are more subject to passive emotions than active ones: “man is 
necessarily always subject to passive relations in that he follows the common order of 
Nature and obeys it and accommodates himself to it as far as the nature of things 
demands.” {cor.P4 EIV). From this, it follows that, to preserve our own being we 
must actively seek passive joyful affections. This leads Spinoza to a redefinition, in
i: “By reality and perfection I mean the same thing.”, (Def.6 Eli).
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book IV of the Ethics, o f  ethical language What is “good” is that which is useful in 
increasing my power to act. What is “bad” is that which acts against my power to act 
Thus, virtue is a human power based on the knowledge of “good” and “evil”, which is 
knowledge of the laws o f nature. As it pertains to human affections to seek one’s own 
preservation, that is, to increase one’s power to act: “no virtue can be conceived as 
prior to this one, namely, the conatus to preserve oneself.” (P22 EIV). To understand 
this as egotism is to completely misunderstand Spinoza’s ontology and the centrality of 
the body to his ethics. Only if one grasps man as a subject who stands apart from 
others and from Nature itself, could one understand conatus as egoism.3 4 For Spinoza, 
on the contrary, the being of an individual must be understood primarily as a body, and 
the body only exists in relation to other bodies. Thus, I can only seek actively my own 
increase of power to act in my relation with other bodies. It is here that we can see the 
transition from Spinoza’s ethics to his politics: “whatever is conducive to man’s social 
organisation or causes men to live in harmony is advantageous, while those things that 
introduce discord into the State are bad ” (P40 EIV). We might describe active 
affections, therefore, as opposed to passive ones, as the striving for an organisation of 
our emotional life in terms of reason which promotes this harmony and thus our own 
power to act. This striving for organisation, this activity, is identified with reason. 
Thus, reason must be understood as the replacement of an external order or as being 
caused by an internal one. That is, through reason we become the adequate cause of 
our actions 35 Thus, the only difference between a joyful passive affection and a
33 For an interesting discussion on the variability of power see B.Massumi’s work on effects in 
Deteuze: A Critical Reader, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp.217-239.
34 For an analysis of different theories of egoism such as 'biological egoism’, rational utalitarianism 
and intellectualism in contradistinction to Spinoza's position see: A.Matheron, Individu et 
communauté chez Spinoza, (Paris: Minuit, 1988), pp.241-284.
35 For a discussion of the deployment of a reasonable life at the level of the individual and the inter- 
individual and the power (puissance) of reason in Spinoza see: Ibid., pp. 517-542, 543-570.
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painful passive affection is that the former, comes into existence from an external cause 
and the latter, from an internal cause. This difference between externality and 
internality is the movement from the analysis of bodies to a practice, that is to say, 
from an analysis o f how a body is joyful to a question of how am I to make myself 
more joyful. Thus, reason becomes constituted and this is what is analysed in book V 
of the Ethics.
The practical project of book V of the Ethics could be said to be how does one 
cure oneself of passive emotions that produce a decrease in one’s power to act?36 To 
do so, Spinoza argues, we must separate ourselves from the external cause of our 
emotion This emotion ceases to be passive as soon as we, through the very separation 
from the cause itself, gain a clear and distinct idea of it: “a passive emotion ceases to 
be a passive emotion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it” (P3 EV). This 
is because as soon as we have a clear idea of our emotion we have some control over it 
and therefore we cease to be passive in relation to it. Now, for Spinoza, this 
translation of passivity into activity is an ability to organise one’s life such that one is 
not attacked by emotions that are contrary to our nature. It is only by avoiding those 
affections which are contrary to our nature that we can organise and associate our 
affections in relation to the order of the intellect rather than the passive affections of 
the body: “as long as we are not assailed by emotions which are contrary to our nature, 
we have the power to arrange and associate affections of the body according to the 
order of the intellect.” (P10 EV). The abilities for the mind to organise and control
36 Here, it is interesting to note the evolution of the idea of “cure” in Spinoza’s work. In his earlier 
Treatise on the Emendation o f the Intellect, the “cure” refers to the intellect in such a way as to allow 
for a form of epistemological reading of being, whereas in his later Ethics there is a move away from 
any possible intellcctualist reading of being. Now the "cure” testifies to the perfect parallelism of 
mind and body. The "cure” is located within emotions, that is the union of mind and body, and our 
power to act. What is most important is not so much what we can think but what we can do from what 
we think.
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emotions exist for Spinoza in five levels: firstly, in the mind’s knowledge of the 
emotions, secondly, in detaching emotions from their external cause, thirdly, 
temporally in that affections that we understand are superior to those which we 
conceive in a confused manner, fourthly, in the knowledge of the causes whereby 
affections can be related to our understanding of nature, and lastly, in that the mind can 
organise affections (sch. P20 EV). From this it can be seen that one can only achieve 
control over passive affections through adequate knowledge of one’s nature and since 
one’s nature is part of Nature as a whole, then, by adequate knowledge of God. Thus, 
Spinoza can say that the highest virtue, that is to say the greatest manner in which one 
can preserve one’s being, is knowledge of God: “the highest conatus of the mind and 
its highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.” (P29 EV). 
In the proof of this proposition we can see that this third type of knowledge proceeds 
from the idea of God to knowledge of the essence of things: “the third kind of 
knowledge proceeds from the adequate idea of certain of God’s attributes to the 
adequate knowledge of the essence of things, and the more we understand things in 
this way the more we understand God. Again, we want to underline that this third 
type of knowledge should not be understood as something spiritual or other worldly, 
and above all, not as the expression of the mind floating above reality. The mind’s 
capacity to think is directly parallel to the body’s capacity to act: “he whose body is 
capable of the greatest amount of activity has a mind whose greatest part is eternal.” 
(P39 EV). And, once more, proposition 40: “the more perfection a thing has the more 
active and less passive it is, conversely, the more active it is the more perfect it is”.
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IV. The Absolute State: DEMOCRACY
We would like to think of Spinoza’s work from the Ethics to the Political 
Treatise as a movement from ontology to ethics and then finally to the political. This 
does not mean that each of these elements should be seen as separate parts such that 
the ethics, as is the case in Kant for example, were opposed to the theoretical or 
ontological. Or indeed, such that the political was to be seen as a compromise of the 
purity of ethical reasoning. It is quite the contrary in Spinoza’s case, for both the 
ethical and the political are not the rejection of ontology but have their bases on it. It 
is precisely for this reason that Spinoza is of such importance to contemporary thinkers 
in their attempts to think beyond the impasse of either liberal or Marxist thought.37 
The success of political theory today is its ability to ground itself in a secure ontology. 
It seems to us that the only work that even approaches this success is that of Deleuze 
and Guattari, and this is perhaps precisely because Deleuze’s own philosophical 
position has its foundation in an intimate knowledge of Spinoza’s philosophical œuvre.
However, a certain retiscence is here required because although the relation 
between the ethical and the ontological in Spinoza is fully fleshed out in parts III to V 
of the Ethics, it is certainly not the case with the passage from ethics itself to the 
political This is no doubt the case because the treatise on politics itself was unfinished 
at the time of Spinoza’s death. Thus, to a certain extent we have to reconstruct 
Spinoza’s politics from his writings In addition, it is also important to stress how
,7 Despite the importance of their connection to Marx, philosophers such as Balibar. Macherey. 
Matheron. Tosel. Deleuze, Negri and Montag are some of those that have looked in Spinoza for a way 
out of liberalism and marxist orthodoxy. Most of these thinkers discover already in Spinoza's position 
the elements of a critique of liberalism. See: W.Montag. Bodies, Masses, Power, (London and New
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Spinoza was writing in a time of great political uncertainty and violence, and thus 
under censorship. For these reasons, it is necessary to read between the lines o f his 
work to get, perhaps, at their ultimate meaning.38
Thus, for example, it might appear at a first reading that the aim of the TP is a 
defence of the absolute power of monarchies, but we would like to suggest that, like 
the TTP, it is actually a defence of democracy as the most rational form of 
government. Unfortunately, the chapter on the democratic State is at the very end of 
the TP, which remains unfinished. However, a clue to its importance is given to us by 
its first sentence: “I pass now to the third State, which is absolute State and which we 
call democratic.” (§1 ch. 11). The word to underline here is the word absolute. Of 
course the only other absolute in Spinoza’s system is substance itself. Adhering to 
Spinoza’s rigorous univocal sense of being, this would mean that only the democratic 
State would be an expression of substance. But we can also see why this is the case if 
we start with one of the modes of substance which is the individual human being. 
Each individual, as we have seen from the reading of the Ethics, is the expression of 
the power of Nature, thus, human nature is not different from any other being in its 
desire to augment its power to exist. Spinoza translates this into the language of 
natural rights in chapter II of the TP by arguing that every individual, no matter what 
powers it has, has the right to exist, existing meaning here, according to their own 
affects and affections:
York: Verso. 1999), p 64. For a detailed discussion of the position of all these thinkers in reference to 
this question see in the same book the whole of the third chapter: Ibid., pp.62-89.
38 The work of Spinoza was badly received by his community and this lead to his excommunication. 
This climate of repression from his Jewish community and the complex political situation of Holland 
at the time can be regarded as two important factors that Spinoza himself had to take into account in 
his writings. It must not be forgotten that not only was he excommunicated which meant no one was 
allowed to speak or even be in his presence, but also there was even an attempt to murder him. For a 
description of this event sec his biography by S.Nadler. Spinoza a life, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 1999). For the more interesting discussion on the measures taken in order to avoid
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by natural right, therefore, I understand the very laws or rules of 
Nature by which everything happens, that is to say the great power 
of Nature. From that it follows, that the natural rights of Nature as a 
whole, and consequently of each individual, extends as far as its 
power and therefore everything a man does following the laws of his 
own nature he does so by virtue of a right of sovereign nature, and 
he has upon Nature as much right as he has power. ( §4 ch.2)
The question then becomes which form of social organisation has as its 
ultimate aim the polentia or power of each individual? For Spinoza this would be a 
State guided by reason. The only difference between the state of society and the state 
of Nature is that, in the latter man is ruled by the affections of hope and fear, whereas 
in the former, life is ruled in common for the security of all. Only that State which is 
contrary to reason undermines the freedom of each man, whereas, on the contrary, a 
State that is ruled by reason is more free:
the more a man lives under the guide of reason, the more he is free, 
the more often he observes the laws of the City and will conform to 
the injunctions of the sovereign of which he is the subject. To that I 
add that the civil State is instituted naturally so as to put to an end 
common fear and doing away with common miseries, and thus it 
follows it aims at the goal that all men live under the guide of reason.
(§6 ch.3)
repression in relation to the marranism of Spinoza, see: I.S.Rcvah, Des Marranes à Spinoza. (Paris: 
Vrin, 1995).
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Of course, the problem is what is sovereign in a State. Spinoza describes three 
possible States in the TP. monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. Some clue to the 
answer to this question is given in chapter five. There he argues that the purpose or 
function of the State is nothing other than the peace and security of life, and that it 
follows from this, that the best government is that one in which men pass their lives in 
harmony. In terms of the Ethics we wish to interpret this harmony in terms of active 
affections. From the viewpoint of the 777*, active affections, in other words, those 
affections which increase the power o f the individual, are inseparable from freedom 
and from the democratic State that makes this freedom possible. Why this might be 
the case, though again we must underline that this cannot be found in Spinoza’s 
writings, is that the political organisation of democracy is the only organisation, in 
comparison to monarchy or aristocracy, which coincides with the immanence of 
substance. Thus, if we are correct in saying that there is a parallelism between 
Spinoza’s ontological and political theory, only the democratic State could be the 
absolute State. This is so because only the democratic State would be purely 
immanent In this purely immanent State (democracy), each individual would be an 
expression of the power common to all in the same way that each individual, from the 
viewpoint of ethics, is an expression o f absolute immanent power. It seems, despite 
Spinoza’s apparent defence of monarchy in the TP, that the only plausible outcome of 
his basing natural rights on potentia, is the democratic State. As we shall see in the 
second part of this chapter this coincides with Toni Negri’s reading of Spinoza’s 
philosophy, which introduces an important element into the interpretation of Deleuze’s 
question of what practice the Ethics offers us. Moreover, that movement from the 
ontological to the political will be a decisive tool in the interpretation of the political
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Chapter II
Reading Deleuze & Negri 
through Spinoza’s Parallelism
Deleuze’s and Guattari’s political thought is not just a new kind of Marxism, 
or better a new kind of marxist Hegelianism, but one that breaks out of the inertia of 
Marxist theory itself. It does so by turning towards a thinker whose revolutionary 
thought was perhaps misunderstood by both Hegel and Marx. This thinker is Spinoza. 
Spinoza is behind both L 'Anti-Oedipe and Mille Plateaux. Thus, the project of this 
thesis is not simply comparing or contrasting these two works as though they were 
two distinct objects, but actually following the thread that weaves them together. This 
thread is a productionist ontology which has its foundation in a materialism whose 
rigorous formulation was first executed in Spinoza’s work. This thesis is in agreement 
with Negri when he remarks that there is a crisis in Marxist thought today and this 
crisis does not require a return to Hegel, as many seem to think, but to Spinoza.1
This question of the relation between Deleuze’s and Guattari’s political theory 
and Spinoza will be approached through an examination o f Deleuze’s writings on 
Spinoza both, prior to his work with Guattari, and after. In addition, the work of Negri 
on Spinoza will also be important. Negri’s work complements Deleuze’s in two
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important ways: first of all they are both interested in Spinoza in terms of his 
materialist ontology, and secondly, there is a different emphasis in their work, a 
difference that can help us to see the particular singularity of Deleuze’s approach to 
Spinoza. It is as though Negri is a catalyst that can produce in Deleuze’s work its full 
completion and importance. What is at the centre of this relation between Negri and 
Deleuze, their similarity and difference, is a ‘parallelism’ between the ontological and 
the political. This is of fundamental importance to the understanding of political 
theory. There can be no rigorous political theory that is not founded in an ontological 
order. This has its basis in Spinoza’s depiction of the relation between ontology and 
politics. Spinoza’s politics is inconceivable without his ontology. In the field of 
politics as much as in the field of ontology it is always a matter of the auto-production 
of the Real and it is on this basis that one may talk of a radical materialism in 
Spinoza.
Deleuze and Negri’s interpretation of Spinoza, both of whom are involved in 
the construction of an ever more rigorous materialism, place the emphasis on a 
‘parallelism’ of the ontological and the political. Parallelism is the strategy whereby 
Spinoza, according to Deleuze and Negri, inextricably links ontology to politics and it 
is precisely this angle they both take that most distinguishes them from more 
traditional interpretations of Spinoza. These other readings place his political writings 
within liberal theory, specially the social contract tradition.1 2
However, as it has already been indicated, although Deleuze and Negri share 
this common interpretation of Spinoza, they each approach Spinoza in a different
1 Antonio Negri, Spinoza subversif (Paris : Kimc, 1994), p. 131.
2 As has already been pointed out in the previous chapter, the work of Leo Strauss is one of the most 
illustrious exponents of Spinoza's supposed liberalism. See: L.Strauss, Spinoza's Critique o f Religion, 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press. 1997). Negri emphasises forcibly that it is a complete 
misunderstanding of Spinoza to read his politics through the model of the social contract. See : Op.Cit. 
Spinoza subversif pp. 41-44.
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manner. And it is here that a return back to Hegel and Marx is necessary. Negri’s 
reading of Spinoza, not unsurprisingly considering his history of political 
commitments, still has a flavour of Hegel and Marx.3 This is despite the fact that 
Negri will argue that Spinoza cannot be understood through dialectics. This 
Hegelianism or Marxism returns in Negri’s elaboration of political praxis from out of 
Spinoza’s concept of absolute democracy.4 Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza has none of 
these Marxist or Hegelian overtones, and it is for this very reason that one can discern 
within L Anti-Oedipe a Spinozist imprint which works against a very Hegelian- 
Marxist horizon.
Another way of thinking about this difference is starting from the parallelism 
between the ontological and the political as such. One might therefore characterise 
Negri’s approach as a direct and clear translation or conversion of Spinoza’s 
ontological concepts into a current debate about what is meant by the concepts of 
democracy and liberation. This does not mean, of course, that thereby he ignores the 
ontological content of Spinoza’s work, since this would deny the very parallelism that 
is as much a part of his approach to Spinoza’s as Deleuze’s is. Rather, it is better here 
to speak of a matter of emphasis, or perhaps even of an ‘exaggeration’, of the political 
where the unity of the political and the ontological is read from the side of the 
political as such. The ontological is political because politics is the construction of the
3 Negri wrote his PhD thesis on Hegel. Also he is one of the theoreticians of the italian “operaismo” in 
the 60’s and later in the 70’s of “autonomia operaia”. His name has been associated to the kidnapping 
and murder of the italian ex-president Aldo Moro through the activity of “the Red Brigades". His 
militancy, whether it implicates him in real terms to the activities he has been charged with or not. has 
taken him to prison more than once.
4 This can be anested in the following sentence : ‘Spinoza refuse en outre la dintinction société civile- 
Etat. cette autre fiction au service de l’idéologie du rapport de production.’ A.Negri, L'anomalie 
sauvage, (Paris : puf. 1982), p. 228.
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ontological: being is social being. Thus, for Negri, in Spinoza’s naturalist philosophy 
of substance spirit is nothing but the social body in its political auto-organisation.5
If Negri’s angle can be characterised as an emphasis of the political, then in 
turn, Deleuze’s might be characterised as the emphasis of the ontological. Deleuze’s 
interpretation of Spinoza concentrates on the latter’s fundamental overcoming of any 
theological or idealistic residue within philosophical thought. In other words, the 
denial of any appeal to transcendence in the explanation of the real. However, just as 
Negri’s counterpart, it would be wrong to suggest that the ontological reading of 
Spinoza’s work ignores its political consequences, for this would be to break with the 
parallelism of the ontological and the political which is common to both Deleuze and 
Negri’s reading of Spinoza. Their difference lies, then, in their approach to the 
problem and not in the content that is developed in both cases. However, one needs to 
be careful not to think that the two approaches merely cancel one another out, so that 
what is lacking in Negri is completed by Deleuze, or vice versa. This would be much 
too simple.
Paradoxically, it is perhaps Deleuze’s ontological emphasis that can better 
help us understand the political theory of L 'Anti-Oedipe and Mille Plateaux instead of 
Negri’s political reading of Spinoza. I shall address some comments on this idea at the 
end of this chapter. For the moment, it might be useful to suggest what could be said 
to be the weakness of both approaches. It could be argued, for example, that Negri’s 
political reading of Spinoza tends to straight jacket the ontological concepts of 
Spinoza’s thought within traditional concepts of praxis which Spinoza’s materialism 
might make us think of as redundant. Negri, for all his commitment to a materialist
5 For an excellent discussion of this see Laurent Bove, La stratégie du conatus, ( Paris : Vrin, 1996 ), 
especially chapters I and IX. His thesis focuses on the question of conatus through a particularly strong 
reading of the causa sui in Spinoza that is very much inspired on Negri’s own interpretation.
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ontology remains strongly attached to a humanist tradition.6 On the other hand, it 
might perhaps be argued, that Deleuze’s emphasis on Spinoza’s ontology make it 
difficult to conceive how one moves from philosophical concepts to political activity. 
This, of course, is a problem that is just as pressing for a reading of L 'Anti-Oedipe and 
Mille Plateaux. Does a materialist ontology lead to passive nihilism? There are 
important temptations to avoid here. Ones that might result in a reading of their work 
in terms of a mechanicism that would be closer to French materialism than to 
Spinoza’s 7 The question is whether Deleuze’s idea of active joy can be thought of 
within political organisations or even as revolutionary praxis. It might appear that 
Deleuze’s work can be interpreted as a self-overcoming which has accidental relations 
to others only.8 All these criticisms, however, need to be thought and tested as to their 
validity through a sustained reading and interpretation of Deleuze’s own philosophical 
work and in his collaboration with Guattari.
6 See for example the importance and place of Humanism in his latest publication with M.Hardt. There 
is a chapter that draws the distinction between two modernities. This leads them to postulate a positive 
account of Renaissance as part of their political agenda. In this spirit they declare both Spinoza and 
Foucault (and one may wonder if Deleuze and Guattari may find their place here as well) as some kind 
of renaissance figures in the sense of a ‘Humanism after the death of Man' as their title of the last 
section announces. A.Negri and M.Hardt. Empire, (London and Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2000), pp. 69-92 but especially pp.91-92.
A mechanicism such as Diderot’s. La Mettrie and D’holbac has little to do with Spinoza’s system.
8 This is the line Rorty takes with regards to Deleuze’s work.
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I. NEGRI : a politics of the m ultitudo
In Spinoza subversif, Negri speaks of two planes in Spinoza’s work: 
the metaphysical and the political.9 These two planes, however, should not be seen as 
opposite to one another, or as different disciplines within a philosophical project, as 
though, like Aristotle one first began with one’s metaphysics having a completely 
different order from an ethics that then comes to complete the project. On the 
contrary, in Spinoza’s work, as has already been underlined, there is a direct parallel 
between the metaphysical or ontological order, on the one hand, and the political on 
the other. The first form of this parallelism, however, is postulated by Spinoza in his 
famous Proposition 7 of the second book of the Ethics, ‘the order and connection of 
ideas is the same as the order and connection o f things.’10 This deceptively simple 
form in which Spinoza establishes the principle o f  parallelism opens the way to the 
larger parallelism of the ontological and the political, as both Deleuze and Negri 
agree.
One can approach this parallelism in two different ways: either one 
approaches it through the political order, so that one understands Spinoza’s absolute 
being as political being, or one approaches it from the ontological order, so that one 
understands the political as immediately ontological. As has been noted, these two 
angles reflect the two different ways in which Deleuze and Negri approach Spinoza’s 
work. The first political, and the second ontological, but both expressing the
9 Op.Cit. Spinoza subversif, p. 24.
10 B. Spinoza, Ethics, Part II, Pr 7, (Minneapolis : Hackett, 1992), p. 66.
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parallelism between the ontological and the political that marks the originality of 
Spinoza’s thought.
O m nino absolu tum  dem ocraticum  im perium
There is one sentence of Spinoza that is the fulcrum of Negri’s interpretation: 
omnino absolutum democraticum imperium.11 This sentence can be split into two 
halves which correspond to the two planes of Spinoza’s work: the metaphysical or 
ontological, and the political. The first half of the sentence, omnino absolutum, 
corresponds to the ontological or metaphysical order, and the second part of the 
sentence, democraticum imperium, to the political order. First of all, let us say a few 
words about the metaphysical part of the sentence. There will be, of course, more to 
be said about this subject when the discussion will centre on the work of Deleuze.
Spinoza’s thought, is a theory of being. Being here is understood as univocal. 
There is no split, unlike in the history of Western thought between a region of 
immanence and one of transcendence or between the real and the ideal. Being is a 
continuum, or as Spinoza would say, everything is either a mode or an attribute of 
God. Despite this identification of being with God, Spinoza’s thought is resolutely 
anti-theological. Words like God, or substance, or the absolute, as Spinoza himself 
writes, are merely contingent expressions of being. Beyond the words Spinoza uses, 
what matters above all, is his interpretation of being as univocal and immanent. There 1
11 The whole of Chapter III centres on the development of this strategy of interpretation of Spinoza’s 
politics but it is more precisely set up on p. 47.
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is only one substance and everything is an attribute or a mode of it. In this way,
Spinoza’s ontology stands in opposition to traditional ontology:
Spinozist ontology is an absolute violation of the ontological 
tradition [. . .] Spinoza affirms being as foundation [. . .] but the 
foundation is conceived as surface [...] the surface appears as 
determined being, but the determination is practical, it is the 
consolidation of the crossings and shifts of the forces that we 
experience on the physical and historical terrain.12
If God is the word Spinoza uses for being, what is Negri’s ? For Negri 
being is social being. The absolute is the ‘collective singularity.’13 As will be seen, 
this understanding of being, which is perhaps more visible in Negri’s book the Savage 
Anomaly, is at the heart of his political reading of Spinoza’s ontology. From the 
beginning Negri understands Spinoza’s substance through political praxis and not 
political praxis through substance. The identity of substance and political praxis is 
from the side of political praxis itself. For Negri, the only possibility of a politics free 
from ideology must be its support by a strong ontology. To read Spinoza today is 
precisely to supply this rigorous ontological base to a politics that is committed to 
liberation. This means a complete reformulation of the concept of democracy such 
that it is no longer understood through its usual juridical and legalist definition, and 
which is returned to an ontological definition that adequately expresses the social 
being of the collective singularity. This return to an ontological definition of 
democracy has its condition, for Negri, in history. It is only the process of 
socialisation produced by capitalism that leads to crisis in democracy, and so to a 
possible return to real democracy. What is meant by real democracy here is a
12 My translational Op.Cit. Spinoza subversif, p. 132. Further. Negri argues elsewhere that it is 
Spinoza’s denial of the unity of God that makes his position irrevocably anti-theological: |Thus, is 
erased up to the last trace of the traditional theological figure of divinity. Corresponding to this 
disappearance we sec emerge a new referent of the divine as the production of infinite power. A total 
horizon, which docs not even admit logical transcendence. The divine is the ensemble o f all powers 
(puissances)]. My translation from Op.Cit., L Anomalie sauvage, pp. 209-10.
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democracy that reflects the true nature of the human psyche and its collective being, 
rather than a democracy that is merely the ideological defence of a regime that 
crushes the individual through modern superstitions. Negri discusses this relation 
between the individual and the collective in Spinoza’s work through the concept of 
the multitude>. This again, is a directly political concept because it is only 
comprehensible, both subjectively and objectively, in the historical possibilities of 
democracy. It is through this concept that we can begin to think the second part of the 
sentence: democraticum imperium.
M ultitude
The concept of multitudo is to be thought, Negri argues, in three different 
levels: the physical, the animal and reason.14 The first two levels, the physical and the 
animal, correspond to the analysis of the movement and rest of bodies, and then the 
analysis of affects that Spinoza gives in the Ethics. The last level, reason, is linked to 
the concept of democracy which Negri reconstructs from Spinoza’s incomplete 
political writings. The first level is the critical puissance (potentia) of the real as a 
combination and intertwining of physical being, much like the concept of Nature in 
Lucretius or in Hobbes’ physicalism.15 This gives a rigorous material basis to the 
second level where animal puissance, which includes the human animal, is to be 
understood through the concepts of conatus and cupiditas. This second level is to be 
understood as the continuous entanglement of contradictory passions and situations at 
the level of the psyche or the affective subject. It is only with the third level, with 
reason, that we can begin to speak of the formation of a political subject. This subject
1 ’ Op.Cit. Spinoza subversif, p. 12.
14 Ibid., pp. 57-60.
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itself, as in the other two levels that it does not negate, is to be thought of as a 
multitudo. The political subject is a tendency within the network of passions of the 
psyche and the material basis of which it is a part. For Spinoza, affects are not to be 
contrasted to a political will as something external because political will, or reason, is 
an immanent possibility of ethical life. In other words, sociality is immanent to the 
realm of affects just as affects are immanent to material being. From this is obtained 
an imperative o f politics: discover and be with those who produce joy and avoid those 
who produce sadness. This community of joyful beings is the condition of a reasoned 
constitution of democracy. For this reason, ethics and politics, are not two distinct 
regions within a philosophical project, as though ethics were to do with individual 
behaviour or civil society and politics with the organs of government exterior to the 
individual or civil society, the State. Indeed, Spinoza himself argues that this division 
between the State and society itself is an illusion that does not correspond to reality.16 
Ethics already includes the social, or the individual is already collective and this 
collectivity ‘is the liberation of all the social forces in a general conatus of the 
organisation of all.’17 This conatus is what Negri understands to be absolute 
democracy.
The mode of social being is understood by Negri through Spinoza’s 
conception of power. Power is defined in two very different ways in Spinoza which 
correspond to two different Latin expressions that are not easily translatable into 
English. Power is either po ten tia  or potestas. Potentia  is defined by Spinoza in the 
Ethics as force to produce and po testa s  as capacity to produce in the act. Negri argues 
that in the P olitica l Treatise these definitions are inverted and poten tia  becomes 
capacity to produce in the act and p o te s ta s  becomes force to produce. These formal
15 Lucrèce, De ta nature, (Paris: Gallimard, 1985).
16 Op.CH., Anomalie sauvage, pp. 188-89.
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definitions are given a political expression by Negri through the language of natural 
rights. Every individual is born with a natural right or po ten tia l This is not to be 
understood juridically but in terms o f the language of affects or desire. The definition 
of freedom now becomes: every individual desires. Your freedom is proportional to 
your degree of potentia Nonetheless, all human societies hitherto have been 
determined by the diametrically opposed notion of power, potestas. This latter 
conception of power can be defined in the modem age as the result of the split 
between magistrature and the magistrate, that is, as the split between those who 
execute power and those who are governed by power.19 In terms of the ideology of 
democracy, this division of power is ideologically defended through social contract 
theory according to which members of a society transfer their power to an external 
authority that then acts independently.
Even though Spinoza might use the language of social contract theory, due to 
the context in which he was working at the time, Negri argues that his political 
thought is diametrically opposed to any notion of contractualism.20 It is here that a 
distinction can be made between liberal democracy on the one hand, and absolute 
democracy. Only the latter expresses the ontological dimension of Spinoza’s thought : 
the multitiido. Liberal democracy, on the contrary, is an ideological misrepresentation 
of social being for the sake of the unequal division of power, potestas : ‘The theory of
1 My translation from: Op.Cit., Spinoza subversif, p. 51.
18 This is based in Spinoza's definition of natural right: ‘Par droit de nature, donc, j ’entends les lois 
mêmes ou règles de la Nature suivant lesquelles tout arrive, c’est à dire la puissance même de la nature. 
Par suite le droit naturel de la Nature entière et conséquement de chaque individu s’étend jusqu’ou va 
sa puissance, et donc tout ce que fait un homme suivant les lois de sa propre nature, il le fait en vertu 
d'un droit de nature souverain, et il a sur la nature autant de droit qu’il a de puissance.’ B.Spinoza. 
Traité Politique, §4, ch.2, (Paris: Flammarion. 1996), p. 16. |By natural right I understand the laws or 
rules of Nature according to which everything happens, that is to say, the power of nature itself. Thus, 
it follows that the natural right of Nature in its entirety and consequently of each individual extends as 
far as its power reaches, and thus everything a man does following the laws of his own nature, he does 
in virtue of sovereign natural right and he has over nature as much right as he has power ).
19 Op. Cit. Spinoza subversif, p. 50.
20 Ibid. pp. 41-44.
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social contract has a specific historical and conceptual determination. It is 
substantially predisposed to the legitimisation of different forms of government in 
which absolutist forms of the modern State represent themselves.’21
Absolute democracy, on the contrary, is the unity of the social and the psyche 
in the auto-constitution of the social. What characterises absolute democracy is the 
non-separation of potentia from potestas, or the absolute immanence of power. Social 
being then becomes the expression of freedom in which freedom is understood as the 
reciprocal relation between reason and affects. This relation between freedom on the 
one hand, and absolute social being on the other, is, Negri suggests, the aporia of 
radical democracy. The absolute nature of democracy is absolute because it expresses 
the ontological definition of society as multitudo in all three levels (of the physical, 
the animal and reason), whereas freedom is the natural right of the individual potentia 
which reaches its full extent in its relation to others. This tension between freedom 
and the social, between the individual and the collective, and the social and the 
psyche, where all two terms of the opposition are already multiple, is the dynamic 
principle of democracy. In absolute democracy institutions express the social being of 
subjectivities without these institutions becoming alienated as separate powers as is 
the case in liberal democracy.
What is decisive, however, in Negri’s concept of absolute democracy, is the 
parallelism of the political and ontological orders. Democracy is the best kind of 
political constitution because, unlike monarchy or oligarchy, it expresses the true 
nature of the real as social being. Absolute democracy is absolute because only 
democracy is the reality of the absolute as social being. Only in absolute democracy is 
the pleasure of the world possible because democracy is the condition for the ethical,
21 My translation from Ibid. p. 43.
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in the spinozist sense of the word, life of the individual.22 The subjective expression 
of the absolute, for Negri, is the translation of this objective understanding o f social 
being into praxis. This praxis, in turn, is essentially revolutionary, since only a 
revolutionary subjectivity could unmask the ideological nature of liberal democracy 
and the axiomatics of capitalism. It is here that the greatest difficulties arise in the 
movement from the objective to the subjective and it is here, perhaps, that it is 
possible to say that Negri is at his least Spinozist and at his most Hegelian-Marxist. 
This is particularly visible in Negri’s other major work on Spinoza, the Savage 
Anomaly. Hegelianism is present in this work both in terms o f form and in terms of 
content. Its form is an examination of the progress of Spinoza’s work that could be 
characterised as a dialectical progression. Such a progression is premised on Negri 
reading Spinoza backwards much as Hegel himself would argue that one has to read 
the Phenomenology o f Spirit twice, once forward and once backwards, and only in the 
final backward reading will the truth of absolute knowledge be revealed.23
Negri reads Spinoza’s work as a complete system that has two formations: the 
first formation is in the first written part of the Ethics and the description of substance, 
and the second formation arises out of the interruption of the writing of the Ethics by 
the Tractatus-Theologicus Politicus. It is from this interruption that Negri reads 
Spinoza backwards. Thus, what he calls the phenomenology o f production, or the 
metaphysics of productive forces, becomes the key for understanding Spinoza’s 
notion of substance and ontology. In this way, the constitutive ontology of Spinoza’s
Op.Cit. L Anomalie sauvage, p. 335. For a different interpretation of Spinoza to that of Negri’s but 
still from the perspective of joy see. R.Misrahi, Spinoza. Un itineraire de bonheur par la joie, (Paris: 
Grancher Editeur, 1992)
23 Hegel concludes there must be two readings of the Phenomenology o f  Spirit. Once from the 
perspective of Spirit as a phenomonology. as a ‘gallery of images' and the other from the perspective 
of Absolute Knowledge as Science having ‘digested’, ‘recollected’ or ‘reborn’ into its new figure. See: 
G.W.F.Hegel. Phenomenology o f  Spirit, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 492-93.
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system is identified with the auto-constitution of the world by man.24 Despite the 
great differences between the statist philosophy of Hegel and the democratic politics 
of Spinoza as it is understood by Negri, this identification of being with social being 
seems identical to Hegel’s conception of the world as a result of human deeds. Thus, 
it can be argued that Negri’s unification of the political and the ontological from the 
side o f the political as the concept of constitutive ontology, exhibits a kind of 
Hegelianism in reserve. Does not Negri’s notion of absolute democracy bear the same 
kind o f teleological and immanent denouement as absolute knowledge in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology o f Spirit ?25 In both cases there is a conjunction of the objective and 
the subjective produced by the system itself but precisely because the system is the 
subject objectified The question remains open as to whether Negri leaves too much 
out when he identifies Spinoza’s idea of being with absolute democracy and whether 
it is possible to read the political writings ontologically rather than the ontological 
writings politically. It might be the case that this other way of reading, which still 
remains within an ontological and political parallelism, will produce a new kind of 
politics, one that is less amenable to be replaced with a politics of the subject.
24 Ibid. pp. 325 and 336-340.
25 This is also argued by Macherey in avec Spinoza, (Paris : puf, 1992), pp. 267 and 270.
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II. DELEUZE : a politics of events
In turning to Spinoza, philosophie pratique by Deleuze, one notices 
immediately a change in style and tone. In Spinoza subversif Negri reads Spinoza 
through a political project and thereby interprets the Ethics through Spinoza’s 
political writings. Deleuze, on the contrary, focuses his discussion of Spinoza on the 
metaphysics of the Ethics, and his politics will therefore result from that reading. 
However, this is not just a matter of difference in style but whether a materialist 
ontology can support a political praxis in the way that Negri describes it in Spinoza 
subversif. As has already been shown, Negri is still willing to admit, in this book, of a 
political praxis which still appears to require a subjective correlate in some sense 
similar to ‘class consciousness’. Deleuze’s materialism, on the other hand, appears to 
make such a discussion of a project of politics unfeasible if not irrelevant. One way of 
underlining this difference is that Negri is still at home in the vocabulary of 
subjectivity or consciousness, even if it is thought within an ontological structure, 
whereas the very same ontological structure seems to result in a secondary nature of 
the subject for Deleuze. The subject is always something produced in a relationship 
between ideas and bodies on a physical plane, and it is not itself productive. Such 
differences of interpretation will necessarily lead to a different politics even though 
both belong to the same ontological and political parallelism.
Talk of the subject for Deleuze belongs to theological explanations of nature 
that are to be opposed to immanent explanations of nature. Theological explanations 
always refer to some transcendent form or structure which determines nature from the
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outside and, thus, always imply a supplement to what requires explanation. Immanent
explanations only invoke what Deleuze calls a plane of immanence or composition.
On this plane there are no prior forms, structures or subjects, but only relations of
speed and movement between bodies of non-formed matter that produce
individualities (singular essences) within the flow of an infinite productive power:
On appelle plan théologique toute organisation qui vient d’en 
haut, et qui se rapporte à une transcendence, même cachés 
[. . .] Un tel plan peut être structural ou génétique, ou les deux 
à la fois ; il concerne toujours des formes et leurs 
développments, des sujets et leurs formations. Développment 
des formes et formations de sujets : c’est le charactère 
essentiel de cette première forme de plan [...] Un plan de 
transcendence [...] implique toujours une dimension 
supplémentaire aux dimensions de ce qui est donné [,..]Au 
contraire, un plan d’immanence ne dispose pas d’une 
dimension supplémentaire : le processus de composition doit 
être saisi pour lui-même, à travers ce qu’il donne, dans ce 
qu’il donne. C’est un plan de composition, non pas 
d’organisation ni de développment [. . .] Il n’y a plus de forme, 
mais seulement des rapports de vitesse entre particules infimes 
d’une matière non formée. Il n’y a plus de sujet, mais 
seulement des états affectifs individuants de la force 
anonimes.26
If we go back to Negri’s triple delimitation of the concept of multitudo (the 
physical, the animal and reason), then it might be argued that in the difference 
between the animal and the rational he inserts an unnecessary subjective teleology. 
This one becomes the condition for political praxis and, in so doing, he risks the 
danger of separating the first level from the third and second, thus falling into a 
theological paralogism.
26 G.Deleuze, Spinoza, philosophie pratique, (Paris : minuit, 1981), p. 172.[We call a theological plane 
every organisation that comes from above, and that relates to a transcendence, even a hidden 
one.. . Such a plane may be structural or genetic or both at the same time; it always concerns forms and 
their development. Development of forms and formation of subjects: this is the essential character of 
this first form of the plane...A plane of transcendence... always implies a supplementary dimension to 
the dimensions of what is given. . . On the contrary, a plane of immanence does not dispose of a 
supplementary dimension: the process of composition must be grasped in itself through what it gives, 
in what it gives. It is a plane of composition, not of organisation nor of development... There is no
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How then are we to think of reason outside of the concept of the subject? For 
Deleuze, this question is one of the most important in Spinoza’s work. He refers to it 
as the ‘dévalorisation of consciousness in relation to thought.’27 This operation, 
Deleuze points out, takes place in Spinoza’s consideration of consciousness as the site 
of a triple illusion: the illusion of final ends (telos), the illusion of free will, and the 
theological illusion (God). This triple illusion is a disguised anthropology -  the 
supposition that the universe is to be understood from the perspective of the human 
species. If consciousness is an illusion what is reality? It is the relation between 
bodies and ideas. If consciousness is the site of a triple illusion then, the condition of 
this site is the doubling of an idea that takes itself as the origin of ideas. 
Consciousness, therefore, does not exhaust thought. What, then, is the relation 
between bodies and ideas ? In Spinoza’s vocabulary they are to be interpreted in the 
language of affects. Affects are to be understood in a double manner: first of all, an 
affect is an image of a thing, but also, an affect measures the augmentation or 
diminution of the power to act. The first concept of affect explains the relation 
between bodies and ideas, whereas the second explains the transition from nature to 
ethics.28
In relation to the interpretation proposed here, it is the second definition of 
affects that is most significant. There are two ways in which a body can be affected by 
another body: by composition or decomposition. In composition the power to act 
(potentia) is increased, whereas in decomposition it is diminished. Translated into a
longer any form but only relations of speed between minute particles of a non-formed matter. There is 
no longer a subject but only individuating affective states of anonymous forces ).
27 Ibid. pp. 28-33.
28 The distinction between two affects that is being drawn here should not be confused with the two 
affects as described by Spinoza corresponding to the Latin distinction between affectio and affectus and 
which Deleuze translates into affections images or ideas and affects-sentiments. This latter distinction 
however, cannot be understood as dualist one between ideas on the one hand and bodies on the other. 
This is well explained by Deleuze as the reason why this thesis chooses to talk of affects in both cases 
leaving to the force of explanation the working out of this internal distinction. Ibid. p. 69.
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language of ethics decomposition is passivity or sadness, and composition is activity 
or joy. If one can speak of a politics present, therefore, in Spinoza, philosophie 
pratique, then it is in this relation of affects, between composition and 
decomposition ; and the distinction between active affects (agir) and passive affects 
(pâtir), in which the former are to be celebrated and sought, whereas the latter are to 
be avoided : ‘the more perfection a thing has, the more active and the less passive it 
is. Conversely, the more active it is, the more perfect it is.’29 However, this ethics 
cannot be understood in terms of a language of subjectivity or consciousness. Affects 
exist in relations of bodies on the plane of composition. If one can speak of an ethical 
imperative here, then one could perhaps only say the following: seek those encounters 
that produce joy, avoid those that produce sadness. Such encounters, are always 
fortuitous and unpredictable and thus cannot be thought of in terms of a language of 
projects or programs that still imply the operation of a final cause. These encounters, 
on the contrary, need to be conceived of as experimentations.30
The themes that have been described here can be deepened by turning to 
Deleuze’s systematic treatment of Spinoza’s thought in Spinoza et le problème de 
!'expression 31 The three branches of Spinoza’s philosophy are being, knowing and 
acting or producing.32 Deleuze renames these three branches with the concepts of 
being, expression and event. Each concept itself can be divided into three different
J> Op.Cit. Ethics. Part V, Pr 40, p. 221. Deleuze’s commitment to an ethics of joy follows quite closely 
his analysis of active and reactive forces in his interpretation of Nietzsche, where morality is replaced 
not by an ethics of values, but of forces existing in relations of composition and decomposition with 
one another See. G. Deleuze. Nietzsche et la philosophie. (Paris : puf. 1962), Nietzsche & Philosophy. 
(London : Athlone Press. 1983).
30 The field of experimentations is already more complex than what is simply understood by a 
fortuitous encounter’ though. M.Hardt argues that in Spinoza’s formation of common notions has to
do with the practical constitution of reason. Thus, there is a degree in which a direction can be given to 
events. The transformation of reality is always possible. This is the meaningfulness of ethics. See: 
M.Hardt. An Apprenticeship in Philosophy, Gilles Deleuze, (London: UCL Press, 1993), pp.100-104.
31 G.Deleuze, Spinoza et le problème de l'expression, (Paris : minuit. 1968) and Expressionism in 
Philosophy: Spinoza. (New York: Zone Books, 1992). [Hereafter SE for the French original and ES for 
the English translation],
32 Ibid. SE, p.299, ES, p.321.
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elements: Being into immanence, univocity and parallelism; Expression into 
explanation/envelopment, substance-attributes-modes, and constitution/production; 
finally, Event into bodies, relations, encounters. Let us go through these three 
concepts in turn.
II.I Being
immanence
The meaning of being in Spinoza’s thought is to be understood as the 
affirmation of immanence.33 This conception of being as the affirmation of 
immanence, differentiates Spinoza from the rationalism of his contemporaries. In 
Descartes, for example, God is cause of himself, in itself and by himself, but he is the 
cause of other things not in the same way that he is the cause of himself. This means 
that Descartes’ conception of being is still determined by a Thomist legacy. This 
legacy can be explained through three notions that are intimately tied together: 
equivocity, eminence and analogy. Equivocity means that God is cause of himself but 
in another sense that he is the efficient cause of things. Being is, therefore, not 
univocal. Eminence means that God contains all of reality but in another way than the 
reality of things themselves. Analogy means that God as self-cause cannot be reached 
through things themselves.34 In Descartes’ conception of being there is an absolute 
cleavage between transcendence and immanence or, to put it in the language of
33 Spinoza's philosophy of immanence : ‘cherche les conditions d'une affirmation véritable, dénonçant 
tous les traitements qui retirent à l’être sa pleine positivité, c'est à dire sa communauté formelle.’ Ibid. 
SE, p. 152, ES, p. 167.
34 Ibid. SE, p. 148, ES, p. 162.
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causality, the cause is ontologically distant from the effect. For Spinoza, on the 
contrary, the cause is immanent to the effect. Substance contains no more reality than 
the attributes, which are expressions of its essence. If Descartes’, and other idealists, 
conception of being is divided, then Spinoza’s philosophy of immanence is a theory 
of being as one, equal, univocal and common.35
univocity
There is a complete identity between the idea of immanence and the concept
of expression since substance expresses itself through the attributes in which are
expressed essences and the principle of univocity.36 Or, as Deleuze writes:
‘l’immanence expressive ne peut se suffire à elle-même tant qu’elle ne s’accompagne
pas d’une pleine conception de l’univocité, d’une pleine affirmation de l’Etre
univoque.’37 Immanence requires that there is no difference at the level o f being
between God and creatures38, or to put it in the language of the Ethics, there is no
difference of being between substance on the one hand, and, attributes and modes on
the other. The immanence of these distinctions necessitates a univocal conception of
being. Attributes are not exterior to substance but express the formal infinite essences
of substance. Likewise, modes are not exterior to attributes but express the identity of
attributes. There is an identity of attributes as they constitute the essence of substance
and as they are implied in the essence of creatures (modes):
Le concept spinozist d’immanence n’a pas d’autre sense : il exprime la double 
univocité de la cause et des attributs, c’est à dire l’unité de la cause efficiente 
avec la cause formelle, l’identité de l’attribut tel qu’il constitue l’essence de la 
substance et tel qu’il est impliqué par les essences de créatures 39
35 Ibid. SE, p. 152, ES, p.167.
36 Ibid. SE, p. 164, ES, p.180.
37 Ibid. SE, pl62, ES. p.178.
38 Ibid. SE, p. 157, ES, p. 173.
63
parallelism
This equality of attributes, between attributes as expressions of substance and 
attributes as implicated modes, leads to what Deleuze calls an ontological parallelism. 
This parallelism itself refers back to an epistemological parallelism.40 Deleuze refers 
to the scholium, II, 7 of the Ethics, where Spinoza describes parallelism as the fact 
that the one and the same substance is made up of diverse attributes, and the one and 
the same thing is expressed in all the attributes. No thing exists outside of the modes 
that express it in each attribute, but the modes, which differ from each other through 
the attributes that express them, belong to the same order since attributes are 
expressions of the self-expression of substance. Thus, there is a rigorous ontological 
parallelism between attributes-substance and attributes-modes. This ontological 
parallelism has its correlate in epistemological parallelism in the identity of the order 
of ideas and the order of things. This epistemological correlative has also an ethical 
meaning. The soul and the body are absolutely parallel. What is a passion in the soul 
is also a passion in the body, and what is an action in the soul is also an action in the 
body. This parallelism, as Deleuze argues, dismisses any appeal to ‘the eminence of 
the soul, or moral and spiritual finality, and all transcendence of a God who regulates 
one series by another.’41 Thus, already in the concept of being, with its three elements 
of immanence, univocity and parallelism, one can see a direct movement from a 
materialist ontology to an ethics. This ethics, it might be argued, is Deleuze’s word 
for politics. How this might be so can only be determined by looking at the next two 
concepts: expression and event.
39 Ibid. SE, p. 150.ES, p.165.
40 Ibid. SE, p. 112, ES, p. 126.
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11.2 Expression
explanation /  envelopment
Being’s immanence, univocity and parallelism already involve expression.41 2 43
God’s relation to creation is not as a distant cause, as though it was somehow exterior 
to creation, but as an expressive one. God expresses himself in creation. There is no 
distance between God’s self-expression and the being of creatures, or, in the language 
of the Ethics, substance expresses itself in the infinity of its attributes. This 
immanence of attributes to substance, and also modes to attributes, means that their 
relation cannot be thought of in terms of an exterior final causality but as the 
expressivity of immanent causality. Immanent causality has its own form as 
expression. This expression, Deleuze argues, has two aspects, that of explaining and 
of enveloping:
Expliquer, c’est développer. Envelopper, c’est impliquer. Les 
deux termes pourtant ne sont pas contraires : ils indiquent 
seulement deux aspects de l’expression. D’une part, 
l’expression est une explication : développement de ce qui 
s’exprime, manifestation de l’Un dans le multiple [...] Mais 
d’autre part, l’expresion multiple enveloppe l’Un. L’Un reste 
enveloppé dans ce qui l’exprime, imprimé dans ce qui le 
développe, immanent à tout ce qui le manifeste : en ce sens 
l’expression est un enveloppement.44
Attributes explain substance as its expressions but substance envelops 
attributes in its self-expression. These two aspects should not be seen as opposites but
41 Ibid. SE, p.235, ES, p.256.
42 Ibid. SE, p. 159, ES, p.I76.
43 Ibid. SE, p. 12, ES, p. 16.
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as belonging to the one and same expressivity, as the presence of the One in the 
multiple and the multiple in the One. These two aspects can be understood through 
the absolute horizontality of the relations between substance and attributes and 
attributes and modes: ‘Or, chez Spinoza la Nature comprend tout, contient tout, en 
même temps qu’elle est expliquée et impliquée par chaque chose. Les attributs 
enveloppent et expliquent l’attribut dont ils dépendent, mais l’attribut contient toutes 
les essences de modes correspondantes.’44
This absolute horizontality within being can be differentiated from the two 
traditions of emanation and imitation, both o f which depict God, or substance, as a 
transcendent cause. In the former, attributes and modes emanate from God, or 
substance, but only through a hierarchized order of being, such that God or substance 
is viewed as a distant cause. In the latter, being, as in Plato, is divided into two 
separate substances in which one is the imitation of the other. In terms of the theory of 
emanation expression is interpreted through the model of the seed, whereas in the 
theory of imitation expression is interpreted in the image of the mirror.45 Both images 
still imply some transcendence.46 If one were to characterise Spinoza within the two 
paradigms of the theological position, then one might say that the theory of expression 
is emanation without distance or transcendence. There is no distance or transcendence 
between what expresses itself in an expression and what is expressed in that 
expression.47
44 Ibid. SE. p. 13, ES, p. 17.
45 Ibid. SE, p.300, ES. p.322.
46 Ibid. SE, p. 163, ES, p. 180.
47 The absence of distance in the concept of expression which already intervened in the theological 
tradition (of emanation and creationism) brings within it its own self-destniction for, as Deleuze likes 
saying, : 'll apporte avec lui le “danger" proprement philosophique : le panthéisme ou l'immanence -
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substance -  attributes -  modes
Deleuze reconfigures the relation between self-expression, expression and 
expressed in the language of substance, attributes and modes of the Ethics. Deleuze 
explains their expressivity as follows: attributes express infinite essence that expresses 
the essence o f substance, which in turn envelops the attribute. Every expression 
expresses the one and same substance that they explain, but the one and the same 
substance envelops every expression. This is why there is no contradiction in 
Spinoza’s system between the unity of substance and the diversity of its attributes.48 It 
is necessary, however, Deleuze argues, to look at expressivity in greater detail for 
there are two levels of expression in the relations between substance-attributes and 
attributes-modes. The first level of expression is constitutional: substance expresses 
itself in attributes (expression) and each attribute expresses an essence (the 
expressed). The second level of expression is production: each attribute expresses 
itself in a mode (expression) and each mode expresses a modification (expressed).49
Just as substance and attributes express themselves so the modes, which are 
produced by substance, express themselves too. Attributes express themselves 
through modes, where modes express themselves in relations and powers. What is 
expressed in relations are parts and the bodies that are composed of them, and what is 
expressed in power are affections: ‘Les attributs s’expliquent dans les modes 
existants ; les essences de modes, elle-même contenues dans les attributs, s’expliquent
immanence de l ’expression dans ce qui s'exprime, et de l'exprimé dans l’expression.’ Ibid. SE, 
p.300, ES, p.322.
38 Ibid. SE. p.9, ES, p. 13.
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dans des rapports ou des pouvoirs ; ces rapports sont effectués par des parties, ces 
pouvoirs par des affections qui les expliquent à leur tour.’50 Each mode is measured 
by the quantity of reality of existence that it expresses and its power to be affected.51 
Just as in the concept of being, there is in the concept of expression an ethical 
signification. The expressivity of the modes is their power to act. The power to act is 
the expression both of our existence and our ability to be affected. The aim of ethics is 
becoming active. It is superstition and ignorance that separate men from their power 
to act.52
11.3 Event
bodies
However, this ethical significance of both being and expression only becomes 
concrete in the analysis of the concept of event. An event, meeting or encounter can 
be understood only through modes. For our understanding there are only two types of 
mode, a body or an idea, since the only infinite attributes available to us are extension 
and thought. Modes also follow the law of ontological parallelism. Thus, there is no 
dualism between the body and the soul. To every body corresponds an idea and to 
every idea corresponds a body. Every mode, whether a body or an idea, is made out of 
parts. To exist is to be made up of a great number of parts.51 These parts themselves
49 Ibid. SE, p.10, ES. p. 14. Deleuze also explains these two levels of expression, constitution and 
production in SE, pp.21 and 35, ES. pp.27 and 43.
*  Ibid. SE, p.213, ES, p.233.
51 Ibid. SE. p.84, ES, p.95.
52 Ibid. SE, p.206. ES, p.226.
53 ‘Alors, nous pouvons dire en quoi consiste l’existence du mode : exister, c 'est avoir actuellement un 
très grand nombre de parties (plurimae). ’ Ibid. SE, p. 183, ES, p. 201.
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are to be understood in terms of an infinite quantity. It is this infinite quantity which is 
divisible into a great number of parts. This infinite quantity is an extensive quantity. 
Thus, the parts act on one another extrinsically. It is these relations between extensive 
parts that compose a body. This body itself only comes to pass into existence, and 
continues to exist, through puissance. This puissance is to be understood as an 
intensive quantity. The universe as a whole is therefore to be considered as infinitely 
in movement where ensembles of parts form bodies.54
relations
A body is to be understood through different orders: the order of essence, the 
order of relations, and the order of parts. The order of essences is determined by 
degrees o f power (puissance). In this order there is a total affinity. Each essence is in 
agreement with all the others. This is to do with the fact that each essence is included 
in the production of every other essence. This order is eternal. The order of relations 
is the order of composition that follows laws. These eternal conditions determine the 
manner in which modes, singular essences, come to be. All relations are infinite but 
not the meeting of one relation to another.55 This is why we need to speak of a third 
order, of a meeting, event or encounter. Parts are subsumed under relations of 
composition, and these relations of composition are infinite, but one relation of parts 
does not necessarily agree with another relation of parts. Thus, we can speak of two 
different events: one of composition and the other of decomposition. 56 Decomposition 
comes about because two existing bodies meet one another in an order where their 
relations do not compose, even though each specific relation composes the parts into
54 ‘Toutes ensemble et sous tous leurs rapports, elles forment un univers infiniment changeant, 
correspondant à la toute-puissance de Dieu.’ Ibid. SE, p. 187. ES, p.205.
55 Ibid. SE, pp.216-17, ES, p.237.
“ Ibid. SE. p.215. ES, p. 236.
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each existing body. Thus, to use Spinoza’s example, there is an encounter between 
poison and blood, which is one of decomposition.57
encounters
If the order of essences and the order of relations are infinite and eternal then 
the order of parts is always local and temporary. Every meeting is always fortuitous, 
some composing others decomposing. Meetings under the sway of composition are 
always those that are good and useful to me. Good and useful means here, that they 
produce in me an emotion or affection that is in affinity with my nature. This emotion 
or affection Spinoza calls joy.58 Meetings of the second kind, in which my body is in a 
relation that does not compose with mine and therefore has no affinity with my 
nature, are, on the contrary, bad or useless. They produce in me an emotion or 
affection that is contrary to my nature. This affection is the emotion of sadness. 59
II.4 An ethics of events
Spinoza’s ethics is the ethics of the event, which is the meeting of bodies in 
relations of composition or decomposition. The aim of this ethics is to increase those 
events that compose and decrease those events that decompose. Those events that 
compose one existing body to others increase joy and thereby augment the power to 
act. Those events that decompose increase sadness and thereby diminish the power to
57 Ibid. SE, p.216, ES, p.237.
58 Ibid. SE, p.218, ES, p.239.
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act. But, in each case, the event is always something local and fortuitous since every
meeting belongs to the order of parts and not to the orders of essences or relations.
Translated into a language of ethics this means that there is no Good or Evil as such.
This would be the language of morality. Spinoza’s critique of morality or theology is
expressed in this replacement o f a moral language and logic by his ontological
understanding of events as being nothing more than compositions and
decompositions. This, however, must not be interpreted as a total absence of
references or values, as if Spinoza was making us enter into absolute relativism
leaving us unable to draw distinctions of any kind between one event and another.
The whole point of Spinoza’s ethics, with his emphasis on the distinction between
composition and decomposition, is to make us able to draw even further distinctions.60
Not only for their intellectual interest, even less as a way to punish ourselves in
reprobation for our mistakes in the hope to purge ourselves, but in order to augment
our power to act. Deleuze relates this aspect of Spinoza’s ethics to Nietzsche’s own
project in his critique of morality:
Comme Nietzsche le dira, « Par-delà le Bien et le Mal, cela du 
moins ne veut pas dire par-delà le bon et le mauvais61 » 11 y a 
des augmentations de la puissance d’agir, des diminutions de 
la puissance d’agir. La distinction du bon et du mauvais 
servira de principe pour une véritable différence éthique, qui 
doit se substituer à la fausse opposition morale.62
From this analysis of Deleuze’s Spinoza et le problème de l'expression, how 
can one differentiate Deleuze’s and Negri’s Spinoza? They both show an ontological 
and political parallelism through the univocal definition of being understood in terms 
of the affirmation of immanence. Where they differ is that Negri inserts the political
59 Ibid. SE, p.220, ES. p.241.
60 For Deleuze this is so much the case that he even goes to characterise spinozism as 'une 
extraordinaire théorie des distinctions.’ Ibid. SE, p.309, ES, p.332.
61 Nietzsche. Généalogie de la morate, I, 17.
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through a political subject in terms of a democratic project, whereas if there is a 
politics in Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza, then, it is in a meeting between bodies 
and not through a political program. Deleuze’s politics is an ethics and an ethics of the 
contingent and the fortuitous, even though this contingency has its place only within 
an absolute necessity. Negri retains a concept of praxis and thus requires a subjective 
correlate to substance (the multitude>), whereas Deleuze’s politics is not the politics of 
the subject but of the event. Although in his last work Negri makes a shift from his 
previous positions, as analysed in this chapter, into a politics of the event (a term used 
solely in reference to Deleuze in the context of this thesis), it is nevertheless still true 
to say that his politics stresses the importance o f the political subject insofar as it 
invests itself in the construction of a common telos.62 3 The question remains as to 
whether a politics of events makes impossible any idea of engagement whatsoever, or 
whether we need to rethink the problem of engagement outside any teleology.
62 Op.Cit. SE, p.233, ES, p.254.
63 A.Negri. Kairòs, Alma Venus, Muttitudo, (Roma : manifestolibri, 2000). See last chapter : 
‘Multitudo. Prolegomini della decisione’, but especially p. 171.
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Chapter III
the Ontology of “desiring machines” 
and the Politics of “schizoanalysis”
(L’Anti-CEdipe)
In the previous chapter, Deleuze’s Spinoza et le problème de l'expression was 
broken down into three main elements: being, expression and ethics. In this chapter, 
we want to argue explicitly that this threefold distinction can be used to understand 
and illuminate the complexity of L 'Anti-Oedipe . In one sense, this is a question of 
style, L 'Anti-Oedipe is the rejection of a certain academic style, for the sake of a more 
joyful and expressive style with numerous digressions, hesitations and connections 
between different orders of knowledge, science, art and philosophy. 1 Beneath this 
anarchy, however, there is a rigorous analytical basis and it is this which can be made 
explicit through reference to Deleuze’s work on Spinoza. Again, we need to be
1 “J'essayais dans mes livres précédents de décrire un certain exercise de la pensée; mais le décrire, ce 
n’était pas encore exercer la pensée de cette façon-là. (De même, crier “vive le multiple”, ce n'est pas 
encore le faire, il faut faire le multiple. Et il ne suffit pas non plus de dire : “à bas les genres”, il faut 
écrire effectivement de telle façon qu'il n’y ait plus de “genres”, etc ). G. Deleuze and C.Pamet, 
dialoges, (Paris: Paris. 1977), p.23. [In my previous books 1 tried to describe a certain exercise of 
thought; but describing still was not doing it that way. (The same as shouting "hurray the multiple”, 
still does not make it, the multiple must be made. And equally it is not enough to say: "down with 
genders”, one must effectively write such that there are no “genders”, etc.)].
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careful of making easy comparisons and oppositions, for indeed, as Deleuze says, 
Spinoza was already an escape route for institutionalised philosophy:
Et Spinoza, c’est facile de lui donner même la plus grande 
place dans la suite du cartésianisme ; seulement il déborde 
cette place de tous les côtés, il n ’y a pas de mort vivant qui 
soulève aussi fort sa tombe, et dise aussi bien : je ne suis pas 
des vôtres. C’est sur Spinoza que j ’ai travaillé le plus 
sérieusement d’après les normes de l’histoire de la 
philosophie, mais c’est lui qui m’a fait le plus l’effet d’un 
courant d ’air qui vous pousse dans le dos chaque fois que vous 
le lisez, d’un balai de sorcière qu’il vous fait enfourcher. 
Spinoza, on n’a même pas commencé à le comprendre, et moi 
pas plus que les autres.
Let us then briefly apply the schema we had obtained from Spinoza et le 
problème de l'expression to L'Anti-Oedipe so as to give a preliminary overview of the 
path that we will be taking through this chapter We have three orders: being, 
expression and ethics. In L 'Anti-Oedipe, being concords with the analysis of desire, 
expression with the analysis of production and ethics with schizoanalysis. From this, 
we can see that the chapter will be divided into three sections: desire, production and 
schizoanalysis. As with the previous chapters of this thesis, our aim is to show that 
the ontological analysis, in this case the analysis of desire, leads immanently and 
necessarily to a certain politics. Indeed, one might argue that it is possible to read 
L'Anti-Oedipe backwards. Deleuze and Guattari’s militancy is expounded in the last 
chapter of L ’Anti-Oedipe and is its ethical import. It requires, however, an 2
2 Ibid. p. 22. [And Spinoza, it is even easy to give him the biggest place in the follow up from 
cartesianism; only he overspills this space on all sides, there is no living dead who lifts his tombstone 
harder than him. and who says louder than him: I am not one of yours. It is on Spinoza that I have 
worked most seriously according to the norms of the history of philosophy, but it is him who gave the 
strongest effect of a blow of fresh air that pushes from behind every time you read him, of a broom he 
makes you mount. We have not even begun understanding Spinoza, and I not more than anybody 
else.].
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ontological foundation that is given in the first chapter of the book, and an 
epistemological critique of a counter position given in the second chapter, and finally 
a historical expression deployed in the third chapter.
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I. ONTOLOGY : “desiring production ”
What is truly decisive in Spinoza’s interpretation of being, and this marks 
his divergence from Descartes, is his interpretation of it as univocal and immanent 
Only from this position can one interpret Spinoza’s concept of God and also 
understand why his philosophy engendered such virulent opposition, why he was 
always classified as an atheist, even though his first and last word was God, and as an 
enemy of the State. For, God is usually the name for an equivocal and transcendent 
interpretation of being, as is the case for example in the work of Aquinas. God is 
interpreted as the ground of all beings, whilst being utterly separate from those 
beings, and, in the doctrine of theodicy, all reality is oriented by the final cause (telos) 
which is God, infinite perfection. For Spinoza, on the contrary, there is no division 
within being. God does not signify something transcendent which only has a meaning 
in opposition to something immanent that it determines and rules, rather God is the 
meaning of all that is, that is to say, the real And the real is understood as infinite 
productive being, in which the unitary substance expresses itself in an infinity of 
attributes, which in turn express themselves in a plurality of modes.
It might appear that this language of God is far away from the revolutionary 
discourse of L 'Anti-Oedipe3 First impressions, are deceptive. Deleuze and Guattari
3 G.Dclcu/.c and F.Guattari, I.'Anti-Oedipe, Vol.l of Capitalisme et schizophrénie, (Paris: Minuit. 
1972-73). |Hereafter AO\. The English translation: Anti-Oedipus, (London: The Athlonc Press. 
1984).[Hereafter: AOb\
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are not embarrassed by this word as we might be however, and give a Spinozist reply 
to the question whether they believe in God or not as:
A qui demande : croyez vous en dieu ? Nous devons répondre 
d’une manièr strictement kantienne ou schreberienne: bien sûr, 
mais seulement comme au maître du syllogisme disjonctif , 
comme au principe a priori de ce syllogisme (Dieu défini 
YOmnitudo realitatis dont toutes les réalités dérivées sortent 
par division).4
The Omnitudo realitatis in Anti-Oedipus is the real as it is constituted 
within desiring production. Again, as is the case in Spinoza, we should not see this 
relation between the real and desiring production as an opposition of two distinct 
orders, as though the real were the immanent order and desiring production the 
transcendent order. Rather, the real is desiring production and desiring production is 
the real. There is no division within reality. To put another way, division is a 
production of desire itself within a certain conjunction of forces and thus just as real 
as anything else. Lack does not signify an absence within being, as is the case in 
Aristotle and the medieval philosophy that followed it and which strangely reappears 
in the work of semiotitians such as Lacan. Rather, lack is a part of being itself where 
production produces anti-production: “Le manque est aménagé, organisé dans la 
production sociale. Il est contre-produit par l’instance d’anti-production qui se rabat 
sur les forces productives et se les approprie.”5
4 Ibid. AO, p. 19, AOb, p. 13.
5 Ibid. AO, p. 35, AOb, p.28.
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What do Deleuze and Guattari mean by desire as machinic production? 
First of all, they are quite clear that the term “machine” or “machinic” are not 
metaphors: “Partout ce sont des machines, pas du tout métaphoriquement.”6 We 
might think these words metaphorical, because we think of technical machines first of 
all, but technical machines are secondary. They are the products of a process that is 
the conjunction of desire and the socius, which is primarily machinic. Societies 
produce machines from the wheel to the computer, but societies themselves are 
already the production of a machinic unconscious that is the Omnitudo realitatis. It is 
for this reason that we cannot understand machinic desire through technical machines, 
for we would be taking what is in fact a secondary and dependent term for what is 
primary: ‘Les machines techniques ne sont pas une catégorie économique, et 
renvoient toujours à un socius ou machine sociale qui ne se confond pas avec elles, et 
qui conditionne cette reproduction.’7
How then are we to understand machinic desire on its own terms? Deleuze 
and Guattari explain how the unconscious machine, which is at work everywhere, is 
made up of two functions. One is the flow or the flux and the other is the cut or 
break. The flow or flux is the energy of desire or the libido, and the cut or break is the 
partial object which interrupts this flow. As Deleuze and Guattari write in the first 
sentences o f A O  there is an organ-machine and a source machine : ‘Une machine- 
organe est branchée sur une machine source : l’une émet un flux, que l’autre coupe.
6 Ibid. AO. p.7, AOb, p.2.
7 Ibid. AO, p.39, AOb. p.32.
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Le sein est une machine qui produit du lait, et la bouche, une machine couplée sur
celle-là.’8
The T hree  Syntheses of the Unconscious
There are, however, three ways in which the relation between the cut and 
the flow is produced. These three possible relations are: the cut or break as 
detachment (coupures-détachm ents) , the cut or break as a slicing off (coupures- 
prélèvem ents), and finally, a remainder or “residue” (coupure resté). These relations 
refer to the coding of desire. In detachments, connections between different 
characters which form a momentary combination “la moustache de papa, le bras levé 
de maman, un ruban, une petite fille, un flic, un soulier”9, take place within the flux. 
These chains do not signify anything, rather they reproduce desire: “Produire du désir, 
telle est la seule vocation du signe, dans tous les sens où ça se machine”.10 We must 
distinguish this relation or function rigorously from that of a cut or break, which is a 
“slicing off’. The latter have to do with the relations between fluxes and partial 
objects which in no way can be separated of, or detached from the flux itself. We 
should not, however let this distinction at the level of concepts become oppositional at 
the level of the real. Every relation between a flux and a partial object or objects 
includes an assemblage of heterogeneous elements, which can detach from the flow 
and, likewise, every detachment also includes a relation between a flux and its partial 
object:
8 Ibid. AO, p.l, AOb, p.l.
9 Ibid. AO, p.47, AOb, p.39.
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Le prélèvement de flux implique des détachment de chaîne; et 
les objets partiels de la production supposent les stocks ou les 
briques d’enregistrement, dans la coexistance et l’interaction 
de toutes les synthèses.11
The third break, the residual break (coupure-reste), is that in which the subject 
is produced as a remainder alongside machinic production. There is, first of all, the 
unconscious and the machinic production that is proper to it. It is not the subject 
whom desires, rather it is the unconscious and the unconscious cannot in any way be 
understood in terms of a metaphysics of subjectivity. It is not a will who has any 
origin, source or centre. First of all, there are the immanent processes of the 
unconscious itself with its breaks and flows, and it is in relation to these that the 
subject is produced. The subject is not the originator of the process, rather it is the 
residue of the process. Indeed, such a position is almost identical to Spinoza’s 
interpretation of the body where there are relations between bodies and parts of 
bodies, to begin with, and it is from these that a subject is produced as a state of 
intensive quantities or affects. The language of AO  is unmistakably spinozist on this 
point:
Aussi consomme t ’il les états par lesquels il passe, et naît-il de 
ces états, toujours conclu de ces états comme une part fait de 
parties, dont chacune remplit en un moment le corps sans 
organes.12
,0 Ibid.
"  Ibid. AO. p.48. AOb, p.40.
12 Ibid. AO. p.49, AOb. p.41. We shall return to this question of the subject when we analyse the 
relation between production and anti-production later in this section.
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We would be making a fundamental error if we thought that these functions or 
relations between flows and breaks were somehow above desiring production itself. 
We need, on the contrary, to follow the rigorous immanentism of AO. The three 
relations of detachment, slicing off and residue are themselves merely different 
aspects of the three syntheses of the unconscious, the connective, the disjunctive and 
the conjunctive which themselves are merely another way of naming the three types 
of production immanent to the unconscious: production, recording and consumption, 
that is to say, desire itself.
1.1 The Connective Synthesis
The connective synthesis of the unconscious is the manner in which desiring 
machines are constituted through a “binary” law. No machine exists by itself. Rather 
there is always a relation between a machine that produces flows and another machine 
that interrupts this flow. Production, Deleuze and Guattari argue, is inherently 
connective: “and”, “and then...” (“et”, “et puis...”). Desire is always connecting 
partial objects with flows, which themselves are always breaking and broken up in 
return. Again, one must be careful of not translating the relation between partial 
objects and flows as though they were two opposed orders. Partial objects produce 
flows, which in turn are interrupted by other partial objects and so on. This 
connective synthesis between partial objects and flows draws us to the second form of 
the connective synthesis. Within production there is no opposition between the 
product and the producer, as is the case in the traditional Aristotelian description of
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production where the product is merely the end term of production.13 Rather, a 
product itself is producing: “Il n’y a pas lieu de distinguer ici le produire et son 
produit. Du moins l’objet produit emporte-t-il son ici dans un nouveau produire.”14 
This means that production is the production of production. But what of its opposite? 
The question that haunts A O  is that if the real is desire, why is it that when we look 
out of our window all we see is desire regulated and crushed? The answer must be 
that there is anti-production. If we are to remain within the rigorous immanentism of 
AO, its ontological debt to Spinoza, then this anti-production cannot be outside of 
production. Otherwise there would be something other than the real and we would be 
back into a dualist metaphysics. Anti-production, therefore must be a product of 
production which is itself productive and this is the third form of the connective 
synthesis.
Anti-production (the Body w ithout Organs)
One must postulate in order to explain desire desiring its own repression an 
immobility within production itself. This immobility Deleuze and Guattari describe 
as the Body without Organs which they explain using the Freudian concept of primary 
repression.15 This primary repression is the source of all secondary repression, which
13 In Aristotle’s analysis, production is seen as the absolute difference between product and producer 
but reverses its sense. It is the product that gives to it its necessity. This reversal bearly does away with 
the utter separation of them. This has implications at the level of the production of ideas. See 
P.Aubenque, Le problème de l 'être chez Aristote, (Paris: puf. 1997), p.76.
14 Op. Cit. AO, p.13, AOb. p.7.
15 Primary repression is described by Freud in his Metapsychology as the first time of the operation of 
repression. It contributes to the formation of a certain number of unconscious representations or 
'primary repressions’. The unconscious centres thus constituted, collaborate in the subsequent 
repression proper through the attraction they exercise over the contents that are to be repressed together
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is so manifest within, to use Foucault’s phrase from the preface to the English edition 
of AO, our “every day lives”:
The book often leads one to believe it is all fun and games, 
when something essential is taking place, something of 
extreme seriousness: the tracking down of all varieties of 
fascism, from the enormous ones that surround and crush us to 
the petty ones that constitute the tyrannical bitterness of our 
everyday lives”.16
1.2 The Disjunctive Synthesis
This production of anti-production within the connective synthesis of the 
unconscious leads us inexorably to the second form of synthesis, the disjunctive 
synthesis. This second synthesis explains the relation between desiring machines and 
the Body without Organs. It is first of all described by Deleuze and Guattari from the 
side of the body without organs in terms of repulsion. In this repulsion the body 
without organs invests a counter vector within production itself, a paranoiac machine 
which falls back (se rabat sur) upon all the productive forces inscribing them upon its 
own surface. This inscription is the effect of the disjunctive synthesis:
Mais l’essentiel est l’établissement d’une surface enchantée 
d’inscription ou d’enregistrement qui s’attribue toutes les 
forces de production, et qui agît comme quasi-cause en leur 
communiquant le mouvement apparent (le fétiche).17
If in the connective synthesis the flows and partial objects are aligned along a 
series of “and”, “and then” then in the disjunctive synthesis they are distributed along
with the repulsion coming from the superior instances. Laplanche et Pontalis, Vocabulaire de ta 
psychanalyse, (Paris: puf, 1994), pp.396-97.
16 This Preface exists only in the English translation. Op. Cit. AOb. p.xiv.
17 Op.Cit. AO, p. 18, AOb, 11.
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an axis of “either... or” (“soit. ..soit”). The latter is constituted always in relation to a 
third term, which acts as the focal point of this axis. This third term is the Body 
without Organs. One must be careful here, however, of not translating the disjunctive 
synthesis from the beginning into a triangulation. In the first moment, the Body 
without Organs is immanent to desire, it is only falsely represented in a second 
moment as being exterior to desire as though it were a transcendent force. This, if 
you like, is the false understanding of the divine that becomes objectified outside the 
very process of which it is a product.
the socius
The Body without Organs is not the origin of production, nor its meaning, 
rather it is the product. This particular kind o f productivity is designated through a 
disjunctive synthesis. These two kinds of disjunction, the one inclusive and the real 
expression of desiring production, and the exclusive or false representation of desiring 
production, will become fundamental for understanding the relation between desire, 
on the one hand, and the social, on the other. What would be a grave error indeed is 
to impose an exclusive disjunction itself between desire and the socius. Then, in this 
opposition the social would be objectified as the origin of desire whereas in reality the 
social is the anti-production of productive desire. This means, of course, in terms of 
political praxis, that desire always overflows the social. This has only become more 
exaggerated in capitalist societies, where the social form itself has become stripped of 
its exteriority through the process of decoding which is at its very heart. What needs 
to be emphasised above all is that the true origin of society is the Body without 
Organs. Societies only code desire because of the primary relation between 
production and anti-production which is immanent to desire itself. One can add that if
85
production did not produce anti-production there would be no societies, no “races,
cultures and gods”.18
the subject
If the connective synthesis produces the Body without Organs, then the Body 
without Organs in turn produces the subject. This subject, however, is not a classical 
subject of philosophy, which mistakenly believes that it is the origin of the real, and 
so believes itself to be outside the real as its constituting element.19 Rather, the 
subject is the product of the collision between production and anti-production, which 
is immanent to production itself. If in the philosophy of subjectivity the subject is 
represented as thought, the famous cartesian “I think”, then the subject of desire is the 
affective subject. But the affective subject should not be understood as though it were 
the thinking subject represented as a different kind; that is to say, as a feeling thing  or 
p rocess  at the centre of the real, organising and distributing it. This would precisely 
be both to confuse the subject with the body without organs and also to falsely 
represent the body without organs as a transcendent signifier. Rather, the affective 
subject is feeling as a state, which is the product of the relation between the 
disjunctive and the connective syntheses. This is why the conjunctive synthesis, 
which is the explanation of the subject as a residue rather than as an origin, takes the 
form of “so its...” (“c 'e s t d o n e . . ." ) 20 In other words, subjectivity always has the
18 Ibid. AO. p. 101, AOb. p.85.
19 As is the case in Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception. See: I.Kant, ‘the Transcendental 
Deduction', The Critique o f Pure Reason. (London: MacMillan Press. 1993), pp. 120-169. For a 
discussion of the subject in Kant and the legislative role of the Understanding see: G.Deleuze, Kant's 
Critical Philosophy, (Minneapolis: University of Minesotta Press, 1990).
20 Op. Cit, AO. p.23,AOb. p.16.
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grammatical form of the accusative and not the nominative. “It’s me”, rather than “I
am”.
1.3 The Conjunctive Synthesis
Deleuze and Guattari explain this conjunctive synthesis through the example 
of the case of Nietzsche. What the connective synthesis produces, since every 
product, to follow the law of unconscious production, is productive, is intensive 
states. It is quite wrong, therefore, to think that one has, first of all, an individual 
called Nietzsche who then has feelings which are in turn translated into ideas. Rather, 
first of all there are feelings that are produced in a multitude of disjunctions on the 
surface of the Body without Organs. It is these disjunctions that, in their fulguration, 
produce intensive states through which the subject passes. No longer do we have the 
stable subject of classical subjectivist philosophy, but the nomadic subject of the 
machinic unconscious, which is nothing more than the degrees of intensity in relation 
to zero intensity of the Body without Organs. “It’s me” is nothing more than the 
momentary illuminations of the disjunctive points as they slide and skid on the 
smooth surface of the Body without Organs. Indeed, the classical subject, which 
believes itself to be the origin of everything and the measure of reality, is itself 
nothing more than the product of a given socius, whose own origin is to be found in 
the eternal becoming of desiring production. As we have argued earlier in this 
section, this understanding of the subject is almost identical with Spinoza’s notion of 
affects in the bothies. In both cases it is a matter of interpreting the subject not as the 
origin of affection or the unconscious but as its product or remainder. Affects or the
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unconscious must first of all be understood as subjectless. The subject only comes as 
a second moment, even though it misrecognises itself as being the first.
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II. C R I T I Q U E  : “social production ”
If the first part of AO  gives an ontology of desire linking it directly to the 
social field, then the second and third parts of this book are the application of this 
concept to a philosophical problematic. The second part takes the form, if one might 
use such a traditional word in this context, of an epistemological critique. And just as 
the first part of AO  exists under the name of Spinoza, as we have argued, then this 
second part (chapters two and three) is a critique undertaken within the field of an 
obviously Kantian heritage. The second part of the philosophical problematic is the 
application of substantive ontology and epistemological critique to the historical 
formations of the relation between desiring production and social production. What is 
criticised in the first part of the philosophical problematic is in fact a historical event. 
The philosophical problem itself is a historical problem. The Oedipal complex, which 
represents for Deleuze and Guattari the philosophical problem par excellence, results 
from a particular contingent and historical configuration of desiring production and 
social production.
II.l Psychoanalysis
We have seen from the previous section that the real is understood by Deleuze 
and Guattari as unconscious machinic production and that this productivity is 
organised by three immanent forms of synthesis: connective, disjunctive and 
conjunctive. The first part of AO  gives us the proper description of these syntheses, 
but we already know there must be a misapplication of these syntheses, otherwise it
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would be impossible to describe how desire desires its own repression. The second 
part of AO  gives us the form of the illegitimate uses of the unconscious syntheses, 
whereas the third part gives the historical conditions for this misapplication. Freud 
did not invent the unconscious, the unconscious was already there as desiring 
production. Likewise, Freud did not invent the illegitimate uses of the syntheses of 
the unconscious, they already existed at the level of social production in its 
organisation and coding of desiring production. Freud’s texts are merely the most 
concentrated description of the social repression of the unconscious, even though 
Freud himself thought he had discovered the truth about the unconscious.
Oedipus complex
For Deleuze and Guattari, Freud destroyed his discovery of the unconscious 
by constraining and interpreting the libido through the Oedipus complex.21 Rather 
than the unconscious being a place of productivity and desire, it becomes a theatre of 
myths and symbols:
La production n’est plus que la production de phantasme, 
production d’expression. L’inconscient cesse d’être ce qu’il 
est, une usine, un atelier, pour devenir un théâtre, scène et 
mise en scène. Et pas même un théâtre d’avant-garde, comme 
il y en avait au temps de Freud (Wedekind), mais le théâtre 
classique, l’ordre classique de la représentation. Le 
psychanalyste devient metteur en scène pour un théâtre privé -  
au lieu d’être l’ingénieur ou le méchanicien qui monte des
21 The Oedipus Complex is defined by Freud as the set of organised desires of love and hostility that 
the child feels for his parents. In its positive form, the complex presents itself as in the myth of Oedipus 
King. As the desire for the death of his rival of the same sex and sexual desire for the opposite sex. In 
its negative form, it presents itself as love for the parent of the same sex and hate and jealousy for the 
parent of the opposite sex. These two forms are found to different degrees in the complete form of the 
Oedipus complex. Op. Cit. Vocabulaire de lapsychanalvse, pp.79-84.
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unités de production, qui se bat avec des agents collectifs de 
production et d’anti-production.22
A transcendental critique, and here Deleuze and Guattari operate through a 
form in no way different to that of the Critique o f Pure Reason, is a critique of the 
transcendent misuse of immanent concepts. Thus, to use one example, Kant criticises 
the misuse of the immanent category of causality, which in the cosmological 
argument becomes a transcendent category in the notion of absolute totality, thus 
effectuating a dialectical misuse of the hypothetical syllogism.23 But in what way can 
the Oedipus complex be said to operate a transcendent misuse of an immanent 
principle? Just as in the cosmological misuse of reason an immanent category was 
taken out of the area of its proper application and predicated to a subject which cannot 
possibly be an object of experience, so is the Oedipus complex detached from the 
immanent flow of desiring production, and is thus said to determine it from the 
outside. Of course, this similarity is only formal. We are not saying that Deleuze and 
Guattari, and Kant are involved in the same project. Transcendental materialism and 
transcendental idealism are quite different positions.24 Transcendental idealism itself 
is based upon a transcendent misuse of the syntheses of the unconscious where the
22 Ibid. AO, p.64, A Ob, p.55.
23 I.Kant, Critique o f Pure Reason, (London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1929), A406, B 433.
24 The difference between these two ‘transcendental’ systems has to do with the distance that separates 
materialism from idealism. Ian MacKenzie has an interesting approach to this question which can be 
resumed as follows. In What is Philosophy?. Deleuze and Guattari dispute that philosophy could ever 
be contemplation, reflection or communication. Each of these terms represents a version of idealism. 
Thus, we could talk of 'obejetive idealism’ in the case of Plato who defines philosophy in terms of 
contemplation. Then, we might talk of a ‘subjective idealism' for Descartes who basis philosophy in 
reflection. Finally, we could talk of ‘intcrsubjectivc idealism' or philosophy as communication, which 
is phenomenology, especially Husserl's. Instead, they oppose to all idealisms a constructionist 
definition of philosophy. For Deleuze and Guattari all activities already involve contemplation, 
reflection and communication. These cannot be the sole privilege of philosophy nor can they serve as 
definition. All thought is creative. The specificity with regards to other activities of thought has to do
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subject produced by the conjunctive synthesis is taken to be the origin of all 
production and, indeed, is seen to be exterior to all production. Thus, even though 
transcendental materialism and transcendental idealism are formally the same, 
transcendental materialism is in fact the critique of transcendental idealism; critique 
once more again.
the Phallus
The transcendent meaning of the Oedipus complex is explained through the 
development of the phallus in Freud’s interpretation of sexuality. In sexuality we 
have two series, two flows of desire which can intermingle and cross over. But for 
Freud the very problem is how the sexes become either masculine or feminine. This 
bipartition can only be explained by a third term, which stands outside the double 
series and cuts it into two, then opposing one to the other. This third term is the 
Phallus.25 Freud identifies this third term, the Phallus, as the universal component of 
the structure of the unconscious, which he then undertakes to expound in his infamous 
theory of castration. What must be underlined in the theory of castration is the 
character of exteriority and transcendence the Phallus has. It does not belong to the 
libido or desiring production, rather it determines and constitutes the libido from the 
outside. Because the Phallus is outside desire it can only be experienced as a lack in a 
similar way to the One of negative theology which is by definition unreacheable but 
which determines me in every way:
with what it creates: concepts. ‘Creativity as Criticism. The philosophical constructivism of Deleuze 
and Guattari.’ I.MacKcn/.ic in Radical Philosophy 86 (November/Deccmbcr 1997).
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Ce quelque chose de commun, de transcendent et d’absent, on 
le nommera phallus ou loi, pour désigner “le” signifiant qui 
distribue dans l’ensemble de la chaîne les effets de 
signification et introduit les exclusions (d’où les
interprétations oedipianisantes du lacanisme). Or c’est lui qui 
agit comme cause formelle de la triangulation, c’est-à-dire qui 
rend possible la forme du triangle et sa reproduction : aussi 
Œdipe a-t-il pour formule 3 + 1 , le Un du phallus 
transcendant sans lequel les termes considérés ne formeraint 
pas un triangle.26
II.2 The Three Illegitimate Uses of the Syntheses
This transcendent signification of the Phallus, and thus the operation of the 
oedipal complex, has its source in the three illegitimate uses of the syntheses of the 
unconscious. We can understand the misuse of the syntheses as simply being the 
opposite of what we have learnt about them in the first part of AO Thus, if the 
correct interpretation of the connective synthesis is that of the immanent relation 
between an organ-machine and an energy source machine, then this one is replaced by 
a misuse of the connective synthesis. In the misuse of this synthesis desire is 
interpreted as a fixed subject, and partial objects are interpreted as complete objects 
defined as global persons, such as the father and the mother. In a second place the 
disjunctive synthesis, which is the inclusive distribution of desiring production on the 
Body without Organs, is replaced by an exclusive disjunction. This exclusive use of 
the synthesis operates in the twofold opposition of a transcendent term to the two 
terms it defines, on the one hand, and, between the two terms themselves, on the other 
- the figure of the triangle. Finally, there is the misuse of the conjunctive synthesis,
25 The Phallus underlines the symbolic function that the penis fulfils in the intra- and intersubjective 
dialectics. Thus, the penis is the term reserved to designate the organ in its anatomical reality. Op. Cit. 
Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse, pp.311-13.
26 Op. Cit. AO,p.86, AOb, p. 73.
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where the nomadic and polyvocal subject is replaced by the fixed and bi-univocal 
subject.
Each of these illegitimate uses of the syntheses of the unconscious, again 
reproducing the language of Kant’s critique, has their corresponding parallogism. 
The parallogism of the misuse of the connective synthesis is the detachment of a 
complete object from the signifying chain so as to extract a transcendent signifier, 
which then falls back on all the flows of desire, thereby assigning a lack to every 
desire. The parallogism which corresponds to the misuse of the disjunctive synthesis 
is that of the double bind which makes the Oedipus complex both the cause and the 
solution of the problem, and thus arrests any motion of desiring production, as it gets 
caught in an oscillation between these two poles. The Oedipus complex is both the 
beginning and the end The parallogism which corresponds to the misuse of the 
conjunctive synthesis is that of application whereby desire is only understood through 
oppositions : “I am a Jew and you are a Palestinian”, and “you are my brother, my 
sister, or my father, or my mother”. In every case, a set of bi-uni vocal relations to the 
family and the social field is substituted for the polyvalency of a nomadic subject, 
which is all these things and more.27
Neither the ontological analytic of the machinic unconscious nor the 
epistemological critique of the illegitimate use of the syntheses of the unconscious can 
be abstracted from the social field. Desiring production immediately invests social 
production as well as social production counter-invests desiring production. Thus, the
27 This discussion of the illegitimate uses of the syntheses of the unconscious are described in ibid pp. 
131-132. Deleuze and Guattari also make it clear that there may be more parallogisms than the ones 
described : “Encore n 'avons-nous pas épuisé tous les paralogismes qui orientent pratiquement la cure 
dans le sens d’une cedipianisation forcenée, trahison du désir, mise en pouponnière de l’inconscient, 
machine narcissique pour des petits moi bavards et arrogant, perpétuelle absorption de plus-value 
capitaliste, flux de parole contre flux d’argent, l’histoire interminable, la psychanalyse.” Ibid. p. 132.
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Oedipus complex and the operation of the Phallus are not a structural description of 
language but a mechanism o f the social repression of desiring production. The 
analysis of the Oedipus complex in the works of Freud and Lacan, and their disciples, 
is merely a repetition of this social repression at the level of theory. This is why 
Deleuze and Guattari can argue that psychoanalysis is at the service of the State:
Le névrosé reste installé dans les territorialités résiduelles ou 
factices de notre société, et les rabats toutes sur Œdipe comme 
ultime territorialité qui se reconstitue dans le cabinet de 
l’analyste, sur le corps plein du psychoanalyste (oui, le patron, 
c’est le père, et le chef d’Etat aussi, et vous aussi, docteur...). 
Le pervers, c’est lui qui prend l’artifice au mot : vous en 
voulez, vous en aurez, des territorialités infiniment plus 
artificielles encore que la société nous propose, de nouvelles 
familles infiniment plus artificielles encore que celles que la 
société nous propose, de nouvelles familles infiniment 
artificielles, des sociétés secrètes et lunaires.28
Materialist Psychiatry
The Oedipus complex, therefore, is not simply a theory about the unconscious, 
rather it is the “delegated representative” of the social repression of the unconscious, 
whose origin is the given form of social production, in this case is capitalism. This is 
why a materialist psychiatry itself cannot merely be a theoretical critique, but is 
already a politics, for psychoanalysis, whether it knows it or not, is invaded by the 
social field from every side. Thus, every anti-psychiatry must also be a political act, 
whose theoretical and practical basis is the restoration of the unconscious syntheses to 
their “immanent use”. Just as in Spinoza the ontology of substance and the analysis 
of attributes and modes leads to an ethics of composition and decomposition of
28 Ibid. AO, pp.42 and 43,/40/>,p.35.
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bodies, so schizoanalysis, in its description of the immanent processes of unconscious 
productive desire leads to a militant politics. This is a necessary consequence of the 
parallelism between desiring and social production:
La schizo-analyse ne se cache donc pas d’être une 
psychanalyse politique et sociale, une analyse militante : non 
pas parce qu’elle généraliserait Œdipe dans la culture, sous les 
conditions ridicules qui ont eu cours jusqu’à maintenant. 
Mais, au contraire, parce qu’elle se propose de montrer 
l’existence d’un investissement libidinal inconscient de la 
production sociale historique, distinct des investissements 
conscients qui coexistent avec lui.
It is this parallelism between desiring production and social production, or 
between the ontological and the political, that renders necessary for the 
epistemological critique to become a historical analysis, since the formation of the 
figures of thought have as their origin a particular shape of social production.
One must be careful, however, of not turning the difference between social 
production and desiring production into an abstract opposition, as though society 
determined desire from the outside. On the contrary, desiring production is 
immediately social and social production has as its milieu, the productive 
unconscious. The condition of possibility for a given socius to code, regulate or 
determine desiring production is immanent to the unconscious itself This condition 
is the Body without Organs Without this primary repression of the Body without 
Organs over desiring machines, there would be no social repression.
29 Ibid. AO, pp. 116 and 117, AOb, p.98.
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11.3 Social Production
The three major forms of social production for Deleuze and Guattari are the 
primitive, the despotic and the capitalist. Each describes a historically contingent 
surface from which flows and cuts of desiring production are inscribed. These 
surfaces are merely different versions of the Body without Organs transposed onto the 
social field. Although, in this transposition we are no longer faced with an 
undifferentiated Body without Organs, the limit of every society, but with the full 
body of the socius. In the case of the primitive society this full body, or the socius, is 
the Earth, in despotic society it is the body of the Despot, and in capitalism it is 
capital. In each case it is a matter of the socius falling back onto desire and codifying 
it according to its own affiliations and alliances. In this falling back upon desire the 
socius is represented as the miraculous origin of society.
Capitalism
The special case here, is that of capitalism. This is because in capitalism the 
socius is the closest to the body without organs. Thus, one of the effects of capitalism 
is the decoding of all societies that have hitherto existed. This is why Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that capitalism is at the limit of every society, for capitalism is that 
limit. This limit, however, is only a relative limit and not an absolute one. The 
absolute limit is schizophrenia. Thus, as much as capitalism unleashes desire, in the 
conjunction of the movement of capital and labour (and one only has to see the truth 
of this when capital invades primitive or feudal society - everything starts falling 
apart), it immediately seeks to control the desire it has unleashed. The fundamental
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contradiction within capitalism is not the falling rate of profit, as Marx believed.30 
But, the socius at one and the same time decoding desire, and thus allowing desiring 
production to invest the social field completely, whilst on the other hand overcoding it 
through a “gigantic machine for social and psychic repression.”31
relative /  absolute limit
Capitalism is the limit of every society because it decodes the flows that the 
other social formations coded and overcoded. It substitutes, however, for these 
decoded flows an even more rigorous axiomatic which ensures that the energy of 
these flows are always attached to capital: “ .. .parce qu’elle machine et fait couler des 
flux effectivement décodés, mais en substituant aux codes une axiomatique comptable 
encore plus oppressive.”32 Unlike the other social formations, however, this 
disciplinary control of desire is immanent to desire. In the despotic society, for 
example, the overcoding comes from the side of social production itself and is 
represented as exterior to desire, ultimately in the figure of God. Capitalism requires 
that desire disciplines itself. Desire must desire its own repression. This is the
1(1 ‘La chute tendantielle du taux de profit est combinée -ist verbundem mit -avec une hausse 
tendantielle du taux de la plusvalue, donc du degré d'exploitation du travail.' K.Marx, Capital VI. [The 
falling rate of profit is combined -  ist verbundem mit with the growing rale of profit, thus of the 
degree of exploitation!. E.Balibar interprets Marx’s critique of the falling rate of profit from the 
perspective of its opposition to classical economy that basis itself in the notion of contradiction. Instead 
Marx's analysis shifts this notion to that of limits which are non-contradictory. Balibar's argument 
centres on reading from what Marx indicates with this shift that contradictions in Capitalism need to be 
explained at another level than the economical and in the complex conjunctions of Capitalism: 
‘L’analyse de la transformation des limites requiert donc une théorie des temps différents de la 
structure économique et de la lutte de classes et de leurs articulation dans la structure 
sociale.'E.Balibar. ‘Concepts fondamentaux du matérialisme historique. IV. Elements pour une théorie 
du passage', Lire le Capital, (Paris: puf, 19%), p.547. [The analysis of the transformation of limits thus 
requires a theory of times different from the economic structure and class struggle and their articulation 
in the social structure).
31 “une gigantesque machine de repression-refoulemenf'.Op. Cit. AO, p.292, AOb, p.245.
32 Ibid. AO, p.207, AOb, p. 176.
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purpose of the Oedipus complex: to insinuate the axiomatics of capital within desire 
itself through the three illegitimate uses of the syntheses of the unconscious.
deterritorialisation /  reterritorialisation
Everytime there is a deterritorialization, there is immediately a 
reterritorialization: “il est impossible de distinguer la déterritorialisation de la re- 
térritorialisation, qui sont prises l’une dans l’autre ou sont comme l’envers et l’endroit 
d’un même processus.”33 And this reterritorialization has as its central mechanism the 
Oedipus complex: global and specific objects rather than partial and non-specific, 
exclusive differences rather than inclusive, fixed subjects rather than nomadic. “Le 
triangle œdipien est la territorialité intime et privée qui correspond à tous les efforts 
de re-térritorialisation sociale du capitalisme.”34 Precisely because capitalism is the 
relative limit of society it also makes possible, for the first time, the absolute limit to 
society. Thus, like Marx, Deleuze and Guattari believe that capitalism is its own 
impossibility. In other words, capitalism, and thus the Oedipal complex, contains its 
own auto-critique. The purpose of schizoanalysis, is to lay out this auto-critique.
33 Ibid. AO, p.307, AOb, p.258.
34 Ibid. AO, p.317, AOb, p.266.
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III. POLITICS : “sc h izo a n a ly s is  ”
We should not fall into the error of translating the parallelism between 
desiring production and social production into an opposition of two different orders, 
as though their difference was simply the difference between the individual, on the 
one hand and society, on the other. On the contrary, Homo natura and homo Historia 
are one and the same in desiring production.35 We can see why this unity must be the 
case since the parallelism between desiring production and social production is 
founded on the more primary relation between desiring production and the Body 
without Organs.
III.l The Body without Organs
The Body without Organs is not different than desiring production but is 
produced by desiring production itself. This Body without Organs, anti-production at 
the heart of production , its immobile motor, has two poles. One pole is the repulsion 
of desiring production and the other is attraction. Social production is its attractive 
pole where desiring machines are recorded upon the surface of the full body of the 
socius. It is at this point, in the relation between the socius and desiring production 
that they are falsely represented as opposed to one another, whereas at the level of the 
unconscious they must be one and the same. This unity of the Body without Organs
35 Ibid. AO, p.328, AOb. p.275.
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and desiring production is the spinozist centre of AO The partial objects of desire are 
inscribed on the Body without Organs, but, just as in Spinoza where attributes are not 
to be opposed to substance but are its expression (expression in the ontological sense 
and not in the sense of representation), so the Body without Organs and desiring 
production are mutually and simultaneously implicated :
Le corps sans organes est la substance immanente, au sens le 
plus spinozist du mot ; et les objets partiels sont comme ses 
attributs ultimes, qui appartienent précisément en tant qu’ils 
sont réellement distincts et ne peuvent à ce titre s’exclure ou 
s’opposer. Les objets partiels et le corps sans organes sont les 
deux éléments matériels des machines désirantes 
schizophréniques : les uns comme pièces travailleuses, l’autre 
comme moteur immobile ; les uns comme micro-molécules, 
l’autre comme molécule géante -  les deux ensembles dans un 
rapport de continuité aux deux bouts de la chaîne moléculaire 
du désir.36
In other words, the parallelism of social production and desiring production 
has its basis in a rigorous immanent materialist ontology. Social production is the 
expression, in the spinozist sense, of desiring production. The distance between them 
is immanent to desiring production itself. Nonetheless, it is this very distance which 
allows for the coding and decoding of desiring production. The Body without Organs 
falls back upon desiring machines so as to distribute them upon its surface according 
to inclusive disjunctions, so many possible connections and flows. The socius, on the 
other hand, falls back upon desiring machines according to exclusive disjunctions. 
However, the latter is only possible because desire desires its own repression.
36 Ibid. AO. p.390, AOb. p.327.
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III.2 Social Investment
The reproduction of societies, the reproduction of reproduction, requires an 
investment by desire. There are two types of investment, one from the side of 
desiring production itself, which deterritorial izes the coding of society, and the other 
from the side of society itself through desiring production, which identifies with this 
codes and reproduces them.
paranoiac / schizophrénie poles
These two poles of social investment, which oscillate within unconscious 
production, Deleuze and Guattari name as the paranoiac pole and the schizophrenic 
pole.37 The paranoiac pole of the unconscious investment of the social field is the 
identification of the social forms with the given interests of these forms. From this 
identification are produced global persons and complete objects. This process begins 
with the family and extends to the most complex institutions of society. It is what 
Althusser has called “the ideological State apparatus”. This does not mean, of course, 
that the family is the beginning point of the process, for, as we have already seen, the 
family as such is the delegated representative of social repression. This explains the 
importance of the critique of the Oedipus complex by schizoanalysis, for it is this very 
mechanism by which desiring desire becomes paranoid. And this mechanism has to 
be all the more powerful within capitalism since it itself produces the general 
decoding of flows within the social field
Ibid. AO, p.329, AOh, p.277.
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molecular /  motar
To the two poles of social investment correspond the two kinds of immanent 
organisation of the unconscious: the molecular and the molar.38 The molar 
organisation of consciousness refers to the reduction of desiring production to social 
production through a process of identification (I belong to a species, race or culture). 
Thus it introduces lack into desire and thereby transposes desire onto the plane of the 
personal and the collective, rather than the unconscious and singular. The molecular, 
on the contrary, refers to desiring production investing the social field as such with 
the flows of its energy machines and breaks of its organ-machines, which populate the 
social field without any hierarchy or ideal.
Once more, the difference between the molar and the molecular should not be 
interpreted as a difference between the individual and the collective, as though the 
molar referred to the undifferentiated “they”, and the molecular to the authentic 
individual. On the contrary, both terms refer to a group determination. Thus, to the 
two poles, paranoia and schizophrenia, and the two forms molar and molecular of 
social investment, there correspond two different types of group: the subjected group,
38 See AO. p.322, AOb.pHO. Although this distinction between the molecular and the molar 
introduces a new language into AO borrowed from the biological sciences, it does not add anything to 
the content of the distinctions operative in that work. The difference between the molecular and the 
molar, however, does become the major distinction of Deleuze's and Guattari’s work after AO , and 
also changes its meaning. We shall return to this topic in the second half of this second part of the 
thesis in the analysis of Mille Plateaux.
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with its heard mentality and slavish disposition, and the subject-group with its 
revolutionary tendency to liberate desire:
L’un est un investissement de groupe assujetti, aussi bien dans 
la forme de souveraineté que dans les formations coloniales de 
l’ensemble grégaire, qui réprime et refoule le désir des 
personnes ; l’autre, un investissement de groupe-sujet dans les 
multiplicités transversales qui portent le désir comme 
phénomène moléculaire, c’est-à-dire objets partiels et flux, par 
opposition avec les ensembles et les personnes.39
III.3 The Tasks of schizoanalysis
From this distinction of the two poles of investment of the social field, the two 
positive tasks of schizoanalysis reveal themselves. It should not surprise us that this 
is a matter of politics, since in both cases it is a matter of working against the 
paranoiac investments of the social field. One task is at the level o f  the individual, 
which o f course is a product of social production itself, and the other, at the level of 
group. We might characterise the first task as analytical and the second as political, 
though of course this does not mean there is no relation between the two, as though 
analysis where not already political.
the first task
The first positive task of schizoanalysis is to discover the desiring machines at 
work beneath the mask of the subject, so as to reach partial objects and the ultimate 
unconscious. This would mean, for Deleuze and Guattari, the analyst ridding himself 
or herself of all the tools of Freudian and Lacanian analysis, since they are the illness
Ib id . AO, p .333, AOb, p.280.
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rather than the cure. This positive task leads necessarily to the second positive task of 
schizoanalysis since the institution of psychiatry and psychoanalysis itself is part of a 
wider process o f social repression.
the second task
The second positive task is the diagnosis of political groups so as to be able to 
push them from the form o f subjected group to the form of subject-group. This 
implies, for Deleuze and Guattari, the political-critical task of the auto-critique of left- 
wing groups, which conceal reactionary moments within their supposed revolutionary 
intents. And not only the more obvious critique of fascism:
Un groupe révolutionnaire quant au préconscient reste un 
groupe assujetti , même en conquérant le pouvoir , autant que 
ce pouvoir renvoie lui-même à une forme de puissance qui 
continue de s’asservir et d’écraser la production désirante ;
Au moment ou il est révolutionnaire préconscient, un tel 
groupe présente déjà tous les caractères inconscients d’un
40groupe assujetti...
The second positive task of schizoanalysis contains four theses and one 
general principle: every investment is social, unconscious libidinal group investment 
is prior to preconscious class investment (class needs are subordinate to desiring 
production), the relation to the non-familial is primary (sexuality is prior to 
procreation), social libidinal investment is divided into the two poles of the paranoiac 
reactionary and the schizoid revolutionary. And finally, the general principle of 
schizoanalysis is that desire is constitutive of the social field (social production is
40 Ibid. AO, p.417, AOb, p.348.
105
immanent to desiring production and there is no difference between the two). These 
four theses and general principle of schizoanalysis although political, since they 
concern how desire is manipulated and crushed within society, do not, however, 
announce a political program. A political program would simply institute a new party 
and thus produce a subjected group that would form its own hierarchies in the name 
of libidinal materialism. The political expression of schizoanalysis is not a program 
but the direct investment of the social field with desire, and this is made possible by 
the critique of the Oedipus complex, that is to say by a setting into motion of the 
revolutionary potential of the analytic machine:
Nous croyons au contraire à la possibilité d’une reversion 
interne, qui fait de la machine analytique une pièce 
indispensable de l’appareil révolutionnaire. Bien plus, les 
conditions objectives en semblent actuellement données.41
A revolution is not actual, and thus inside our heads, but is a pure 
potentiality 42 This means that the revolutionary break cannot be the formation of a 
new socius but the following of the decoded flows of desire, which break through the 
oppressive function of the axiomatics of capital. Such lines o f flight have more to do
41 Ibid. AO, p.97, AOb, p.82.
Potentialities are pure puissances or dynamics. These forces that are at play in every situation arc 
liable to certain changes. The different possible changes F.Zourabichvilli calls possibilité de vie and 
thus, although he emphasises the involuntary in his analysis of Deleuze’s politics, he stresses the 
interactivity within this field of forces. Thus, even though politics no longer comes down to a decision 
that steins from our conscious thinking, it is nevertheless possible to talk of an inherent revolutionary 
potential in our relations to the field: 'Quand nous saisissons la situation comme pure possible ou dans 
sa potentialité, nous évaluons ces possibilités de vie (ou ces condensés) qui, par-là mêmes, se 
redistribuent autrement.' F.Zourabichvilli, ‘Deleuze et le possible (de l’involontarisme en politique)’. 
Gilles Deleuze une vie philosophique, (Paris: Synthélabo. 1998), p.343. (When we grasp the situation 
as a pure possibility or in its potentiality, we evaluate its life expectancy which thus redistribute 
themselves differently].
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with momentary events at the level of the everyday, a kiss brushing the skin of one’s 
lover, than with political meetings and manifestos:
Et puis, sourtout, nous ne cherchons aucune dérobade en 
disant que la schizo-analyse en tant que telle n’a strictement 
aucun programme politique à proposer. Si elle en avait un, ce 
serait tout à la fois grotesque et inquiétant. Elle ne se prend 
pas pour un parti, ni même pour un groupe, et ne prétend pas 
parler au nom des masses. Un programme politique n’est pas 
censé s’élaborer dans le cadre de la schizo-analyse.43
It would be wrong however, not to point to a certain tension in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s position similar to the one we may find in the work of Marx, and that is 
whether their very historical description o f the parallelism between desiring and social 
production cancels out politics. If capitalism is the decoding of flows, why not just let 
capitalism undermine itself as it pushes itself to the limit?: “Non pas se retirer du 
procès mais aller plus loin, ‘accélérer le procès’, comme disait Nietzsche...”44 We 
know others who have been tempted by this interpretation -  schizoanalysis as passive 
nihilism. But such an interpretation would misunderstand the relation between 
capitalism, a particular social formation, with desiring production, on the one hand, 
and the relation of the Body without Organs, on the other. Capitalism is only the 
relative limit to the socius. Thus, to push capitalism would only be to push the 
relative limit further from the centre to the periphery, from the first world to the third 
Only the Body without Organs is the absolute limit to the socius. It is true, for 
Deleuze and Guattari, that capitalism is the closest to desiring production since in 
capitalism coding and overcoding are replaced by the decoding of the flows of desire.
43 O p. C it. AO, p .456 , AOb. p.380.
44 Ibid. AO, p .285 , AOb, p.240.
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Nonetheless, the other side of this decoding is the axiomatics of capitalism which is 
an even more rigorous, and the Oedipus complex comes to show this, control and 
determination of desiring production, since in this instance desire desires its own 
repression to the highest degree.
active utopia
It is this difference between the relative and absolute limit that enables 
Deleuze and Guattari to have a utopian politics. They call it an active utopia. 
Deterritorialization beyond the reterritorialization of capitalism, which attempts to re­
inject into the social field failed and ruined representations, above all the holy family, 
so as to block the very flows that capital sets into motion.45 Indeed, in the appendix to 
the second edition of AO, Deleuze and Guattari give a pragmatic example of what an 
active utopia might be. It would be the appropriation of the means of production by 
everyone, whereby there would be the greatest number of people utilising the greatest 
number of machines, the greatest number of small machines, connecting and cross­
connecting, and the destruction of the domination of professionals and experts. This, 
they argue, is not a “return to nature” but the promotion of the greatest invention 
possible in scientific and artistic machines. These are blocked and prevented by 
capitalism for its own political and economic ends, that is, the formation of great 
monopolies that prevent the general démocratisation of the means of production.46
45 See Ibid. AO, p .3 6 0 , AOh, p.302.
46 See on ly  in  the  F rench  original: Ibid. AO. p .479.
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Chapter IV
from “schizo-analysis” 
to “micro-politics”
(Mille Plateaux)
In this chapter, the analysis of the parallelism between the ontological and the 
political order in Deleuze and Guatarri’s work will cover from L 'Anti-Oedipe to Mi lie 
Plateaux ' Before the topic of this chapter is approached directly, we shall first need 
to think about the difference between these two works. It would be wrong to claim 
that there is an absolute break between them, still less that there has been a ‘turn’ in 
their work, as some speak of a similar ‘turn’ in the work of other philosophers, rather 
the same style is present in MP as in AO: a rigourous materialism, no appeal to any 
transcendence, and a new politics of desire or affects. This thesis has argued that all 
these elements belong to the essence of their spinozism. Despite the continuity of this 
project, there are nonetheless subtle differences between these two works that need to 
be alluded to at the beginning of this chapter.
The most important of these differences, and one that is essential to our theme, 
is MP's resistance to the notion of a universal history. This will have important 1
1 G.Deleuze et F.Guattari, VAnti-Oedipe, (Paris : Minuit. 1972/73). [Hereafter AO] The English 
translation: Anti Oedipus, (London: the Athlone Press, 1984). [Hereafter AOb\. And G.Deleuze et
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consequences on how both works configure and reflect upon the political. Unlike MP, 
the argument of AO  seems to require the concept of a universal history that has 
become unnecessary in the former. Indeed, the concept of a universal history is seen 
in MP to have its origin in macro-political forces that run counter to the micro­
political forces of becoming. Universal history is, as Walter Benjamin once famously 
remarked, always the language of the victors, or as Deleuze and Guattari will write, 
the language of universal history is always the language of the State: ‘On écrit 
l’histoire, mais on l’a toujours écrite du point de vue des sédentaires, et au nom d’un 
appareil unitaire d’Etat, au moins possible même quand on parlait de nomades. Ce qui 
manque, c’est une Nomadologie, le contraire d’une histoire.’2
This is quite different from AO  where Deleuze and Guattari appear to have 
found as they say enough ‘innocence’ to be able to write a universal history.3 Why is 
this so? This is because in AO Deleuze and Guattari accept Marxists division of 
history into primitive, despotic and capitalist blocks, of which the last shape is the 
universal form of history itself In other words capitalism is the real that haunts every 
social formation. It is the real because it is the decoding of flows of desire that the 
other social formations repress and codify. It is also for this reason that the writing of 
AO is only possible with the arrival of capitalism. For one can only think desiring 
production through the fact of capitalism. This does not mean that Deleuze and 
Guattari are simply celebrating capitalism in AO, for they are well aware that the 
opposite side of this process of decoding is the repressive axiomatics of capital:
Pourquoi forme-t-elle à son tour une gigantesque machine de 
répression-refoulement à l’egard de ce qui constitue pourtant 
sa propre réalité, les flux décodés?. C’est que, nous l’avons
F.Guattari, Mille Plateaux, (Paris : Minuit. 1980). [Herafter. MP\ The English translation: A Thousand 
Plateaus. (Minneapolis, London: 1987). |Hereafter TP\
2 Op. Cit. M P  p.34, TP, p.23. See also MP, p.269-70, TP, p.221.
1 Op. Cit. AO, p.163,AOb, p.139.
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vu, le capitalisme est bien la limite de toute société, en tant 
qu’il opère le décodage des flux que les autres formations 
sociales codaient et surcodeaint. Toute fois il en est la limite 
ou coupures relatives , parce qu’il substitue aux codes une 
axiomatique extrêmement rigoureuse qui maintient l’énergie 
des flux dans un état lié sur le corps du capital comme socius 
déterritorialisé, mais aussi et même plus impitoyable que tout 
autre socius.4
And yet it is also within the era of capitalism that these contradictions and 
even the possibility of its abolition is both thinkable and achievable. This is why even 
for Deleuze and Guattari at the time of writing AO, capitalism is the end of history.5 
They have quite a different position on history, as has already been remarked, 
however, in MP  This is not because capitalism has ceased to be of major importance 
to them but that the linear narrative of history, which they borrow from Marx, has 
been jettisoned for a micro-analysis of social formations. Rather than these social 
formations being strung, like beads on a chain one after the other through universal 
history, they are placed co-extensively side by side. Thus, history, rather than being 
the story of an evolution that results in a necessary end called capitalism, is the 
connection between heterogeneous and divergent elements across an immanent field :
Un évolutionisme économique est impossible : on ne peut 
guère croire à une évolution même ramifiée « cueilleurs -  
chasseurs -  éleveurs -  agriculteurs -  industriels ». Ne vaut pas 
mieux un évolutionisme éthologique « nomades -  semi- 
nomades -  sédentaires ». Pas d’avantage un évolutionisme 
écologique « autarcie dispersée de groupes locaux -  villages et 
bourgades -  villes -  Etats ». Il suffit de faire interférer ces 
évolutions abstraites pour que tout évolutionisme s’écroule : 
par exemple c’est la ville qui crée l’agriculture, sans passer 
par des bourgades.6
Take one example from MP: the relation between the nomadic war machine 
and the State Apparatus. Deleuze and Guattari are not talking about the super
Ibid. AO,p. 292, AOb, p .245-46 .
5 Ibid. AO, p. 163, AOb, p. 139.
6 O p. C it. MP. p. 536, TP, p. 430.
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imposition of one form upon the other, as though there were first, in a point of history, 
a nomadic war machine that evolves into the State, but that there is a constant war 
between them. Nomadic war machines do not have a ‘once’ in history but are being 
continually recreated and dismantled. The State, also, does not happen ‘once’ in 
history but is continually being recreated in new forms and shapes answering to 
different threats and demands from the outside. The point, then, is not to have the 
‘innocence’ to write a universal history, but to analyse and describe the infinitesimal 
movements and rests across history, in which certain moments of convergence can be 
dated (as the dates that mark the plateaus of MP), but will never stabilise into the 
illusion of an evolutionary history.
Rather than this micro-analysis or micro-politics moving MP away from 
Spinoza it draws it even closer. What is the legacy of Spinoza’s political theory to 
MP? First of all, it is a question of style, and more importantly, the effect of style. Of 
course we know that parts of MP even seem to imitate the geometric model of 
Spinoza’s method. Thus, the plateau called ‘Treatise on Nomadology’ (even echoing 
one of the titles of Spinoza’s work such as his Political Treatise) is made up of 
propositions, axioms and problems. This, however is not really what is at issue in the 
matter of the style of MP, rather, it is a question of writing as a war machine and the 
effects it has on bodies. Thus, as Warren Montag writes in Bodies, Masses, Power, 
one of the fundamental theses of Spinoza’s materialism is the material effects of 
writing:
The written form of these propositions itself possesses a 
corporeal existence, not as the realisation or materialisation of 
a pre-existing mental, spiritual invention, but as a body among 
other bodies. Spinoza’s philosophy compels us to replace 
questions like ‘Who has read it ?’ and ‘Of those how many 
have understood it ?’ with ‘What material effects has it
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produced, not only on or in minds, but on bodies as well ?’
‘To what extent has it moved bodies and what has it moved 
them to do?’ 7
In the same way, at the beginning of MP  where Deleuze and Guattari speak 
about the writing of this very book, they say its importance lies not in what it might 
mean (though this does not discount the pleasure many may find in finding out what it 
might mean) but in what effect this book has upon others; that is to say, what 
connections, breaks and flows it produces:
On ne demandera jamais ce que veut dire un livre, signifié ou 
signifiant, on ne cherchera rien à comprendre dans un livre, on 
se demandera avec quoi il fonctionne, en connexion de quoi il 
fait ou non passer des intensités, dans quelles multiplicités il 
introduit et métamorphose la sienne, avec quel corps sans 
organe il fait lui-même converger le sien.8
Any writing, whether in this case we are talking about philosophy or literature, 
is not political in the first case because it has something to say about politics, even 
Deleuze and Guattari, but is political as writing. Naturally, both philosophy and 
literature can and do suggest to us certain political virtues and actions, but what is 
fundamental and decisive is that writing itself, before the representation of the 
political already has an effect. This is what Deleuze and Guattari mean by rhizomatic 
writing or pragmatics. This question of the relation between writing and material 
effects brings us back to the decisive rupture of Spinoza’s thought within political 
theory. This rupture is still important and significant for us because it marks a 
disjunction with liberal theory that continues to be the ideological justification of the 
State in our own era. Although on the surface it appears that Spinoza adopts the 
language o f liberal theory by appearing to endorse the language of rights, his own 
defence of natural rights, as many commentators have emphasised (such as Tosel,
7 Warren Montag, Bodies, Masses, Power: Spinoza and his Contemporaries, (London. New York: 
Verso, 1999), p.xxi.
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Macherey, Balibar, Negri) is based upon the operation o f power rather than an appeal 
to juridical laws:
Par droit de nature, donc, j ’entends les lois mêmes ou règles 
de la Nature suivant lesquelles tout arrive, c’est à dire la 
puissance même de la Nature entière et conséquemment de 
chaque individu s’étend jusqu’où va sa puissance, et donc tout 
ce que fait un homme suivant les lois de la propre nature, il le 
fait en vertu d’un droit qu’il a de puissance.8 9
This definition of rights in terms of power rather than juridical concepts marks 
an important displacement in political theory even though to a certain extent it has 
taken us this long to see what Spinoza was getting at. To some extent Spinoza ‘s 
displacement of natural rights and contract theory to the language of power and 
affects, and thereby the domination and servitude of the body and its correlate effects 
upon the mind (its beliefs and self-defences), is a foretaste of Foucault’s almost self­
revelation in the first volume of the history of sexuality: juridical power is a fiction.10 
The effects of power upon bodies is always diffuse and eccentric: ‘Chaque centre de 
pouvoir est aussi moléculaire, s’exerce sur un tissu micrologique où il n’existe plus 
que comme difùs, dispersé, démultiplié, miniaturisé, sans cesse déplacé, agissant par 
segmentation fines, opérant dans le detail et le détail de détails.’11 It is this change or 
transformation in the conception of power that perhaps marks the biggest shift 
between MP and AO. In the latter work there is almost no discussion of the spinozist 
vocabulary of bodies and effects and the operation of power upon them. Moreover, 
the conception of power in AO is monolithic: the different forms of the socius, such as 
the Earth, the body o f the Despot and Capital fall back onto desiring production in the 
same way. Even though the historical specific nature of this repression is distinct to
8 Op.Cit. MP. p 10, TP. p. 4.
9 Baruch Spinoza, Traité Politique, (Paris. Flammarion, 1966). p. 16.
10 See Foucault’s, Histoire de la sexualité, vol. 1, (Paris: Gallimard. 1976), p. 107-120, The History o f
Sexuality, (London: Penguin, 1978), p. 81-91.
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each social formation, such that Deleuze and Guattari speak of the coding of flows 
that belongs to the body of the despot as opposed to the decoding that belongs to 
Capital, the actual operation of these repressions is always the same: that is to say a 
homogeneous operation of power. The micro-analysis of power belongs to a different 
conception of the relation between the poles of repression and repressed which makes 
it far more difficult to diagnose the difference between subjected groups and subject- 
groups. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari will say in MP that we need to be more aware of 
the ‘microtextures’ of oppression, such that we can see how even the revolutionary 
groups of Europe are involved in the oppression of the Third World.12 This is not to 
deny the hesitations and uncertainties of AO  in its description of possibilities of 
revolutionary praxis and the fact that any revolutionary group can be parasitic upon 
regimes of oppression. But even in this case this is thought of in terms of the 
contradictions of capital, rather than a micro-politics.
When we speak about the diffused concept of power then we have to begin 
with Spinoza’s description of the relation between bodies and their affects. Subjection 
is a matter of corporeal relations and not a matter of the free will; ‘a matter of what 
bodies do and do not do,’ as Warren Montag writes, ‘and how they affect each 
other.’13 In the opposite movement the possibility of liberation also exists at the level 
of bodies and affects. This means that politics no longer becomes a question of an 
appeal to sovereign power, even if this power might be said to represent the power of 
the people, but a different relation between bodies than the model of domination. 
Maurizzio Lazzarato gives us some indication, in his analysis of Foucault’s
"  O p . Cit. MP, p. 274, TP, p .224.
12 Ib id  MP. p. 275, TP. p. 225.
13 O p . Cit. p. 42.
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biopolitics, about what this other politics might be: a minimisation of domination in 
the relation between bodies and the reversal and re-mobilisation of power relations:
A la frontière entre ‘relations stratégiques’ et ‘états de 
domination’, sur le terrain des ‘techniques de gouvernement’, 
la lutte éthico-politique prend tout son sens. L’action éthique 
est donc concentrée sur le rapport entre relations stratégiques 
et technologies de gouvernement et a deux finalités majeures :
1) permettre de jouer les relations stratégiques avec le 
minimum possible de domination en se donnât des règles de 
droit, des techniques de gestion des rapports aux autres et 
aussi de rapport à soi. 2)augmenter la liberté, la liberté, la 
mobilité et la reversiblité de jeux de pouvoir car elle sont les 
conditions de la résistance et de la création.14
This emphasis on micro-politics does not change the parallel between 
ontology and politics, which is one of the major themes in Deleuze and Guattari, but 
modifies it in subtle ways and these modifications will be the major topic of this 
chapter. Briefly, we might describe these modifications as follows: the ontological 
investigations of MP, in comparison to AO, become all encompassing. In other words, 
the real no longer simply refers to the anthropocentric sphere as it does in AO but also 
to the inorganic and organic spheres exterior to the human species. The description of 
the relations between machinic assemblages, abstract machines and the plane of 
consistency within MP, include just as much the relation between, for example, DNA 
and genetic replication as they do the description of social formations. This means 
that there is no disjunction between the human sphere and Nature in MP as there 
might be in AO  This broadening out of the ontological analysis in MP, however, does 
not discredit the parallelism between ontology and the political. For Deleuze and
14 Maurizzio Lazzarato, ‘Du biopouvoir à la biopolitique’, dans Multitudes. n° 1. mars 2000. pp. 55-56. 
[In the frontier between ‘strategic relations’ and 'states of domination’, on the terrain of the ‘technics of 
government’, the ethico-politcal struggle takes its full meaning. Ethical action is concentrated upon the 
rapport between strategic and technological relations of government and has two major finalities : l)to 
allow the play of strategic relations with the minimum possible domination giving itself rules of right, 
technics of management of the relations to others and also to oneself. 2)to augment the freedom, 
mobility and reversibility of the games of power, since they are the conditions of resistance and 
creation.)
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Guattari, it is always a question of an emergent politics rather than a transcendental 
one. It is through the analysis and description of social formations in the relation 
between abstract machines and machinic assemblages that the possibility of politics 
emerges. We do not have to translate an ontology into a politics, rather a materialist 
ontology is already political. This, again, is the important lesson of Spinoza. His 
political writings are not an addition or an addendum to his metaphysical writings, 
they belong to the same continuity of thought.
This chapter will be organised in the following manner. First of all, it will 
examine the ontology of M P  in as far as it is relevant to the question of the political. 
In attempting to bring out the specific nature of this politics, it will turn to the work of 
the French sociologist Gabriel Tarde, who has had a decisive influence upon 
Deleuze’s work and his collaboration with Guattari. Finally, it will examine the scope 
and depth of the notion of micro-politics as it emerges from this problematic.
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I. MILLE PLATEAUX : ‘translational’ Ontology
No one can hope to give a complete summary of all the twists and turns of 
MP. Indeed, even to think of performing such a task is to profoundly misunderstand 
both the form o f this book and the effect of Deleuze and Guattari’s writing. You have 
to make your own path through the book, and the desire for systematisation and 
closure is merely a counter movement to the philosophical creativity that this book, 
which fundamentally bears no name, desires to inspire. The path that this thesis takes 
is one that follows the connections between a materialist ontology and a new politics. 
For this reason it is concerned essentially with the social formations that are analysed 
in MP  rather than its analysis of inorganic and organic matter. These different levels 
or ‘strata’, as Deleuze and Guattari will call them, however, are not externally related 
to one another. There is not an inorganic stratum opposed to an organic one and then, 
finally, a human stratum opposed to an organic one, as though one stratum evolved 
from another, rather all strata belong to the same immanent material continuum that 
Deleuze and Guattari call the Mechanosphere. This does not mean however, that there 
are no differences between them. These differences are explained by the three 
fundamental ontological terms of MP that will form the basis of our investigation of 
this book: Machinic Assemblage, Abstract Machine and the Plane of Consistency.
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1.1 Machinic Assemblage
Let us first look at the notion of Machinic Assemblage which I have further 
subdivided into three distinct levels: machinic assemblage itself, their effectuation of 
abstract machines and finally their relation to the plane of consistency.
Machinic assemblage is the term that is perhaps the closest to the vocabulary of 
AO. As we remember, this book opens with the description of desire as machinic. 
Desire is to be understood as a flow that is divided and cut up by connections. These 
flows and cuts are to be understood as a machinic process. And, as Deleuze and 
Guattari insist, this machinic process is not to be understood as a metaphor:
Partout ce sont des machines, pas du tout métaphoriquement : 
des machines de machines, avec leur couplages, leurs 
connections. Une machine-organe est branchée sur une 
machine-source : l’une émet un flux, que l’autre coupe. Le 
sein est une machine qui produit du lait, et la bouche, une 
machine couplée sur celle-là.15
Multiplicity
The breaks and flows do not exist counter imposed to one another, as though there 
were only flows upon which there descended breaks and cuts, rather the breaks and 
cuts belong to the flows. In MP, Deleuze and Guattari speak about a substantive 
multiplicity. This is the ontological fundament of their thought. There is multiplicity, 
or better, multiplicity is. What was called breaks or cuts in AO, is now called 
assemblage. These assemblages are connections between multiple points within the 
plane of immanence, which have, whether large or small, some consistency. These 
connections do not come from outside of the multiplicity, rather they are merely the
15 Op.Cit. AO. p. 7, AOb, p. 1.
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expression of its increase in dimension and complexity: ‘Un agencement est 
précisément cette croissance des dimensions dans une multiplicité qui change 
nécessairement de nature à mesure qu’elle augmente ses connexions.’16
Any consistency or order to multiplicity is therefore an emergent phenomena 
and not an external one. Assemblages ‘select, organise and stratify’ elements from 
within the flow and in this process produce, whether artificially or naturally, a 
consistency.17 This process of organisation has a double side for Deleuze and 
Guattari, and this double articulation, as they would say, runs throughout MP The 
double side of machinic assemblages is content and expression. They borrowed this 
distinction from the linguist Louis Hjemslev, but they apply it across all the different 
strata and not just to linguistic expressions and contents. To make this distinction 
understandable, however, let us first understand it through its linguistic formulation.
Language, for Hjemslev, can be divided into a plane of expression and a plane 
of content.18 This is not the same as the distinction between the signified and the 
signifier since this distinction exists through the access of a form-content distinction, 
which Hjemslev wishes to displace. For Hjemslev there is not the signified on the one 
hand, as the content of language, and the signifier on the other as the form of 
language. Rather, the content of language has its proper form and content and the 
form of language, which he calls expression, also has its own proper form and content 
that cannot be confused with the form and content, or substance as he calls it, of the 
content of language. Thus , expression, for Hjemslev, is divided into: unformed matter 
which is the ‘raw sonic matter’ of language, expression-form which is imposed upon
16 Op.Cit. MP, p. 15, TP, p. 8.
17 Ibid. MP. p. 506, TP, p. 406.
18 L.Hejmslev, Prologemena to a Theory o f Language. (Madisson: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1969).
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this matter, and expression-substance that is a result of this imposition of form onto 
matter. Likewise, the content o f language can be divided into thought-matter, the 
form, which is imposed upon this thought-matter, and the substance that is the result 
of the imposition of form upon this matter. What is absolutely important for Hjemslev 
is that the form and matter of content and the form and matter of expression are 
distinct.19
Expression-content
Deleuze and Guattari far exceed Hjemslev’s application of this distinction 
between expression and content by applying it, as was remarked earlier, to every 
strata since this distinction belongs to the very operation of machinic assemblage. In 
other words, stratification, the immanent organisation of multiplicity always takes the 
form of the separation of flows into two distinct lines of expression and content. For 
example, at the level of the organisation of organic life we can speak of the content of 
the protein molecule as given by the immanent organisation of aminoacids, whereas 
the expression is given by the global molecule which gives the specific selection of 
aminoacids and their particular arrangement within a chain 20 What is important to 
stress here is that the expression is not dependent on the content for the sequence of 
aminoacids is arbitrary, determined as it is by an external enzyme. Thus, the content 
of aminoacids is conjugated with a flow of the product of an enzyme. Although this 
example is taken from the organic strata the logic operates at all the other levels. 
Machinic assemblage is always the connection or conjunction of expression and
19 Ronald Bogue gives a good description of this content and expression distinction in his book Deleuze 
and Guattari, (London and New York: 1989), p. 126.
20 This example is given by Philip Goodchild in his book Deleuze and Guattari: an introduction to the 
politics o f desire. (London: Sage, 1996), p. 157.
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content. This will become extremely important for our understanding of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s notion of micro-politics in MP. At the level of human populations, the 
content side of machinic assemblage is composed in the arrangement of bodies 
whereas the expression side of the machinic assemblage is composed through what 
Deleuze and Guattari call a ‘collective assemblage of enunciation’. Again, both sides 
have their own form-matter or form-content distinction that needs to be analysed.
Vertical and Horizontal axes
Machinic assemblages not only have double sides or a double articulation in 
expression and content but also a double axis. There is a vertical axis that includes 
this expression-content distinction in which elements within the multiplicity are 
stratified. And there is a horizontal axis wherein the assemblage has both a territorial 
side, that produce consistency or stability, and an ‘edge of deterritorialization’, that 
cuts across and scrambles these stabilities.21 It is along the horizontal axis that 
machinic assemblages effectuate abstract machines and touch upon what Deleuze and 
Guattari call the plane of consistency. Let us first discuss this notion of abstract 
machines, which as we shall see will become decisive in understanding Deleuze and 
Guattari’s conception of social formation.
1.2 Abstract Machine
What do Deleuze and Guattari mean when they say that machinic assemblages 
effectuate abstract machines? There are two flows across every stratum: expression
21 Op.Cit., MP, p. 112, TP, p. 88.
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and content. But what is it, or better, what function, causes these two flows to come 
into relation? We have in fact here three terms not just two: expression, content and 
the relation between them. The abstract machine is what combines or conjugates 
these two sides of the machinic assemblage. As such, it has neither expression nor 
content. As shall be seen, it necessarily touches upon the plane of consistency. As 
Deleuze and Guattari write, therefore, one function of the abstract machine is to 
organise or territorialize strata, but at the same time it is always deterritorialized:
Une véritable machine abstraite n’a aucun moyen de 
distinguer pour elle-même un plan d’expression et un plan de 
contenu.. .déstratifiée, déterritorialisée pour elle-même, la 
machine abstraite n’a pas de forme en elle-même (pas plus que 
de substance), et ne distingue pas en soi de contenu et 
d’expression, bien qu’elle préside hors d’elle à cette 
distinction, et la distribue dans les strates, dans les domaines 
et territoires.22
Let us think of an example to make these distinctions more tangible. Again, 
we shall go to the anthropocentric stratum because it is this stratum that is significant 
for us in relation to the parallelism between Deleuze and Guattari’s ontological 
materialism and a new politics. At the level of the anthropocentric stratum content and 
expression are defined as follows: content is equivalent to the regime of bodies and 
expression is equivalent to a regime of signs. What brings these two series together is 
the abstract machine. If we imagine the plane of consistency as a smooth space, then 
it is the abstract machine that draws lines upon that space and connects these two 
series together across the different strata. One might say that one side of this function 
is interstratic: it organises and distributes the two series of expression and content 
within a given stratum. A good example of such a process, and it is one that Deleuze
22 Ibid. MP. p. 176, TP. p. 141.
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alludes to in his book on Foucault, is the example o f the Panopticon.23 Bentham’s 
panopticon is a diagram for the ideal prison in which there is a central tower from 
which all the cells containing prisoners can be surveyed. Foucault’s point is not that 
such a building was constructed at a given time in history but that it is a generalisable 
function, certainly substantiated in the panopticon, which expresses, in a certain 
society, the conjunction between bodies, (that is to say content), and signification, 
(that is to say expression). The abstract machine is therefore not the panopticon but 
the diagram. Deleuze and Guattari take this notion of diagram and generalise it across 
all the strata. Thus, following from the previous quotation, they write: ‘Une machine 
abstraite en soi n’est pas plus physique ou corporelle que sémiotique, elle est 
diagrammatique ( elle ignore d’autant plus la distinction de l’artificiel et du naturel). 
Elle opère par matière, et non par substance; par function, et non par forme.’24
Yet what needs to be emphasised is that this is only one side of the function of 
the abstract machine. If one only understands it through the example of Foucault’s 
panopticon, which is generally the way it appears in secondary literature, then we 
would only have an understanding of its repressive function. This is only how the 
abstract machine operates when it is effectuated by machinic assemblages within a 
stratum, for example as the two series of expression and content are effectuated in the 
panopticon. But, precisely because the abstract machine is the relation between 
expression and content, it itself has neither expression nor content. Thus, as Deleuze 
and Guattari explain, an abstract machine is always the operation of unformed matter 
and informal function. This means that one side of the abstract machine is always 
metastratic. It cuts across strata and their organisations. The abstract machine is as
23 Deleuze, Foucault, (Paris : Minuit, 1986), pp. 39-43, Foucault, (Minneapolis, London : 188), pp. 39- 
44.
24 Op.Cit.. MP. p. 176, TP, p. 141.
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much a force of deterritorialisation across strata as it is a force of reterritorialization
within strata:
Tantôt elles restaient prisonnières des stratifications, elles 
étaient enveloppées dans telle ou telle strate déterminée, dont 
elles définisseaient le programme ou l’unité de 
composition. ..tantôt la machine abstraite au contraire 
traversait toutes les stratifications, se développait unique et 
pour elle-même sur le plan de consistance dont elle constituait 
le diagramme, la même machine travaillait aussi bien 
l’astrophysique et le micro-physique, le naturel et l’artificiel, 
et pilotait des flux de déterritorialisation absolue.25
1.3 Plane of Consistency
What is the meaning of the plane of consistency? This is perhaps the most difficult 
question facing anybody that wishes to understand Deleuze and Guattari’s 
philosophy. One path into this problem might be to remind ourselves of Spinoza’s 
rigorous immanentism. Although Being for Spinoza is divided into three terms, 
substance, attributes and modes, there is no external disjunction between them. To put 
it into the language that Deleuze uses, attributes express substance as modes express 
attributes, each term envelops the other. By analogy, we might suggest that machinic 
assemblages are modes, abstract machines are attributes and the plane of consistency 
is substance. The force of the analogy here is to prevent us from thinking that the 
plane of consistency somehow stands outside the abstract machine and machinic 
assemblages. Rather, one must think of there being two forces or movements across 
the plane of consistency, territorialization and deterritorialization. The strata are not 
external or opposed to the plane of consistency, but are merely movements and rests 
within it. The abstract machine is that function which determines these movements or
25 Ibid. MP, p. 73, TP, p. 56.
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rests, or, to use Deleuze and Guattari’s language, draws lines across the plane of 
consistency, but these lines can either be the line of stratification or the line of 
destratification.
What, however, does MP say about the plane of consistency in itself? We 
shall divide the response to this question into three parts: subtraction, expression and 
translation. Subtraction is a matter of analysis (or schizoanalysis, or micro-politics as 
Deleuze and Guattari will call it), expression concerns the spinozist definition of the 
univocity of Being, and finally translation pertains to the reconnection of this idea of 
univocity to a pragmatic politics.
subtraction
The plane of consistency is everywhere and always present, but we rarely see 
i t . This is because we confuse the order of the real, or its origin with transcendent 
structures. That is to say, in the language of MP we make ontologically distinct the 
strata and the surface upon which they are composed. It is as though the order of the 
stratum came from the outside and fell back upon the plane of consistency. But for 
Deleuze and Guattari there is only the plane of consistency, and even the principles of 
organisation must emerge from it. Thus, at the level of analysis, we must subtract the 
principles of organisation in order to reach the plane of consistency, always aware that 
these principles of organisation do not have a different status of being than the plane 
of consistency. The principle of organisation lies at the level o f exclusive disjunctions 
or differentiations, such as artificial-natural, content-expression, forms and formed
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substances.26 In other words it is the operation of the abstract machine in relation to 
machinic assemblages as they are enveloped within strata.
But, after this subtraction are we not left with the black night o f the 
undifferentiated, absolute death and zero intensity? The analysis of subtraction 
enables us to see that precisely the opposite is the case, that the plane of consistency 
has its own ordering (that is to say its own relation to the abstract machine). And that 
this ordering is not at all identical to the principle of organisation, but of which the 
latter itself is its product. That is why we should not see the difference between the 
plane of transcendence, organisation and stratification as opposed to the plane of 
immanence, composition and destratification. Rather, there are only two vectors or 
directions of deterritorialization and reterritorialization that belong to the same 
continuum. In other words, compositions can be transmuted into conjugations and 
equally conjugations can be transmuted into compositions. This is why we shall see 
that politics for Deleuze and Guattari becomes a question of analysis: what are the 
conjunctions and compositions present in this relation between an abstract machine 
and the plane of consistency?
expression
Thus, after the analysis we are not left with an undifferentiated chaos of 
elements, but a different kind of relation between elements. Where, rather than 
elements being related to one another by transcendent or stratified schemas these 
elements cut across these strata and schemas. It is where everything is flattened out, 
and thereby where everything can relate to everything else, and in which elements are
26 Ibid. MP, p. 90, TP, p. 70.
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only distinguished by movement and rest, slowness and speed. In this plane there are 
only assemblages of multiplicity and individuation rather than assemblages of 
stratification and organisation. At this moment, Being, the expression of Being is the 
multiple -  the infinite productivity, as Spinoza will name it, of the One. The One is 
not opposed to the multiple as though the plane of consistency were a unity outside of 
the multiplicities, rather the infinite assemblages of multiplicities are the expression of 
one and the same Being. The plane of consistency,
est un plan d’étalement, qui est plutôt comme la section de 
toutes les fonctions, et dont les dimensions croissent pourtant 
avec celles des multiplicités ou individualités qu’il recoupe. 
Plan fixe ou les choses ne se distinguent que par la vitesse et 
la lenteur. Plan d’immanence ou d’univocité, qui s’oppose à 
l’analogie. L’Un se dit en un seul et même sens de tout ce qui 
diffère. Nous ne parlons pas ici de l’unité de la substance, 
mais de l’infinité des modifications qui sont parties les unes 
des autres sur ce seul et même plan de vie.27
translation
What is decisive, as has been continually repeated and emphasised in this 
thesis, is that this expression of the univocity of Being has its direct translation into a 
pragmatic of politics. This does not mean that we first of all plan out our ontology and 
then somehow deduce from this a political program, rather a materialist ontology is 
straight away political because it makes no distinctions between the different strata 
since they all belong to one and the same substantive multiplicity. Or if one likes, the 
other way around, a counter politics such as liberalism or its modern formulations, has 
its own ontological basis or ground, which it nonetheless obscures or keeps concealed 
by appealing to epistemological or ethical categories. Deleuze and Guattari’s
27 Ibid. MP, p. 311, TP. p. 254.
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ontological materialism implies that any principle of organisation is immanent to a 
process of deterritorialisation in two senses : the relation between any organised 
assemblage, whether large or small, is always a question of a relative 
deterritorialisation, and at the same time every relative deterritorialisation is also 
linked to an absolute deterritorialisation. The principle of organisation has its primary 
function in preventing these absolute deterritorialisations, to prevent the movement 
across different strata. Politics, which is now localised within the relation between the 
machinic assemblage of the social formations at the level of expression and at the 
level of the body, is now translated into finding and constructing those abstract 
machines that cut across the organisations of these signs and bodies That is to say, of 
constructing differing relations between bodies and signs that break through the 
monolithic stratum of political identities :
Le plan de consistance, ce serait l’ensemble de tous les CsO, 
pure multiplicité d’immanence, dont un morceau peut être 
chinois , un autre américain , un autre médiéval , un autre 
petit-pervers , mais dans un movement de déterritorialisation 
généralisée où chacun prend et fait ce qu’il peut d’après ses 
goûts qu’il aurait réussi à abstraire de telle ou telle formation , 
d’après tel procédé qui serait abstrait de son origine.28
Such a political project, which is not to be confused with any program or plan, 
demands a rejection of macro-politics (such as parties, international organisations, 
demands for human rights and so on), for a micro-politics that functions and 
effectuates change at the level beneath global representations. Before going on to 
attempt and explain the meaning of micro-politics in MP, and how it is both similar 
and different from the political position in AO, I shall turn to the work of the French 
sociologist Gabriel Tarde whose analysis of micro-sociology can help explain how
28 Ibid, MP. p. 195, TP, p. 157.
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society can be understood both at the levels of, in the words of Maurizzio Lazzarato, 
the ‘sub-personal’ and the ‘supra-personal’.29
Maurizzio Lazzarato, 'Gabriel Tarde et l’économie des aiTects'. dans Chimères, n° 39, Eté 2000. p
64.
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II. Gabriel Tarde : “micro-sociology” or the Infinitesimal
in Mille Plateaux
Gabriel Tarde is one of the most significant and perhaps subterranean 
influences in the development of Deleuze’s thought. In fact, before Deleuze is 
interested in him he had almost completely disappeared from the intellectual scene 
and his major works have only been recently republished.30 His name first appears in 
Différence et Repetition in which he is one of many names of a counter tradition put 
into battle by Deleuze against the great systems of the idealism of Western thought.31 
The Tarde that is important for this thesis, however, is the Tarde of micro-sociology ; 
Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of a micro-politics cannot be made sense of 
without it. The social stratum is made up of segmented lines and constant flows. 
Segmented lines belong to the global representation of society whereas the quantum 
flows belong to the infinitesimal relations between bodies and signs. The practice of 
sociology on the whole has always been to ignore these micro sociological 
phenomena for the sake of global representations. This explains to some extent the 
disappearance of Tarde’s work. For as Deleuze and Guattari remind us in MP, the 
work of Gabriel Tarde was crushed by ‘Durkheim and his school’ because the latter 
investigated ‘great collective representations.’32 If Durkheim and his school study 
these collective representations which are binary and segmentary, then the work of
30 The exception to this is Jean Milet’s Doctorat d’Etat, Gabriel Tarde et ta philosophie de l'histoire, 
(Paris : Vrin, 1970).
31 The importance of Tarde at this stage for Deleuze is dial in his thought there is a sustained critique of 
representation and dialectics through the concepts of difference and repetition. See DR(a), (Paris : puf, 
1968) p. 39, fh. 1, p. 104-05, fn 1, DR(b), (London : Athlone Press, 1994), pp. 25-26, 76, 307, 313-14.
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Tarde interests Deleuze and Guattari because it analyses that which flows beneath 
these binary and segmentary representations. What flows beneath are the social 
quantities of belief and desire, which for Tarde are not individual psychological 
entities, but pre-individual quanta detached from global persons. Thus, as Deleuze and 
Guattari underline, the fundamental difference is not between the individual and the 
social, but between molar representations (of which the idea of the individual and the 
social are products), and the molecular realm of social quanta that detach themselves 
from codification and stratification:
Car, finalement, la différence n’est nullement entre le social et 
l’individuel ( ou l’interindividuel), mais entre le domaine des 
représentations, qu’elles soit collectives ou individuelles, et le 
domaine moléculaire des croyances et des désirs, où la 
distinction du social et de l’individu perd tout son sens, 
puisque les flux ne sont pas plus attribuables à des individuds 
que surcodables par des signifiants collectifs.32 3
Social Quanta
Tarde’s theory rests on one fundamental principle: all relations that link individuals 
together, and these relations are not the same as the individuals themselves but are 
social quanta, can be brought back to one original and unique relation : imitation. For 
Tarde this force can be explained by the natural tendency that all individuals have 
within them that makes them prone to imitate one another in such a way that a series 
of similarities are developed: ‘Je prétends que le rapport de ces deux personnes est 
l’élément unique et nécessaire de la vie sociale, et qu’il constitue toujours,
32 Op.Cit. MP. p. 267, TP. p. 218.
33 Ibid. MP  pp 267-68, TP. p. 219.
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originairement en une imitation de l’une par l’autre.’34 Again, it needs to be 
emphasised that what interests Tarde is not the individuals of this relation, but the 
relation itself. This relation is pre-individual made up of social quantities that like a 
wave rises and falls as a passage through the bodies of individuals constituting them 
prior to any conscious acts. The principle of imitation therefore is the explanation of 
group cohesion and expansion, producing an ever greater amount of similarities as the 
only guarantee of its own perpetuation: ‘De là que cette définition du groupe social: 
une collection d’être en tant qu’ils sont en train de s’imiter entre eux ou en tant que , 
sans s’imiter actuellement, ils se ressemblent et que leurs traits communs sont des 
copies anciennes d’un même modèle.’35
What makes a people or a community can be analysed in several different 
ways: economical, juridical, political, religious and so on. But what needs to be 
explained at a most profound level is how these common or shared beliefs pass from 
one individual to another thus constituting a given social formation What is shared by 
all the individuals of a given social formation, is a certain similitude, a similitude of 
values arising from the past, marking the present and to a certain extent shaping the 
future. All the quantity of values that are shared by the individuals of the same social 
formation constitute similarities amongst them. The members of a given social 
formation are quantifiably similar to one another through the values that they share.
” Gabriel Tardc, Les lots sociates, (Paris : Institut Synthelabo, 1999), p.59. [I assert that the relation 
between these two people is the unique and necessary clement of social life, and that it always consists 
in the imitation of the one by the other. |
35 Gabriel Tarde. Les lois de / 'imitation, (Paris : Kimd. 1993), p. 73. |From this the definition of a 
social group: a collection of beings as they arc in the process of imitating each other or as they 
resemble one another, without actually imitating one another and that their common traits arc ancient 
copies of a same model.)
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But this identity is not given, it is produced, and it is produced, Tarde writes, ‘peu à 
peu, de proche en proche, par voie d’imitation.’36
the Pre-individual
Imitation is not an individual decision or act. The fundamental forces that 
constitute the social organisations through similitude exist at a deeper level than the 
social representations that would appear on the surface to represent them. These social 
representations are in fact a secondary product of a conglomeration that has already 
happened at the level of the pre-individual. For Tarde imitation can be conscious or 
unconscious, deliberate or automatic, positive or negative, attractive or repulsive, but 
the difference that lies between these oppositions is one of degree not one of nature. 
Thus, unconscious processes can be congealed into conscious ones and conscious 
ones can flow into unconscious ones, but there is no absolute distinction between 
them. It is closer to the truth to say that we pass from the unconscious to the conscious 
(and vice versa) by degrees rather than by abstract jumps. This passage from the 
unconscious to the conscious therefore, cannot be understood at the level of the 
individual. Thus, the relations between individuals, their imitation of one another, and 
the infinite amount of similarities that binds and forms social formations, is not itself 
something that can be thought at the level of the individual person -  in fact, individual 
persons are the product of this relation. This is why Tarde believes that imitation can 
only be made sense of at the level of the infinitesimal. It has to be subdivided into a 
range of small repetitions, and it is these repetitions that produce desires and beliefs at 
the level of the individual. It is for this reason that Tarde is weary of generalisations à
36 Ibid. p. 65. [little by little, next by next, by way of imitation.].
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la Durkheim and other sociologists, that leads to totalisations and general 
representations which conceive of the social as merely the antinomy between the 
individual and the community. If the principle relation of the social is imitation, then 
it becomes clear, that imitation does not occur at the level of a total or global person. 
Imitation takes place, for Tarde, at the level of two social quantities of belief and 
desire which flow through individuals, rather than being constituted by these 
individuals:
L ’energie de tendance psychique, d’avidité mentale, que 
j ’appelle le désir, est, comme l’energie de saisissement 
intellectuel, d’adhésion et de constriction mentale, que 
j ’appelle croyance, un courant homogène et continu qui, sous 
la variable coloration des teintes de l’affectivité propre à 
chaque esprit, circule identique, tantôt divisé, éparpillé, tantôt 
concentré, et qui d’une personne à une autre, aussi bien que 
d’une perception à une autre dans chacune d’elles, se 
communique sans altération.17
In other words, these social quanta, and they are quantities because they 
increase and diminish within the social field, can be analysed separately from the 
global representations, which constitute the order of social formations. In the 
language of MP, these social quantities are lines of deterritorialisation that flow 
through individuals as they are constituted by global representation, whereas the latter 
are segments that belong to stratification and are thereby always reterritorializations 
of the deterritorial ized flows of social quantities.
1 Ibid, pp 56-7. [The energy of psychic tendency, of mental avidity, that I name desire is . like the 
energy of intellectual grasping, of mental adhesion and constriction, which I call belief, a homogenous 
and continuous current which beneath the varied colourings of the shades of the affectivity proper to 
each spirit, circulates identical, now divided, spread, then concentrated, and that from one person to the 
next, just as much as from one perception to another in each of them, communicates without 
alteration. |. For a further description of the meaning of social quanta see Op.Cit. Les b is de I 'imitation, 
pp. 15-6, and Op.Cit. Les lois sociales, p. 57.
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A Critique o f  Political Economy
The analysis of social quanta also leads Tarde to a fundamental critique of the 
foundations of political economy. This perhaps is one of the causes for the shift in 
register from AO to MP. In the former work, Deleuze and Guattari are quite content 
to still operate in the language of political economy. This is no doubt due to their 
adoption of the Marxist distinction between production, distribution and consumption. 
Despite the fact that Marx’s work can be seen as a critique of political economy such 
as Ricardo and Smith’s, this critique is an immanantist critique in the style of Hegel. 
In other words, it adopts the very terminology of that system that it criticises in order 
to demonstrate that system’s internal contradictions. Even though Marx’s works 
remain the most important critique of capital we have (and many assert that the last 
work Deleuze was writing was to be on Marx), it nonetheless retains the fundamental 
premise of all political economy that production can only be understood through the 
nexus of capital and labour. Tarde rejects this fundamental premise. It can perhaps be 
postulated that this rejection explains, as we shall see in the following section, that the 
immanent dissolution of capital at the level o f the nexus of labour and capital is no 
longer the fundamental site for resistance for Deleuze and Guattari.18
In political economy all values are economic; that is to say that economy is the 
source of all values and production is essentially understood as economic. For Tarde 
all values are social, and economic values are simply one example of social values. 
Take for example the category of production. For political economy, production is 38
38 Gabriel Tarde is quite direct in his rejection of the fundamental premise of political economy when 
he writes : ‘Ne disons plus que le travail est la seule source de valeur. La source première, c ’est 
l’invention, qui n’est pas un travail'. Ps. Ec., I. (Paris : Alcan. 1902), p. 168. |We no longer say that 
labor is the only source of value. The first source is invention which is not labor.]. And : ‘Le capital 
[...] n'est nullement du travail accumulé, ou du moins ce n’est pas cela essentiellement, mais bien, 
avant tout, l’invention accumulée'. La logique sociale, (Paris : Alcan, 1893), p. 352. (Capital... is not at
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merely an economic category in the conjunction of capital and labor (or for the neo- 
classicists: use-value). Rather than understanding value through production in this 
sense. Tarde wishes to reach the fundamental layer of the production of values as 
such. He is interested in the productivity of production, rather than production as a 
result of an anterior process (in this case the social formation of capital) that captures 
the productivity of production in a global representation. Tarde calls the productivity 
of production invention We can understand this concept in the following way: 
invention is that which translates social quanta into value through the reciprocal 
combination of beliefs and desires. It is through this combinatory that the real forces 
that constitute history and politics are produced: ‘Ne voit-on pas qu’avec leurs 
combinaisons réciproques, les passions et les desseins, ils sont les vents perpétuels des 
tempêtes de l’histoire, les chutes d’eau qui font tourner les moulins des politiques ?’* 39
This conjunction between desires and beliefs takes place beneath the economic 
categories of political economy. Invention cannot be reduced to work nor can it be 
reduced to the ideological fantasies of artists, philosophers and so on. Invention, for 
Tarde, happens at the level of the pre-individual. It is the eruption of the new within 
the continuum of habit across all spheres of productivity whether we are speaking of 
the religious, juridical, economic and even beyond these discourses themselves, at the 
level of the infinitesimal unheard of becomings. This is why Tarde will say, almost 
quite humorously, that the force of invention that translates quanta into value has its 
site in ‘little men’.40 Moreover, what prevents us from reducing invention to the level
all accumulated labour, or at least it is not that essentially, but before anything else, accumulated 
invention.].
39 Gabriel Tarde, Monadologie et sociologie, (Paris : Institut Synthélabo, 1999), p. 50.
40 ‘Ce qu'il faut accorder aux adversaires de la théorie des causes individuelles en histoire, c’est qu'on 
la faussé en parlant de grands hommes là où il fallait parler de grandes idées, souvent apparues en de 
très petits hommes, et même des petites idées, d ’infinitésimal innovations apportées par chacun de nous 
à l’œuvre commune.' Op.Cit, Les lois sociales, p. 126. [What we can grant to our adversaries of the 
theory of individual causes in history is that it is false to speak of great men where it should have spoke
137
of the individual is that it is always in an intrinsic relation to imitation. Tarde explains 
the synthesis between invention and imitation through the concept of adaptation. An 
invention expands through the social field by means of imitation, which as we have 
described above occurs at the level of infinitesimal transformations, at the level of the 
pre-individual.
If we understand innovation as difference then no difference stands without its 
necessary repetition. Invention only arises through repetition, but also repetition only 
has its source in innovation. This inclusive relation between invention and imitation is 
not external to the social quanta of belief and desire, rather it explains their 
transubstantiation into molar organisations. But equally, these two forces also explain 
the dissolution of molar organisations through the intensities that are translated by 
these forces. Thus, the question is not what is the relation between the individual and 
society but which forces produce territorialized flows and which deterritorialized 
flows. Durkheim and his followers begin from the level of the individual and deduce 
transcendent forms of collective schemas of objectivity which miraculously stand 
apart from the individuals they constitute. Tarde’s genius is to show that beneath all 
our collective beliefs and desires there is a whole micro-sociology of ‘little’ beliefs 
and desires which are continually bubbling underneath our most cherished and 
fictional values and habits.
of great ideas, often coming from little men, and even of little ideas, infinitesimal innovations brought 
about by each of us in common effort ).
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III. MICRO-POLITICS : shifting the status of the Unconscious 
and of Capitalism
Tarde’s emphasis on desire as being a social quantum and the influence of this 
idea in MP  marks a subtle change of emphasis from A O to this later work. It would be 
quite wrong to understand this difference as one of opposition or rupture. Indeed, MP 
still operates with much the same vocabulary as AO, such as, for example, molar and 
molecular, territorialization and deterritorialization. But nor can M P  simply be seen as 
merely a further explanation of the key terms of the former work. The change of 
emphasis takes place in two key problems: the status of the unconscious and the status 
of capitalism as a social formation. First of all, one may remark that it is quite strange 
considering the importance of the unconscious in AO that it rarely appears in MP  
One reason for this, of course, is that psychoanalysis is no longer a key enemy which 
one needs to diagnose as it is in AO. There is, however, a far more important reason 
why the unconscious is not such a key element in the argument of MP, and that has to 
do with Tarde’s famous statement where he says that ‘toute chose est une société, que 
tout phénomène est un fait social.’41 Of course, as we discussed in the chapter on AO 
in this thesis, there is an unshakable parallelism between the psyche and the social in 
AO. This is why we say that the difference between AO  and M P  is not one of 
opposition but of change of emphasis. The parallelism between the psyche and the 
social in AO, nonetheless, still contains a formal distinction between the two terms.
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when for example Deleuze and Guattari speak of the unconscious as being neither 
expressive nor representative, on the one side, whereas on the other the social 
machine is symbolic.* 42 Formal oppositions like these are present throughout the 
argument of AO. This is unlike MP, where the distinction between unconscious 
machines and social machines is no longer present. There are only social machines or, 
more fundamentally, there are only, at the level of the anthropomorphic, social quanta 
that constitute a combinatory of connections and conjunctions.
the Outside
Although, both M P  an AO talk about absolute and relative deterritorialization, 
this change in emphasis leads them to be interpreted in a different way. In AO 
absolute deterritorialization is almost imagined as an outside to society as such. There 
are two reasons for this: one reason is to do with the manner that AO understands 
capitalism in a Marxist sense as the contradiction between an absolute and a relative 
limit, and the other, is to do with the manner in which the machinic unconscious, 
although it is understood as being social, it is only social as that which is exterior to 
every society. This might explain the residual romanticism, if one may use such a 
word, of AO  which resides in the figure of the schizoid who exists outside the limits 
of every society as can be found in the example that opens AO of the famous stroll of 
Buckner’s Lenz :
La promenade du schizophrène : c’est un meilleure modèle 
que le névrosé couché sur le divan. Un peu de grand air, une
11 Op.Cit. Monadologie et sociologie, p. 58.
42 ‘L'inconscient ne dit rien, il machine. 11 n’esl pas expressif ou représentatif, mais productif. Un 
symbole est uniquement une machine social qui fonctionne comme machine désirante, une machine 
désirante qui fonctionne dans la machine sociale, un investissement de la machine sociale par la 
inachinc.'Op.Cit. AO. p. 213, AOb, p. 180.
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relation avec le dehors. Par exemple la promenade de Lenz 
reconstituée par Bückner. C’est différent des moments ou 
Lenz se retrouve chez son bon pasteur, qui le force à se 
repéree socialment, par rapport au Dieu de la religion, par 
rapport au père, à la mère. Là au contraire il est dans les 
montagnes, sous la neige, avec d’autres dieux ou sans dieu du 
tout, sans famille, sans père ni mère, avec la nature. « Que 
veut mon père ? Peut-il me donner mieux ? Impossible. 
Laissez-moi en paix. » Tout fait machine. 43
This is why one cannot underestimate the importance of Tarde to MP. There is 
no necessity to appeal to a psyche which, no matter the parallel that is drawn with the 
social, somehow, still stands apart from it even though all the elements it contains are 
social. There is no psyche as such, there are only flows of social quanta and rather 
than speaking of a schizoid at the limit of the socius, we can only speak of there being 
two forces which direct the two social flows of beliefs and desires. Or, in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s language, the flows o f affects go one in the direction of stratification and 
the other in the direction of absolute destratification. Of course, this is not a vision 
directed against AO, rather it merely pushes the immanence of the latter to its own 
implicit conclusion. If everything is immanent to the social field, then the 
phenomenological distinction between the psyche and the social is no longer required. 
The abolition of this distinction, however, will also change the way in which MP 
constructs the political and this is what will be analysed in what follows. Micro­
politics, as they call it in MP, is different from schizo-politics as they name it in AO. 
This difference too has to do with the change in the problematic of the parallelism 
between the psyche and the social and the status of capitalism as the end of history.
•*3Ibid. AO, pp. 7-8, AOb, p. 2.
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the Molecular and the Molar
This difference becomes more visible if we look at the analysis of the 
distinction between the molecular and the molar (already in use in AO), in the chapter 
entitled ‘micro-politics and segmentarity’ in MP In this work, this distinction is first 
of all used to describe the difference between what they call ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ 
segmentarity. One example they give of this difference is through the relation 
between the sexes. One can think of the relation between the sexes across hard 
segmentarity, as Freud does, in the difference between the masculine and the 
feminine. One can also think of the relation between the sexes not in terms of an 
exclusive relation but as an inclusive one, in which one cannot speak of a femininity 
opposed to a masculinity (embodied in the two distinct sexes), but as a masculinity or 
femininity that passes between sexes. Also, one may think of a relation of these two 
sexes to other becomings beyond the woman-man distinction: ‘Car les deux sexes 
renvoient à de multiples combinaisons moléculaires, qui mettent en jeu non seulement 
l’homme dans la femme et la femme dans l’homme, mais le rapport de chacun dans 
l’autre avec l’animal, la plante, etc., mille petits-sexes.’44 These molecular couplings 
are first of all defined by Deleuze and Guattari in terms of a ‘soft segmentarity’.
Having made this distinction between a ‘hard’ and a ‘soft’ segmentarity, later 
in the chapter Deleuze and Guattari actually correct themselves. Rather than the 
distinction existing at the level of segments, whether they are rigid or not (whether 
they are, ethnographically speaking, modem or primitive), the real distinction is now 
placed between segments on the one hand, of which there are two kinds, and flows of
44 Op.Cit, MP, p. 260, TP, p. 213.
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quanta on the other. The molar is on the side of segmentarity and the molecular on the 
side of flows:
Peut-être alors faut-il réserver les mots « ligne » et 
« segments » pour l’organisation molaire, et chercher d’autres 
mots qui conviendraient davantage à la composition 
moléculaire. En efet, chaque fois que l’on peut assigner une 
ligne à segments bien déterminé, on s’aperçoit qu’elle se 
prolonge sous une autre forme , en un flux à quanta45
Not that we should see these two forces as being opposed to one another, 
rather they are reciprocally combined. Thus, it is never possible to say that a given 
society or organisation is molar or molecular, in fact, across molar organisations there 
is always a flow of deterritorialisations and equally these flows are always being 
reterritorialized in turn. Deleuze and Guattari use the example of money. Money has 
two aspects: money as molar and as molecular. On the one hand, it is molar, they call 
it ‘payment money’, it is a money-segment that is linked to another aspect of money, 
that is, a money-flow that they call the ‘flow of financing-money’.46 Every element 
within the social field can be described in the same way : at one moment caught 
within molar organisations, and at another, mutant flows, which are always carrying it 
somewhere else. These deterritorialisations, as Deleuze and Guattari remark, are also 
the site of a new territorialization, as for example the bourgeoisie were with the 
dissolution of feudal structures 47
Now this description of the difference between the molar and the molecular is 
subtly different from their description in AO. It is true to say that in AO the molecular 
is thought on the side of deterritorialisation and the molar on the side of 
reterritorialization. And yet, the difference lies in the fact that the molecular in AO  is
45 Ibid, MP. p. 264, TP. p. 217.
46 Ibid, MP. pp. 264-65, TP, p. 217.
47 Ibid, MP. p. 269, TP, p. 221.
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on the side of desiring production itself whereas the molar is thought only on the side 
of social production. In MP, on the other hand, as has already been remarked, both the 
molar and the molecular are descriptions of social forces that act upon social 
quantities to produce either lines of flight or lines of segmentarity. The question we 
have to ask ourselves now, is whether these subtle differences change the way we 
need to think about politics as such. The question is: are schizoanalysis and micro­
politics the same thing?
Schizoanalysis and Micro-politics
It should not surprise us that this difference will be subtle. It is a question of 
where you are looking. The similarity between schizo-politics or schizoanalysis and 
micro-politics is that both are not to be thought of within any kind of traditional 
political schema In other words, they do not embody theoretical principles that can 
then readily be translated into practice. Thus, in AO  Deleuze and Guattari write that 
i a  schizo-analyse en  tan t que telle  n’a strictement aucun programme politique à 
proposer Si elle en avait un, ce serait tout à la fois grotesque et inquiétant.’48 And 
equally in MP, they will sharply distinguish between micro-politics and macro­
politics, the latter describing all kinds of organised, whether big or small, political 
groups:
La politique opère par macro-décisions et choix binaires, 
intérêts binarisés ; mais le domaine du décidable reste mince. 
Et la décision politique plonge nécessairement dans un monde 
de micro-détermination, d’attirances et de désirs, qu’elle doit 
pressentir ou évaluer d’une autre façon [...] Bonne ou 
mauvaise, la politique et ses jugements sont toujours molaires.
48 Op.Cit, AO, p. 456, AOb, p. 380.
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mais c’est le moléculaire, avec ses appréciations, qui la 
« fait ».49
Both are also similar in that they offer an analysis of capitalism that cuts 
across the theoretical-practice divide -  to do schizoanalysis or micro-politics is to 
analyse. It means to draw a map of the lines of deterritorialisation that cut across the 
segmentary divides: ‘Tout autre est le rhizome, carte el non pas calque . Faire la 
carte, et pas le calque [...] La carte est ouverte, elle est connectable dans toutes ses 
dimensions, démontable, renversable, suceptible de recevoir constament des 
modifications.’50 And yet, it is at the level of the content of this analysis that there is a 
subtle difference between schizoanalysis and micro-politics. Both are a critique of 
capitalism, but in the former capitalism is seen as a social formation that exists at the 
end of a linear line of history, whereas in the latter capitalism is co-extensive to other 
social formations. This means that in schizoanalysis it is only with the end o f history 
that a politics of desire is possible, and this possibility is due, here reformulated 
within the language of desire, to the internal contradictions of capitalism itself. Micro­
politics on the other hand is turned towards those infinitesimal encounters that Tarde 
was one of the first to describe: ‘L’infinitésimal, donc, diffère qualitativement du 
fini ; le mouvement a une cause autre que lui-même ; le phénomène n’est pas tout 
l’être. Tout part de l’infinitésimal et tout y retourne.’51
Here the subtle difference is a matter of scale but also of pathos. In AO 
becoming revolutionary is understood through the difference between subjected and 
subject-groups whereas in MP  becomings (including becoming revolutionary) are 
happening everywhere beneath the homogenous space hollowed out by the State
11 Op.Cit MP. p. 270, TP. p. 221. And also : ‘Bref, tout est politique, mais toute politique est à la fois 
macro-politique et micro-politique.’ Op.Cit, MP, p. 260, TP, p. 213.
50 Ibid, MP. p. 20, TP, p. 13.
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apparatus. This is because the possibility of deterritorialisations does not come from a 
subject position even if this subject is now understood as the unconscious, but from 
that side of the abstract machine that is turned towards the plane of consistency: a 
whole nexus of criss-crossing lines that are surging through the stratified layers of 
society. But this is also a change in pathos, in mood and optimism. In AO  there is still 
a faint shadow of a Marxist melancholia that the internal contradictions on which the 
revolution resides are simply infinitely iterative. As soon as one situates becoming 
revolutionary between the interstices of power within infinitesimal changes that 
happen between and beyond binary oppositions of whatever kind, and not just the 
disjunction between capital and labour, then it is understandable we find a certain 
optimism of Deleuze as for example in Dialogues:
D’une certain manière, c’est tout simple, ça se fait tout seul, et 
tout les jours. L’erreur serait de dire : il y a un Etat 
globalisant, maitre de ses plans et tendant ses pièges ; et puis, 
une force de résistance qui va épouser la forme de l’Etat, 
quitte à nous trahir, ou bien qui va tomber dans les luttes 
locales partielles ou spontanées, quitte à être chaque fois 
étouffées et battues. L ’Etat le plus centralisé n’est pas du tout 
maître de ses plans, lui aussi est expérimentateur, il fait des 
injections, il n’arrive pas à prévoir quoi que ce soit : les 
économistes d’Etat se déclarent incapables de prévoir 
l’augmentation d’une masse monétaire [...] C’est sur les 
lignes différentes d’agencements complexes que les pouvoirs 
mènent leurs expérimentations, mais qui se lèvent aussi des 
expérimentations d’une autre sorte, déjouant les prévisions, 
traçant des lignes de fuite actives, cherchant la conjugaison de 
ces lignes, précipitant leurs vitesse ou la ralentissant, créant 
morceau par morceau le plan de consistance, avec un machine 
de guerre qui mesurerait à chaque pas les dangers qu’elle 
rencontre 51 2
51 Op.Cit, Monadologie el sociologie, p. 39. [The infinitesimal, thus, qualitatively differs from the 
finite: movement has another cause than itself; the phenomenon is not the whole of being. Everything 
leaves the infinitesimal and returns to it.]
2 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Pamet, Dialoques, (Paris : Flammarion. 1996). p. 174. On the line, (New 
York : Semiotexte. 1983). pp. 110-11.
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Chapter V
the practice of micro-politics 
or philosophy as ‘ethics’
To some extent the operation of this thesis so far has only been to describe the 
status of the political in Deleuze and Guattari’s work. But there is a question, a very 
important one, which still needs to be analyzed: the practice of politics as such. This 
is a very difficult question that many seem to ask of philosophers nowadays; what is 
Derrida’s politics? Levinas’ politics, and so on... Yet, the real problem that is being 
posed here lies not in the difficulty to find an answer in terms of some content to these 
questions. But, in that the image this thought presents us with renders diagnose 
difficult in it self. It is difficult to find an answer because the image of this thought 
presents itself to us as being utterly obvious and therefore we have no need to think 
about it. Politics therefore appears as the more obvious of consequences for 
philosophy: is it not simply a matter of putting into practice what a philosopher has 
said? But, what precisely does it mean to put something into practice? How do we 
translate from the level of thought to that of action?
The first response to this question is to think about the image of thought itself, 
and this is perhaps the very definition of what it is to do philosophy. In Difference et
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Répétition, Deleuze describes the image of thought in terms of dogmatism.1 As one 
part of his analysis he talks of the dogma of common sense or the ‘postulate of the 
ideal’, wherein is explained how the notions of common sense and good sense 
combine and complete each other.2 In accordance to this image of thought the affinity 
between truth and thought itself is formally established and, as Deleuze tells us, ‘c’est 
sur cette image que chacun sait, est censé savoir ce que signifie penser.’3 This is not 
itself a philosophical thought, but an image of thought that a certain kind of 
philosophy presupposes as its necessary condition. Within its own boundaries this 
image of thought, although it can be refined upon, itself remains unquestioned.4 For 
Deleuze therefore, to think in a different way is first of all to attack this image of 
thought, and one of the most important recourses for him in this task is the thought of 
Nietzsche. It is not about having different thoughts, which is simply not enough, but 
about having a different image of thought altogether, or even as we shall see, having 
no image of thought: ‘La pensée qui naît dans la pensée, l’acte de penser engendré 
dans sa genitalité, ni donné dans l’innéité ni supposé dans la réminiscence , est la 
pensée sans image. Mais qu’est-ce qu’une telle pensée, et son processus dans la 
monde?’5
This talk of a philosophy that has no image of thought does not presuppose a 
pre-philosophical foundation and is above all a political problem (as the question
1 The very interesting concept of the image of thought is treated at length by Deleuze and makes the 
matter of a full chapter. See 'l'Image de la pensée’. Différence et Répétition, (Paris : puf. 1968), 
pp. 169-217. [Hereafter DR], And ‘the Image of Thought’. Difference and Repetition, (London : the 
Athlone Press, 1994). pp. 129-167. [Hereafter DRb[
2 'Car si le sens commun est la nonne d’identité, du point de vue du Moi pur et de la forme d ’objet 
quelconque qui lui correspond, le bon sens est la norme de partage, du point de vue des moi empiriques 
et des objets qualifiés comme tel ou tel (ce pourquoi il s’estime universellement partagé)[.. .[lc bon 
sens et le sens commun se complètent ainsi dans l’image de la pensée, d'une manière tout à fait 
nécessaire : à eux deux, ils constituent les deux moitiés de la doxa.' Ibid.. DR. p.175 and DRb. pp. 133- 
4.
11bid. DR. p. 172, DRb. p.132.
Deleuze defines the image of thought in the following manner: ‘L’image de la pensée n’est que la 
figure sous laquelle on universalise la doxa en l ’élevant au niveau rationnel.’ Ibid. DR, p.176 and DRb. 
p. 134.
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ending the above quotation suggests). In Différence et Répétition this political form of 
the image of thought is presented through the notion of morality. As Deleuze remarks, 
Nietzsche’s critique of philosophy is the demonstration that philosophy’s fundamental 
presuppositions are in fact moral ones, and thus its pre-philosophical foundation is in 
fact non-philosophical; that is to say, put outside any critique.5 6 In MP, however, this 
political form of the image of thought is made more expressly obvious. Deleuze and 
Guattari do not talk of it in terms of common sense, but in terms of the State 
apparatus.7
It is here that we get to the crux of the problem: our contemporary desire for a 
politics arises from an image of thought that is counter to the very politics that we 
desire. Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of the image of thought in MP  is a critique of 
political theory for it is this form of philosophy that bases itself upon the rational 
defense of political sovereignty. Now, the usual translation of thought into practice 
takes the form of this rationality. Then, the problem is: can one move from thinking to 
acting outside of the image of thought since it is the image of thought itself which 
seems to supply the necessary coordinates to move from thought to the constitution of 
rational and objective political institutions?
The classical formulation of this form of procedure is the rational defense of 
the State. This image of thought establishes that the State is merely the external form 
of rationality. ‘L’image classique de la pensée, et le striage de l’espace mental qu’elle 
opère, prétend à l’universalité. En effet, elle opère avec deux “universaux”, le Tout
5 There are no italics in the original text: Ibid. DR. p.217, DRb. p. 167.
6 Ibid. DR. p. 172-3. DRb. p. 132.
In fact, in M P  they give another name to the State-form as it is developed in thought, they call it 
"noology”.
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comme dernier fondement de l’être ou horizon qui englobe, le Sujet comme principe 
qui convertit l’être en être pour-nous. Impérium et république.’8
Thus, if you obey the State you are not obeying an external heterogeneous 
power but the inner form of your rational will. The question of politics then becomes 
merely the creation of rational institutions throughout the world as it is defended 
through the universal language of human rights. Deleuze and Guattari’s argument is 
that this image of thought (thought as universal and subjective) cannot itself be a 
defense of the State for it is itself a production of the State. It is not as though the 
image of thought is simply given, the rational will, and from that we can deduce the 
State, rather the rational will, the production of identical subjects, is itself a 
consequence of State power. Thus, the language of human rights is not a 
philosophical defense of the State, but the State’s capture of philosophy: ‘Il n’y a pas 
à s’étonner que le philosophe soit devenu proffeseur public ou fonctionnnaire d’Etat.’9 
Deleuze and Guattari’s response to this impasse is not to offer another image 
of thought, another model of the True, the Just, the Good, but to think outside of the 
image or the model. Such a counter-thought could only be possible if there were an 
exteriority to the State apparatus as such. If there were no exteriority of the State, then 
the language of human rights would be the only political language. In AO  the 
exteriority or the Outside of the State, as has been remarked in the previous chapter, is 
presented through the contradictions of capital. In MP, however, this outside is 
thought differently. The outside of the State apparatus is what Deleuze and Guattari 
call the War Machine. A thought that does not presuppose an image of thought is, 
therefore, one that is linked on to a war machine. Once more, the important precursor 
for Deleuze and Guattari is Nietzsche: ‘Mettre la pensée en rapport immédiat avec le
8Ibid. MP, p.469. TPp.319.
9 Ibid. MP. p.466, rpp.376.
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dehors, avec les forces du dehors, bref faire de la pensée une machine de guerre, c’est 
une entreprise étrange dont on peut étudier les procédés précis chez Nietzsche.’10
It is well known that Nietzsche was not a very systematic thinker, but this 
absence of system is not a failure on his part but marks the absence of an image of 
thought. In other words, this failure on Nietzsche’s part to be ‘rational’ is the mark of 
the success of his ‘counter-thought’. Of course, from the perspective of the 
philosophy of the State, this counter-thought can only present itself as being vaguely 
ridiculous or even poetic. Nonetheless, what presents itself in terms of the philosophy 
of the State, that is to say, as a philosophy that is captured by the State apparatus, is 
paradoxically also connected on its side to the very possibility of an outside to the 
State’s domination On this basis it can be understood how this writing or thought can 
still present us with a ‘new politics’, a new legitimization of sovereign power, yet 
writing and thought themselves run in a counter direction to any form of sovereign 
power. There is always the potentiality of counter-thought at the heart of any 
thought11 The object, therefore, is not just to write well but to think, and to think, for 
Deleuze, is to stammer: ‘Le bégaiment créateur est ce qui fait pousser la langue par le 
milieu, comme de l’herbe, ce qui fait de la langue un rhizome au lieu d’un arbre, ce 
qui met la langue en perpétuel déséquilibré.’12
10 Ibid, p. MP, p.467, TP, pp. 376-77.
11 It is important to recontextualize this double aspect of thought in terms of the analysis of power as 
discussed in the second chapter of this thesis. This analysis centred on drawing the important 
conceptual distinction between the two forms of power for which the English terms are not readily 
available: potentia and poteslas. There is, as it were, a potentia or puissance of thought, as 
inexhaustible creativity and power of resistance, and there is a poteslas or pouvoir of thought which is 
the form the State takes in thought, its power of self-legitimisation. But the important point to remark, 
and this is where the argument follows the same logic than that of Spinoza's analysis of power, is that 
tile power of thought is necessarily linked to its puissance. Herein, lies its resisting and creative power. 
This double aspect of thought will be further examined throughout this chapter.
i:G Deleuze, Critique et clinique, (Paris : Minuit. 1993), p. 140. (Creative stammering is that which 
makes language grow through the milieu, like grass, making language a rhizome instead of a tree, 
putting it in a perpetual state of disequilibrium.!.
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Thus, it can never be a matter here of moving from thought to practice via a 
process of self-justification and legitimisation. Rather, the activity of thought itself is 
a practice as long as it is linked on to a war machine. The fundamental question 
therefore becomes what is a war machine? Or how does one analyse the difference 
between different machinic assemblages such that one could decide between a war 
machine that is outside the State apparatus and one that has become captured by the 
State apparatus. It is this question, to some extent, that has replaced the distinction in 
AO  between subjected groups and subject-groups.
This chapter will be organised in the following manner. First of all there will 
be an analysis of the relation between the War Machine and the State apparatus in so 
far as it is constitutive of thought and counter-thought. Then it will explore the notion 
of ‘becoming’ as Deleuze and Guattari’s alternative answer to the more classical 
image of a thought in which the passage from theory to practice is what remains most 
unthought. Finally, having realised the full transformational and metamorphical 
character of the latter notion the discussion will return to the question of the subject 
and its possible redefinition as a site both of revolutionary resistance and creative 
potential.
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I. Of the relation between the War Machine 
and the State Apparatus of Capture
Let us first of all, therefore, turn to the description of the relation between the 
war machine and the State apparatus as it is described in MP. Again, we need to 
remind ourselves of the subtle difference between M P  and AO  concerning the 
importance and opposition o f the State in relation to the codification of desire. In AO 
the State exists as one form o f  the socius existing between primitive social formations 
and capitalism. The State does not disappear after the emergence of capital. 
Nonetheless, in AO, the State and capital operate by a wholly different logic: ‘La 
machine despotique est synchronique tandis que le temps de la machine capitaliste est 
diachronique, les capitalistes surgissent tour à tour dans une série que fonde une sorte 
de créativité de l’histoire, étrange ménagerie: temps schizoide de la nouvelle coupure 
créative.’13 In MP, on the other hand, it is the State rather than capital that is the 
fundamental agent of repression and in fact it explains why the contradictions of the 
latter have not at all lead to an increase in revolutionary potential within the so called 
industrial societies. Within capitalism the State has not become tangential, despite the 
talk of flows of international capital, but ever more powerful. The State intervenes at 
every level of life.
The State, for Deleuze and Guattari, is not an evolutionary historical 
phenomena that occurs at a certain point in time and then disappears, but is the
13 G. Deleuze and F.Guattarri. L 'Anti-Œdipe, (Paris : Minuit. 1972), p.264 and Anti (Edipus, (London : 
die Athlone Press. 1984), p.223. Thus, we can agree with Bogue’s remark that though the State in AO 
has a residual existence within capitalism it nonetheless can be confused with the latter. Capitalism is a 
totally separate formation : ‘ [tjhey identify primitive societies as those which oppose the centralization 
of power, and hence all forms of state organisation, and they regard the capitalist state as a residual 
despotic archaism, which functions as a unit of anti-production within the capitalist machine, but which
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necessary horizon of every social formation: what they call the Urstaat. ‘Il faut dire 
que l’Etat, il y en a toujours eu, et très parfait, très formé. Plus les archéologues font 
de découvertes, plus ils découvrent des empires. L’hypothèse de VUrstaat semble 
vérifiée, « l’Etat bien compris remonte déjà aux temps les plus reculés de 
l’humanité ».’l4 It always and everywhere has the same function and that is to capture 
and control the flows of the ecumenon, flows of ‘populations, de marchandises ou de 
commerce, d’argent ou de capitaux, etc.’15 But this means, and this is the decisive 
point for Deleuze and Guattari, that the State cannot exist without the exterior or 
outside that it must appropriate. Thus, this explains why there can be no self- 
legitimisation and rationalisation of the State, which is the cornerstone of a juridical 
conception of power, because the State first of all exists as an apparatus of capture. It 
can only be the interiorization of these flows into a striated and organised space 
because of this exteriority that resists it.
This exteriority or Outside, Deleuze and Guattari call the War Machine. 
Again, we need to remind ourselves that this is not simply the description of a 
historical phenomena, so that we might imagine a happy band of nomads who were 
suddenly one day enslaved by a despotic State; rather, the process of the 
interiorization of an exteriority and the extériorisation of an interiority are coextensive 
within the historical field. This means that the nomadic war machine can take many 
different forms and guises. This also means, however, that the State apparatus, which 
is constantly on the search for new forms of war machines, can equally take on 
different forms and guises. In M P  Deleuze and Guattari first speak of there being two
has no intrinsic connection with capitalism itself. The three machines, therefore, may be roughly 
described as pre-state, state and post-state machines.’ R.Boguc, (London : Routledege. 1989), p.96.
uOp.Cit, MP, p.445, TP, p.360.
15Ibid. M P  p .4 7 9 , TP, p.386.
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forms in the present age of the war machine. These two forms take the shape of world 
wide machines that are continuously escaping the power of States to appropriate them 
(for example, multi-international corporate organisations and religious sects). And on 
a different scale, but perhaps even more disruptive, ‘méchanismes locaux de bandes, 
marges, minorités, qui continuent d’affirmer les droits de sociétés segmentaires contre 
les organes du pouvoir d’Etat.’16 We shall need to talk about the apparatus of capture 
in more detail later on in this chapter. First of all, however, let us focus on the 
exteriority of the war machine in relation to the State and how this becomes a locus 
for Deleuze and Guattari’s conception or perhaps ‘condition of possibility’ of any 
kind of revolutionary affect.
1.1 The W ar Machine or the Outside
It is not enough to think of the War Machine as being external to the State 
apparatus, rather it is the pure form of exteriority. If the war machine were merely 
external, then like any proposition that opposes it would have to be defined by what it 
is opposed to. The war machine would merely be the projection of the worst fears and 
horrors of the State that it could continually excise from itself through the sublime 
operations of its organising interiorising power of appropriation. If the war machine in 
all its different historical guises has appeared as that which is most to be feared then 
this has arrived from out of its own exteriority to the State apparatus The Outside is 
not a function of the inside; it is what happens to the inside. To understand this we
16 Ibid. MP. p .445, TP, p .360 .
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need to remind ourselves of the two sides o f the abstract machine that we discussed in 
the previous chapter.
If we remember, the abstract machine has two sides: one that faces towards the 
plane of consistency and the other which faces towards machinic assemblages; one 
that is metastratic and the other which is intrastratic The same logic holds true for 
the war machine, for it too is an abstract machine of a special kind. On the one side it 
is appropriated by the State apparatus for the means of domination and control, and on 
the other side, it is always in movement along a deterritorialization that moves beyond 
every social formation. The war machine is not another kind of State, but the non­
state itself. Not the private individual but another type of organisation that Deleuze 
and Guattari call the pack or the band:
Les meutes, les bandes sont des groupes du type rhizome, par 
opposition au type arborescent qui se concentre sur des 
organes de pouvoir. C’est pourquoi les bandes en général, 
même de brigandages, ou de mondanité, sont des 
métamorphoses d’une machine de guerre, laquelle diffère 
formellement de tout appareil d’Etat, ou équivalent qui 
structure au contraire les sociétés centralisées.17
That we can speak, however, of a pure form of exteriority and interiority does 
not mean that they exist independently.Their pure difference is only at the level of 
analysis. In concrete terms they are always mixed. In other words, there has never 
been a pure State without any outside, and likewise there has never been an outside 
that has not been continually appropiated by some form of State apparatus. The 
distinction or difference between the State apparatus and the war machine is, 
therefore, like every distinction in Deleuze and Guattari’s work, an immanent and not 
a transcendent one. They occupy, to use Deleuze and Guattari’s expression, the ‘same
17 Ibid., M P , p .443, TP, p .358 .
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field’ in which interiority describes the formation of States and exteriority what 
‘escapes and stands against States’.18
This same field is the field of war such that Deleuze and Guattari can reverse 
Clausewitz’ famous formula ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means’ into 
‘politics is the continuation of war by other means’ .19 The immanent relation between 
the war machine and the State apparatus is thereby one of war. However, the war 
machine itself does not have a direct relation to war. It only relates to war 
supplementarily; that is to say, the war machine only becomes or has war as its object 
when it confronts the State form as such. In itself, the war machine is the invention of 
a nomad:
la machine de guerre était dans son essence l'élément 
constituant de 1‘espace lisse, de Toccupation de cet espace, du 
déplacement dans cet espace, et de la composition 
correspondante des hommes : c'est là son seul et véritable 
objet positif (nomos). Faire croître le désert, la steppe, non pas 
les dépeupler, bien au contraire. Si la guerre en découle 
nécessairement, c’est parceque la machine de guerre se heurte 
aux Etats et aux villes, comme au forces (de striage) qui 
s’opposent à l’objet positif : dés lors, la machine de guerre a 
pour ennemi l’Etat, la ville, le phénomène étatique et urbain, 
et prend pour objectif de les anéantir.20
It is only when the war machine has been appropriated or captured by the State 
apparatus that its direct object becomes war. This is why the analysis of the war 
machine is so difficult because we tend to take its appropriated form as the 
manifestation of this pure Idea. This uncertainty is only further increased with the 
modern development of the State, which is the conjunction of the State apparatus with 
capital. Here war becomes total war, war pushed to the nth degree of annihilation 
even self-annihilation, as is witnessed in the fascist State. But also on the other side,
18 Ibid. MP, p 446, TP, p. 361.
19Ibid. 4#P. p.525,TP. p. 421.
20 Ibid. MP. p.519, TP. p.417.
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‘post-fascism’ in which ‘total war itself is surpassed towards a norm of peace more 
terrifying still.’21 At this point, the war machine is not a means of power of the State 
against the outside, rather it is the war machine itself which surrounds the whole Earth 
and States have merely become parts of its mechanism. Yet even in this case, where it 
appears that the war machine has become through a conjunction with capital a total 
interiorized form of stratification, there is nonetheless still the possibility, indeed a 
possibility exacerbated by the existence of this ‘World war machine’, of the 
emergence of countless and unforeseen revolutionary machines. This also explains 
why the modern State in its conjunction with capital must continually improve its 
mechanisms of surveillance and discipline in order to prevent these ‘mutant’ 
machines from proliferating: ‘Cependant, les conditions mêmes de la machine de 
guerre d’Etat ou du Monde, c’est à dire le capital constant (ressources et matériel) et 
le capitale variable humain, ne cessent de recréer des possibilités de ripostes 
inattendues, d’initiatives imprévues qui déterminent des machines mutantes, 
minoritaires, populaires, révolutionnaires.’22
It is not a question, therefore, of a simple opposition between a nomadic war 
machine on the one hand and a State apparatus on the other. Or even of thinking of it 
in terms of an opposition of a pure form of exteriority and a pure form of interiority, 
because for us the war machine has always already been appropriated The question 
that needs to be asked therefore, is how this machine is appropriated by the State and 
why this is necessarily linked to the conjunction of the State form in capital. And 
how, at the very same time, a new kind of war machine is created at the margins of 
this appropriation or capture. Thus, it would be absurd to think, that Deleuze and 
Guattari are saying that we should literally become nomads again, or that it is even
21 Ibid. MP. p.525, TP, p.421.
22 Ibid? MP, p.526, TP. p.422.
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possible to exist purely outside the State; rather what is at stake is far more modest, 
and thereby more real. How is it possible even within the most powerful repression of 
human desires and potential for there to be a form of desire which is not collapsed and 
flattened by the State machine? How are we to find the war machine that is on the 
other side of the appropriated war machine? It is never simply a matter of war in any 
simple sense, but only metaphorically and ‘metaphorically’, such that Deleuze and 
Guattari can talk of writing and music as being war machines. Any thing that is a 
weapon, a projectile, even metaphorically, is a weapon against the State: ‘L’écriture, 
la musique peuvent être des machines de guerre. Un agencement est d’autant plus 
proche de la machine abstraite vivante qu’il ouvre et multiplie les connexions, et trace 
un plan de consistance avec ses quantificateurs d’intensités et de consolidation.’23
1.2 The State Apparatus of Capture
From the previous analysis of the War Machine and its double operation it has 
become important to investigate in more detail, therefore, the State apparatus of 
capture of the war machines and its necessary relation to capital. The decisive 
question is what does capital add to the State form? Let us remind ourselves that it is a 
certainly different question than the question of the relation between the State and 
capitalism in AO. The latter text, as we know, works through a kind of evolutionism 
that has its basis in a Marxist topology of social organisations. Capitalism comes after 
the State. In MP , on the other hand, as it is also known, social formations which have 
their origin in machinic assemblages are coextensive to one another. We cannot
23 Ibid, M P. p .639 , TP. p.513.
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speak, for example, of a primitive society that exists in complete isolation from any 
State formation, and then to whom suddenly one day a State appears over the horizon 
that comes to crush its existence. As Deleuze and Guattari argue in MP, the primary 
relation of the primitive society and the State is one of anticipation and prevention 
(they obtain this thesis from the work of Pierre Clastres). This means that the State 
formation is always already present in primitive society even whilst that society 
pretends to ward it off.24
But before we can answer the question of what happens to the State when 
capital is added to it, we first of all have to define the State form itself. First of all, let 
us go back to the definition of the State form in AO Here, the State is defined, in 
relation to the flows of desire and in opposition to the coding of primitive societies, in 
the form of affiliation and alliances, as overcoding. This overcoding has two sides : 
the first side is the appropriation of the surplus value of agricultural communities by 
referring back to the higher transcendent unity of a transcendent power (a despot or a 
tyrant), and on the other side a desperate repulsion of decoded flows that it must keep 
at the limits of its empire :
Le surcodage, telle est l'opération qui constitue l'essence de 
l'Etat, et qui mesure à la fois sa continuité et sa rupture avec 
les anciennes formations : l'horreur de flux du désir qui ne 
seraient pas codés, mais aussi l'instauration d'une nouvelle 
inscription qui surcode, et qui fait du désir la chose du 
souverain, füt'il instinct de mort.25
MP  continues with this definition of the State as overcoding, but gives a far 
more detailed description of its appropriation o f  resources through the process of what 
they call the apparatus of capture.26 We have already come across the latter in our
24 Ibid. MP. pp. 534-35, TP. pp.429-30.
25 Op.Cit, AO. p.236, AOb. p. 199.
26 MP  gives a similar definition of the State as overcoding as follows : ‘Un appareil d'Etat s’érige sur 
les communautés primitives agricoles, qui ont déjà des codes lignagers-territoriaux; mais ils les
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description of the relation between the State apparatus and the war machine. In this 
case the apparatus of capture is directed against the pure form o f exteriority in the 
guise of the nomad. But the apparatus of capture also has a new economic function 
that Deleuze and Guattari describe, again following Marx, as having a threefold form 
of rent, profit and taxation. In each case it is a matter of appropriating and thereby 
deterritorialising an earlier form so as to link it back to the higher transcendent unity 
for the State.
Take for example rent: territories are exploited in order to be translated into 
Land (extensive cultivation). This land, in the relation between the least and most 
productive produces rent. This operation, however, is impossible without the action of 
the State, the apparatus of capture, which has a twofold function of comparison and 
appropriation. For a territory to be transformed into Land there first of all needs to be 
the operation of comparison: the territory needs to be reduced to quantitative criteria. 
Only after having been reduced to such a quantitative measure can this land be 
distributed to landowners; that is to say can exterior uncultivated land be 
appropriated. It is the monopoly of the State that fixes this ownership. In other words, 
all ownership of land that produces rent refers back to the State as a transcendent 
principle of ownership and property.
The same double function of the apparatus of capture as comparison and 
appropriation operates with the other two forms: profit and taxation. In profit free 
activity is translated into labour and in taxation exchange is translated into money.27 
Through these different processes of the apparatus of capture all human beings 
become pieces within a megamachine of the State, what Deleuze and Guattari call
surcode, les soumel au pouvoir d’un empereur despote, propiétaire publique unique et transcendent, 
inaitre du surplus ou du stock, organisateurs des grands travaux (surtravail), source des fonctions 
publiques et de bureaucratic.’ Op.Cit, MP. p.533, TP, pp.427-28.
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machinic enslavement: ‘Il y a asservisement lorsque les hommes sont eux-mêmes 
pièces constituantes d’une machine, qu’ils composent entre eux et avec d’autres 
choses (bêtes, outils), sous le contrôle et la direction d’une unité supérieure.’28 Even 
the monetary economy is not the arrival of capital. For that to take place there are 
required two abstractions: abstract money quantities and abstract labour quantities. 
These two quantities are relative deterritorialisations of both labour and money. They 
are therefore no longer codifiable by the imperial or despotic State. It is what this 
State must ward off just as much as the primitive society warded off the State.
To answer why capitalism did not happen in China, for example, Deleuze and 
Guattari explain that the Chinese State warded off the arrival of capital by shutting 
down the production of mines as soon as they became no longer useful in terms of the 
traditional economy of the State apparatus.29 But if the decoding of the abstract 
quantities of capital opposes the overcoding of the State, why doesn’t the State 
disappear with the triumph of capital? The answer to this question is given by the 
axiomatics of capital. Of course, to produce capital, the two abstract quantities of 
labour and power need to be conjugated. This cannot be brought about by a code since 
the abstract quantities themselves disrupt any code. It therefore requires a different 
kind of binding or joint. This is given by the axiom.
2 For a description of these three forms of the apparatus of capture see MP. pp. 549-554 and TP. 
pp.440-444.
Ibid. MP  p.570, TP. p.457.
”  Ibid. MP  p.562. TP. p.450.
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1.3 Axiomatics and Politics
Deleuze and Guattari first talk about axioms in AO, and they remark there that
it is at this point that we can understand the function of the State within capitalism: its
purpose is to regulate the axioms of capital:
L'Etat capitaliste est le régulateur des flux décodés comme 
tels, en tant qu'ils sont pris dans l'axiomatique du capital. En 
ce sens il achève bien le devenir-concret qui nous a semblé 
présider à l'évolution de l'Urstaat despotique abstrait : d'unité 
transcendante, il devient immanent au champ de forces 
sociales, passe à leur service et sert de régulateur aux flux 
décodés et axiomatisés.30
Just as in the case of how the notion of appropriation that comes from AO  is 
given a much more complex analysis in MP  through the apparatus of capture, so too 
this idea o f the State as a regulator of axioms is given a more detailed description in 
MP The notion of the State is now understood in terms of a ‘model of realisation’. 
Through this notion it is easier to understand why the State form does not disappear 
with the triumph of capital, but in fact increases in power in comparison to the power 
of the despotic State. The Modern State ‘realises’ the axioms of capital by giving 
them a concrete instantiation. This does not just mean in terms of its laws but through, 
for example, its families, schools and universities. The effectuation of axioms takes 
place through ‘normalisation’.
Normalisation is the creation of the subject who only recognises itself through 
a dominant reality 31 It is a far more powerful repressive machine than any thing 
under the control of the despotic State for it no longer requires any external 
transcendent higher unity. For in obeying the dominant reality the more you become
30 Op. Cit., AO , pp. 299-300, AOb, p.252.
31 The key text for Deleuze and Guattari's here is Althusser’s essay ‘ The Ideological State Apparatus’ 
in .
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yourself. Normalisation is the invention of a new form of slavery: ‘being a slave to 
oneself. No one has to tell you to be at work on time, you tell yourself to be. This 
does not mean that the Modem State does away with machinic enslavement, but it is 
the combination of both the processes of subjectification and machinic enslavement. 
We are lucky to have both, Deleuze and Guattari ironically retort.32 Take for example, 
they say, the wonderful effects of T V. We are both subjected to T V., we use and 
consume it, and also are produced as subjects by T V. The T V. addresses us as 
subjects of consumption, ‘dear viewer... and so on’. Such as one of the processes that 
take place in our everyday reality. But also we are enslaved by T V., we are not just 
consumers and subjects produced by it, but one of the pieces of the process of making 
T V., an ‘input and an output...and so on’.33
Present day politics, therefore, must take place within the axioms of capital 
and their effectuation or realisation in the State through the process of normalisation. 
For such a politics if it can be called a politics at all, and Deleuze and Guattari are 
only willing to call it so by naming it a micro-politics, must recognise that all standard 
majoritarian politics, whether of the ‘left’ or the ‘right’, belong to the axiomatics of 
capital. Why is this so? The reason is that it is the fundamental law of capital that it 
sets up and continually repels its own limits in order to increase the rate of profit. The 
function, therefore, of majoritarian politics is to invent and create axioms that 
compensate for the continual change at the boundaries of capital. One of the most 
famous of these changes, of course, is the response of the majoritarian political 
institutions to the great ‘crash’ of the 1920’s, which led to a whole proliferation of 
new axioms in terms of a change of labour law and the regulation of capital, but did 
not at all change the general rule of capital. What is important here is not the
32 Op. C it, MP, p.573, IP, p.458.
33 Ibid.
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designations ‘left’ or ‘right’, which have become utterly meaningless labels in the 
present age, but the relation of axioms to capital.
There are two poles of the relation between axioms and capital in the present 
age, which Deleuze and Guattari typify as addition and subtraction. The majoritarian 
political institutions of the State either add axioms to the flow of capital or they 
subtract them. The former, typify the social-democracies of the West and the latter the 
anarcho-capitalist societies which spring up on the periphery of the centre of capital, 
such as in Latin America. These extreme poles however, conceal a whole mixture of 
gradients that mark out the field of dispute of the world wide market of capital. If one 
opens a paper today, watches a T V. program or looks at the internet, then the whole 
discussion is whether one should add more axioms or take them away, or which 
axioms we should have and which not.
Deleuze and Guattari’s point is that this operation is far more fundamental 
than the spurious nomenclature of left and right (and in fact explains much of the 
dissatisfaction of voters with so called ‘leftwing parties’, whose only claim to power 
is that they can regulate capital better than their reactionary opponents). But none of 
this gets outside of the relation between axioms and capital. A minoritarian politics a 
micro-politics, always seeks those places in which something escapes from an axiom. 
Again, this goes back to the general rule of capital that is always producing a decoded 
flow that must be axiomatised. It does not just come across this outside, it produces it, 
and it is continually producing it in more and more complex and varied ways that 
must necessarily escape the model of realisation of the State. Even if a decoded flow 
is axiomatised, then somewhere else another decoded flow will emerge. This is why, 
Deleuze and Guattari can say ‘ours is becoming the age of minorities’ .34
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11. Minoritarian “becomings'
Minorities, whether large or small, name anything that escapes the axiomatics 
of capital. Deleuze and Guattari take the example of the ever-present fear today of 
being swamped by minorities. Even on the ‘left’, they argue, there is this bizarre fear 
that the majority is being engulfed on all sides: the great capitalist war cry that whites 
will only form 12% of the world population. Of course this is quite absurd, but what 
interests Deleuze and Guattari is that only the majoritarian sphere, which even though 
it is smaller acts as a standard (the white, educated male), is denumerable, whereas 
minorities (black, yellow, female, whatever, it is always multiplying...) are 
nondenumerable. It is, to use the language of set theory, a fuzzy set. And because it is 
nondenumerable, it resists axiomatics. Not because it is political, for as soon as a 
minority demands rights, then it is axiomatised. Nondenumerable sets only resist 
capital through a becoming minoritarian they communicate to the majority. This is 
what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘la formule des multiplicités. Minorité comme figure 
universelle, ou devenir tout le monde. Femmes nous avons tous à le devenir, que nous 
soyons masculins ou féminins. Non-blancs, nous avons tous à le devenir que nous 
soyons blancs, jaunes ou noirs.’34 5 Such a disruption of axiomatics by nondenumerable 
sets of minoritarian becomings demolishes the reality of the modern State. For as 
Deleuze and Guattari remark, has any one ever heard of a ‘woman’s State’ or a ‘State 
of erratic workers’?36
Micro-politics is, therefore, a politics of becoming: ‘Devenir-minoritaire est 
une affaire politique, et fait appel à tout un travail de puissance, à une micro-politique
34 Ibid., MP. p.586. TP. p.469.
35 Ibid.. MP. p.588, TP. p.470.
36 Ibid.. MP. p.590, TP, p.472.
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active.’37 What does it mean, however, to say that one should become, for instance, a 
woman or a black? Is it not as some commentators have complained a most 
hypocritical discourse that claims it can appropriate the histories of the struggles of 
women or blacks for the sake of a struggle against the axiomatics of capital? Some 
care is needed here in order not to accuse Deleuze and Guattari of a mistake they do 
not commit. Too many are hasty to jump to conclusions, especially in regards to their 
comments about becoming woman, without being aware of the wider implications of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s materialist politics.38 First of all, it is important that the 
necessity of the statement of becoming-woman or becoming-black should not be 
thought of in terms of an identity politics. The politics of a becoming-minoritarian is 
not to be understood as becoming a woman, or a black.
11.1 ‘blocks o f becoming ’
The process of becoming takes place not in the terms o f the relation, that is to 
say, as a subject imitating, resembling or translating itself into the opposite term, such 
as the woman defined as an opposite, or the black defined as an opposite of the white 
man. Becoming occurs between the terms. In fact, Deleuze and Guattari tell us that 
becoming must always be thought in terms o f ‘a block of becoming’.39 But first of all,
37 Ibid.. MP. p.357, TP, p.292.
18 If Deleuze and Guattari are anti-feminist then it is, as D.Beddoes points out, only a feminism of a 
certain kind (an even here there is a hesitation -  Deleuze and Guattari mention in a few places in MP 
that they do not disagree with majoritarian politics of women's struggles, as long as it does not just stay 
there, for example see MP, p.338, TP. p.275) that reduces the question of feminity to an csscntialisin of 
‘Woman’: ‘When mediated by theories whose structural grasp crushes beauty with taste, fabrication 
with logic, and women with law. feminization is corrupted as much by feminism as by any other 
methodological systematization of patterns in flux. The "status' of an image, of its reality, truth, beauty, 
etc., it is a question of emerging only on this secondary level; the 'value' of women is condensed into a 
question of ‘Woman’.’ D.Beddoes. ‘Mapping V’. in A tapping Woman. (University of Warwick : Centre 
of Research in Philosophy and Literature, 1994), p. 89. Dorothea Olkowsky gives a good resume of all 
the debates on feminism in relation to the work of Deleuze and Gualtari in her book Gilles Deleuze and 
the Ruin o f Representation. (London : University of California Press 1999), pp.32-58.
39 Op C it, MP, p.291, TP, p.238.
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to understand that becoming takes place in-between the terms, rather than in the terms 
themselves, we must understand that these terms are not equivalent.
majoritarian
The white male is not the same as the black or the woman, for example. The 
white male, Deleuze and Guattari describe as the majority whereas the black or the 
woman is described as a minority. Again, we must remind ourselves that this 
distinction is not numerical. The white male might be less numerous than the other 
minority terms, but in any case operates as the ‘standard’ through which all the rest of 
minoritarian terms are measured as being deficient: ‘Par majorité, nous n’entendons 
pas une quantité relative plus grande, mais la détermination d’un état ou d’un étalon 
par rapport auquel les quantités plus grandes aussi bien que les plus petites seront 
dites minoritaires: homme-blanc adulte-mâle, etc.’40
minoritarian
Equally, if one must distinguish between the majoritarian term and the 
minoritarian, one must also discriminate between the minoritarian term as it is figured 
and constructed in opposition to the majoritarian term, and the minoritarian term as a 
‘medium o f becoming’. This latter distinction is probably what is missing in many of 
the critiques of Deleuze and Guattari’s position of minority politics. Their argument is 
that minority politics, such as the demand for equal rights for women, and many of 
the demands of a homeland or Nation-State that take place in the struggles, for 
example at the edges of the European empire, take their images of themselves directly 
from what they oppose. Of course, one needs a little discrimination here -  it is not, as 
has already been remarked, that Deleuze and Guattari deny the force of these
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struggles. If one remains at this level, of the demand for the recognition of one’s 
identity (an identity which is the construction of the standard -  white adult male and 
so on. . . and only reverts a negative marking with a positive one -  it is good to be a 
woman and so on...), then, in the end one will simply be re-appropriated by the 
axioms of capital, which does not have any problems at all with identity politics. 
What interests Deleuze and Guattari is what takes place beneath or between these 
identity politics, which in one sense is less grand, but far more contagious and 
unpredictable for its diffusion is infinitesimal, as Tarde would say.
two examples: becoming-Jewish and becoming-woman
Take for example their description of becoming Jewish. It would be quite 
ridiculous to think that Deleuze and Guattari would find it at all revolutionary that we 
should all begin to take on a Jewish identity, that we should all start to imitate, 
resemble or transform ourselves into Jews, because the very notion of a Jewish 
identity opposed to the majority is itself a construction o f that majority. Becoming- 
Jewish is not a movement from one term to the other but happens ‘between’ the terms. 
It takes place, Deleuze and Guattari argue, from the side o f the non-Jew in relation to 
the Jew but only in the sense that both the non-Jew and the Jew are tom out of their 
identities. The subject is withdrawn from the majority, and the agent of the process of 
becoming rises up from the minority. There is no subject o f becoming, as Deleuze and 
Guattari write, except a deterritorialized one, there is no medium of becoming, except 
a deterritorialized minority.40 1 Thus, becoming Jewish affects the Jew, understood as a 
state of being, as much as it affects the non-Jew. Becoming, as Deleuze and Guattari
40 Ibid. MP, p.356, TP, p.291.
41 Ibid. MP, p.357, TP, pp.291-2.
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describe it, is a line between the points that carries these points out of their standard 
representation.
Let us return to the question of becoming-woman. It must be obvious to us 
now that it is not at all a matter of a man or a woman deciding to be a woman (though 
again, we need to be careful here that this does not make it insignificant that certain 
men should desire to imitate women -  for instance, to use Deleuze and Guattari’s 
examples, homosexuals and transvestites -  but it would be only another kind of 
reterritorialization of women if these imitations simply stopped there). It is a matter of 
‘a block of becoming’ that happens between the man and the woman, and even 
though it starts from the side o f the woman, takes both woman and man elsewhere.42 
There are several moments that need to be distinguished here. Becoming-woman does 
not belong to woman, in the sense of belonging to her definition or essence, since her 
definition or essence is something that is given to her by the masculine standard. This 
is what is meant, from the side of being a woman that becoming-woman takes place 
in-between man and woman. But equally becoming-woman does not belong to man; it 
is something that happens to man in relation to woman. Indeed, for Deleuze and 
Guattari, becoming-woman is the first dimension that overthrows the white adult 
male. There is a kind of emission of particles or molecules, a micro-femininity, that 
exists between the terms, and which is possessed by neither of them though it only 
comes into existence in their relation.
What is this zone of indeterminacy that exists in-between these two terms that 
are ordinarily defined in opposition? Deleuze and Guattari’s answer to this question is 
that it is the body. Not the body as something that is possessed by a subject, whether 
we define the subject as masculine or feminine, but the body that cuts across or
l: See Ibid. MP, p.337, TP, p.275, for Deleuze and Guattari’s comments on homosexuality and trans­
sexuality in relation to becoming-woman.
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girl is the body of both the woman and the man when the body is no longer
understood as an organism, but as a becoming:
La question est d’abord celle du corps -  le corps qu’on nous 
vole pour fabriquer des organismes opposables. Or, c’est à la 
fille qu’on vole d’abord ce corps : cesse de te tenir comme ça, 
tu n’est plus une petite fille, tu n’est La question est d’abord 
celle du corps -  le corps qu’on nous vole pas un garçon 
manqué, etc. C’est à la fille qu’on vole d’abord son devenir 
pour lui imposer une histoire, ou une pré-histoire. Le tour du 
garçon vient ensuite, mais c’est en lui montrant l’exemple de 
la fille, en lui indiquant la fille comme objet de son désir, 
qu’on lui fabrique à son tour un organisme opposé, une 
histoire dominante. La fille est la première victime, mais elle 
doit aussi servir d’exemple et de piège.41
through all subjectivities. In relation to becoming-woman, this body is the girl. The
II.2 the Body
It all comes down, then to the question of the body and here we must return 
again to Spinoza. The body is not to be thought through the difference between form 
and matter, in which form corresponds to the subject as the form of thought, and the 
body to the matter of thought. Rather, the body is to be thought in terms of its own 
being, or to use the language of Spinoza, as a mode of being.43 4 How is the body to be 
understood in terms of its own reality, rather than merely as a stratum animated by the 
form of thought? As Deleuze reminds us, Spinoza is perhaps the most important 
philosopher to give an intrinsic definition of the body. This definition of the body has 
two elements: the body is an infinite number of parts or particles related to one
43 Ibid. MP  p.339, TP. p.276.
44 See chapter II, p, for a description of the body in Spinoza.
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43 Ibid. MP; p.339, TP, p.276.
14 See chapter II. p, for a description of the body in Spinoza.
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another in terms of rest, movement, slowness and speed, and also the body is the 
power to affect and being affected.45
affects
Thus, one does not define a man or an animal in terms of its organs, functions, 
or as being a subject, that is to say, as a formed matter, but as a ‘complex relation of 
differential speeds’ and the limitation or extension of its affective power.46 Deleuze 
uses the example of the tick to explain how one would define a body in a spinozist 
sense. A tick is defined by three affects: Me premier, de lumière (grimper en haut 
d’une branche) ; le deuxième, olfactif (se laisser tomber sur le mammifère qui passe 
sous la branche) ; le troisième calorifique (chercher la région sans poil et plus 
chaude).’47 A body, therefore, in a Spinozist sense, is defined in terms of not what it is 
(form-matter distinction), but what it can do. The more complex an organism, that is 
to say, the more complex the differential relations of movement, rest, speed and 
slowness that inhere within it, and the more complex the ways in which it can affect 
and be affected, the more complex its definition will be, to such an extent that when 
we talk about the human species its power complexity exceeds definition. No one 
really knows what the body can do.
45 As Deleuze explains in Spinoza, philosophie pratique'. ‘Un corps quelconque, Spinoza le définit de 
deux façons simultanées. D’un pari, un corps, si petit qu’il soit, comporte toujours une infinité de 
particules : ce sont les rapports de repos et de mouvement, de vitesses et de lenteurs entre particules qui 
définissent un corps, l’individualité d ’un corps. D’autre part, un corps affecte d’autres corps, ou est 
afTecté par d ’autres corps : c ’est ce pouvoir d’affecter et d’être affecté qui définit aussi un corps dans 
son individualité.’ (Paris : Minuit. 1981), p. 165. (Spinoza defines any body whatever in two 
simultaneous ways. On the one hand, the body, no matter how small, is always composed of an infinity 
of particles : these are relations of movement and rest, of speed and rest between particles that define a 
body, the individuality of a body. On the other hand, a body affects other bodies or is affected by other 
bodies; it is this power to affect and be affected that also defines a body in its individuality.].
46 Ibid.
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hcecceities'
In M P  this spinozist definition of the body is described in terms of a 
cartography of becoming. There is a longitude of becoming that relates to the 
movement, rest, speed or slowness of a body, and there is a latitude of becoming that 
corresponds to a body’s power to affect and be affected. The singularity of a body’s 
existence exists in the intersection of these two vectors. Here, we need also, however, 
to distinguish the mode of individuation of bodies from that of subjects, things or 
substances. Deleuze and Guattari borrow the concept of haecceity from Dun Scottus 
to describe this different mode of individuation : ‘Il y a un mode d’individuation très 
différent de celui d’une personne, d’un sujet, d’une chose ou d’une substance. Nous 
lui réservons le nom d’hecceité.’4* But, as François Zourabichvilli reminds us, even 
though they borrow this concept from Duns Scottus it does not have the exact same 
meaning. For Duns Scotus haecceity defines an individual singularity in terms of the 
individuation of a form (Socrates as opposed to man in general) and not as Deleuze 
and Guattari define it, as the individual singularity, as the individuation of the body.47 89
The individuation of bodies, as opposed to the individuation of things and 
subjects, must be thought of in terms of an event : ‘a season, a winter, a summer, an
47 Ibid., p. 167.
48 Op. Cit., MP. p.318, TP. p.261. Deleuze refers lo the work of Duns Scotus in his reading of Spinoza 
but there centres his attention on the notion of the formal distinction. This leads him to conclude the 
possibility of a non-numerical yet real distinction that will provide more strength to his argument on 
the absolute immanence of substance and thus of its utter indivisibility. See Op. Cit. Spinoza et le 
problème de l ’expression, pp. 54-55, 57. Although the argument does not follow the same course here, 
we can nevertheless see how this same trait of the indivisibility of substance is based on the ontological 
notion of 'haecceity’. For the notion of formal distinction see: Duns Scotus, Metaphvsica, x, cap.iii. For 
the notion of ‘hæcceitas’ see: Duns Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, II, d. Ill, q. vi, n. 12; I, d. Ill, q. iii, n. 15; 
II, d.xxv. q. I. n. 16. See also Duns Scotus. Philosophical Writings. (Indianapolis/Cabridge : Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1987), pp.4, 166-67, 194-95.
François Zourabichvilli writes concerning this relation between Deleuze and Guattari and Duns 
Scotus as follows : 'Duns Scot créait alors le mot "hæcceitas" pour désigner positivement la singularité 
individuelle. Mais la connivance s’arrête là, puisqu’il concevait l’hecceité comme une individuation de 
la forme, tandis que Deleuze pense à travers elle une individuation intensive, événementielle, dès lors 
mobile et communicante.’ Deleuze. Une philosophie de l ’événement, (Paris : puf. 1994), p. 117. |Duns 
Scottus then created the word ‘haxceitas’ in order to positively designate individual singularity. But 
that is as far as the connivance goes, for he conceived of haecceity as an individuation o f the form.
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hour, a date...’50 The individuality of an event is nothing like the individuality of a 
substance or a form that gives permanence to a subject or thing, rather it is the 
evanescent conjunction of the two parts of the body, its material elements and 
particles and its power of being affected or affecting other bodies. To use Deleuze and 
Guattari’s example : that intensity of the light in relation to that degree of heat which 
is that summer evening.51 The individuation of a body also, unlike the individuation 
of a thing or subject, is therefore always in relation to other bodies, to n dimensions, 
because the connection between bodies belongs to the very reality of the body -  these 
connections simply describe this complexity.
Deleuze and Guattari talk of there being two kinds of assemblages, which are
always co-existant : assemblage haecceities, which is a body defined in terms of its
longitudes and latitudes, and interassemblage haecceities which marks the milieu of
the intersection of these longitudes and latitudes. They are co-extensive precisely
because there is no relation of longitude and latitude without a milieu of becoming.
Every haecceity contains any number of heterogenous elements to n dimensions that
either augments or diminishes its multiplicity :
Vous êtes longitude et latitude, un ensemble de vitesses et de 
lenteurs entre particules non formées, un ensemble d’affects 
non subjectivés. Vous avez l’individuation d’un jour, d’une 
saison, d’une année, d'une vie (indépendamment de la durée),
- d’un climat, d’un vent, d’un brouillard, d’un essaim, d’une 
meute (indépendamment de la régularité). Ou du moins vous 
pouvez l’avoir, vous pouvez y arriver. Une nuée de sauterelles 
apportée par le vent à cinq heures du soir ; un vampire qui sort 
la nuit, un loup-garoup à la pleine lune.52
whereas Deleuze thinks of an intensive, factual individuation consequently mobile and 
communicating.].
50 Op. C it. MP. p.318, TP, p.261.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.. MP, p.320, TP, p.262.
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resistance
The body, therefore, is the point of resistance to the State apparatus. For it is 
the State apparatus in its modem form through the axiomatics of capital that defines 
us in terms of our subjectivity through the process of subjectification: you are a 
worker, a student, a teacher, a philosopher, and so on.... Beneath these subjectivities -  
or in reality what you are, say Deleuze and Guattari -  is a swarm of particles that 
cannot be limited to these interpellations -  look at me I really am a worker, student, 
teacher, philosopher, and so on... The object of a human life, therefore, and it is here 
that Deleuze and Guattari’s politics seems most to resemble an ethics, or at least a 
spinozist ethics, is to slip into other haecceities by increasing the dimensions of 
multiplicity.
The limit of this process is a becoming impersonal, which Deleuze and 
Guattari call ‘the immanent end of becoming’.53 As a practice of life, one reaches the 
limit by becoming everyone and everything. Not that you become everyone and 
everything, as though there was a fusion between your subjectivity and the cosmic 
whole, but that there is an event of becoming everyone and everything -  push your 
life to n dimensions, increase the lines between the points until the subjectivity that 
has been given you disappears Thus, a new ethics with its three cardinal virtues: 
imperceptibility, indiscernibility and impersonality 54
53 Ibid. M P  p.342, TP. p.279.
54 Ibid., MP, p.343, TP. p.280.
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III. The Impersonal (Return of the Subject)
All this should not make us think that the subject disappears altogether in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s work, though. It is clear in Deleuze’s last works, such as 
Foucault and le Pli, Leibniz et le Baroque, and his last joint work with Guattari, What 
is Philosophy? that the subject returns. This might appear quite strange to those who 
have read their other works previous to these, which on the whole seem to call into 
question the priority of the subject and especially in its link to politics. Have we not 
ourselves already seen in this chapter that the State apparatus is the ‘model of 
realisation’ of the axioms of capital through the process of subjectification? The only 
answer to this question is the possibility of conceiving the subject in another way. 
And it is the impact of Foucault’s later work (his series on the history of sexuality) 
that allows this possibility, even though the process of subjectification in MP 
probably has the same origin.
Foucault
In Deleuze’s book on Foucault we get quite a different definition of 
subjectivity than we find in MP, rather than subjectivity being the point of application 
of power it is the 'foyer de resistance’ (focal point of resistance), and rather than 
being a pure form of interiority, it is ‘derivative of the outside’.55 To discover this new 
kind of subjectivity we need to return to the Greeks. There are two reasons for this :
55 G.Deleuze. Foucault, (Paris: Minuit, 1986), p. 113. |Hereafter F\. An the English translation: 
Foucault, (Minneapolis, London : University of Minnesota. 1986), p. 106. (Hereafter Tb)
176
first of all, Deleuze remarks that at least at the level of morality we seem to be still 
weigh down with the old problems : ‘Tout se passe comme si les modes de 
subjectivation avaient la vie longue, et nous continuons à jouer aux Grecs, ou aux 
chrétiens, d’où notre gout pour les retours à ...’36 At least at the level of our beliefs 
about ourselves, our relation to our sexualities and bodies, we are still Greek and 
Christian; a long history weighs down upon our souls. But there is also a much more 
important reason to return to the Greeks for Deleuze in his reading of Foucault and 
that is what he calls an ‘Absolute Memory’ of an outside. It is this memory of an 
outside that the Greeks have handed down to us, and which Deleuze believes is in fact 
far more important than the Heideggerian reading of tradition in which Greek culture 
is celebrated as the opening of the question of Being.57
doubling
This absolute memory of an outside is to be understood through a doubling of 
the subject. Greek power is to be essentially understood as external governance, yet 
through a process of doubling this government becomes self-government, for how 
could one govern others unless one can govern oneself? This doubling is not 
interesting in it self except that through this process self-mastery (enkrateia) becomes 
detached from the external power relations and knowledge relations. The doubling of 
the external forces into internal ones actually changes the status of the forces 
themselves. What belongs to the external relations of force, affecting others or being 
affected by others, is repeated or doubled as a power to affect oneself. This ‘auto- 56
56 Ibid., F.p. 107, Fb, p. 114.
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affection’ is the invention of a new subjectivity independent of power and knowledge 
even though it is ‘derived’ from them: ‘L’idée fondamentale de Foucault, c’est celle 
d’une dimension de la subjectivité qui dérive du povoir et du savoir, mais qui n’en 
dépend pas.’57 8
What is interesting about this discovery, as has already been remarked, is how 
different it is from the description of subjectivity in MP  In fact, the French word 
which describes this new subject, subjectivation, is the very same word that is used in 
M P  to describe the way in which molecular assemblages are caught up within molar 
representations. In Foucault it is this term subjectivation which becomes the positive 
term and which is then contrasted to another process of subjectivity designated by the 
French word asujetissement and which is translated as ‘subjugated’. In other words, 
subjectivation describes the subject as a derivative of the outside (and as we shall see 
later there are in fact two ‘outsides’ for Deleuze, the outside of external relations of 
power and knowledge relations, and the outside as something ultimate). And the 
subjected subject describes the subject as subjected by someone else (what in MP was 
designated by the process of subjectification). Thus, the subject describes a double 
operation: it is reduced to a process of individuation and tied to an identity.
Of course, this is not at all a matter of simply returning to the Greeks, but of a 
memory of resistance to subjection It is, as Deleuze writes in a footnote, that ‘nous 
cherchons évidemment un autre type de rapports propre à notre champs social.’59 It is 
a matter therefore in our own time of finding our own resistance to subjection. This is 
as Deleuze describes it, a resistance against individuation and the manner in which 
every individual is attached to a known and recognised identity. This struggle is a
57 ‘Ce que les Grecs ont fait, ce n'est pas révéler l’Etre ou déplier l'Ouvert. dans un geste historico- 
mondiale. C'est beaucoup moins, ou beaucoup plus, dirait Foucault.' Ibid.
58 Ibid., F, p. 109, Fb, p.101.
59 Ibid, F. p. 113, fit.28, Fb, p. 105, fn.28.
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struggle for ‘difference, variation and metamorphosis’ and is, therefore, similar to the 
micro-politics of MP except that with Foucault Deleuze is no longer afraid of 
speaking of this struggle in terms of the self.60 It is perhaps at this point that we might 
speak of a movement of their politics towards an ethics. And ethics in the sense of 
Foucault’s, that is to say as an answer to the question ‘how does one relate to oneself. 
As we shall see, ethics in this sense has no longer only to do with an art of living but 
also with philosophy as a way of life -  the stoic, spinozist ethics of a materialist 
ontology.
folding
How can the subject be a derivative of the outside? That is to say, how by a 
process of doubling escape subjection? The answer to this question is perhaps the 
most important theme of Deleuze’s later works: the fold. It is, Deleuze says at the 
beginning of his book the Fold, the ‘operative function’ of the Baroque, but it is 
equally operative, to use Deleuze’s expression, in the doubling of the self that 
produces a subjectivity independent of the codes of power and knowledge.61 The 
doubling of the self is a folding of the outside or from the other perspective the inside 
of the self, that part which escapes subjection, is a fold of the outside -  an interior 
exteriority. Compare this with the relation with the pure form of interiority and 
exteriority in M P  Here, although both forms are co-extensive and are continually 
related to one another, the State apparatus is continually appropriating the outside and
60 Ibid., F, p. 113, Fb. p.106.
61 G.Deleuze. te Pli, Leibniz et le baroque, (Paris : Minuit. 1988), p.5, the Fold, Leibniz and the 
Baroque, (London : the Athlone Press. 1993), p.3. Strangely enough Deleuzc does talk about a Greek
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the outside is continually encroaching upon the State apparatus finally in the form of 
an imperceptible becoming, nonetheless these two forms retain their purity of form.
In the fold, interiority is infracted from within by the outside, because it is
nothing less than the fold of this outside -  an invaginated, convoluted, involuted self,
the I is an Other: ‘C’est le cerveau qui dit Je, mais je est un autre.’62 The self of
subjectification is not exposed to an exteriority, still less does it identify with
exteriority, rather it is an interiorization of exteriority. It is this self as a fold that
continually escapes the codes of power and knowledge. Self-mastery then becomes:
place oneself within the fold of the outside:
Le plus lointain devient intérieur, par une conversion au plus 
proche: la vie dans les plies. C’est la chambre centrale, d’ont 
on ne croit plus qu’elle soit vide, puisqu’on y met le soi. Ici, 
on devient maître de sa vitesse, relativement maître de ses 
molécules et de ses singularités, dans cette zone de 
subjectivation : l’embarcation comme intériur de l’extérieur.63
There are, Deleuze argues, four folds of the outside: the fold of the body, the 
fold of external force (power), the fold of knowledge, and finally the ultimate fold, the 
fold of the outside itself.64 It is the last fold that is probably the absolute memory of 
the outside that escapes beyond any strata or diagram and it is that fold that goes 
beyond any body, power or knowledge. It is perhaps the equivalent to the becoming 
imperceptible of MP, but now recast within the stoic language of self-mastery. It is 
the last line of becoming oneself in which self is no longer distinguishable from any 
of the elements of the cosmos: ‘Le quatrième est le pli du dehors lui-même, l’ultime : 
c’est lui qui constitue ce que Blanchot appelait une “intériorité d’attente”, c’est de lui
fold in this book but refers it to Plato and deems it ‘not satisfactory’. He seems to have forgotten his 
discussion of the more Stoic Greek fold in Foucault. Ibid., p.L(a), p.53, L(b), p.38.
62 G.Deleuze and F.Guattari, Qu'est-ce que la philosophie, (Paris: Minuit 1991), p. 199, What is 
Philosophy?, (London, New York : Verso, 1994), p.211.
“ ibid., F  p. 130, Fb, p.120.
64 Ibid., F, pp. 111-12, Fb, p. 104.
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que le sujet attend, sur des modes divers, l’immortalité, ou bien l’éternité, ou le salut, 
ou la liberté, ou la mort, le détachement...,6Î
Is not this ultimate fold of the outside the impersonal as the expression of life, 
similar to Spinoza’s beatitude, that Deleuze describes in his last published work 
Immanence, une vie., the final aim of philosophy? Not a philosophy of ethics, but 
philosophy as ethics.65 6
65 Ibid., F, p. 112, Fb. p.104.
“  For the remarkable description of the impersonal at the heart of life see Deleuze ‘Immanence, une 
vie...’, Philosophie, n°47. September 1995. pp.3-7.
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CONCLUSION
Ontological Materialism:
Philosophy as Ethics
Amor fati
Let us return to the central tenet of this thesis: ‘ontological materialism’ is the 
parallelism of the ontological and the political. This parallelism was first described in 
Deleuze’s and Negri’s reading of Spinoza, where it was shown that the ethical and the 
political have their bases in ontology. What, however is the materialist basis of this 
ontology? It is a materialism in four senses: first of all, inasmuch as it affirms the 
auto-production of the Real; that is to say, it is a productionist ontology. Secondly, in 
that all the principles of organisation and composition are strictly immanent. Thirdly, 
because it takes the body as its model of ethics. Finally, since it understands writing in 
terms of its material effects These four aspects, already present in Spinoza’s thought, 
are reawakened in Deleuze and Guattari’s own philosophy. Their ontological 
approach to this parallelism means that philosophy itself comes to be defined as ethics 
in a spinozist sense. The questions that need to be asked are: how to increase our 
puissance, how to become active, how to become joyful. Here ethics goes beyond any 
notion of good and evil, and beyond the sad passions on which morality necessarily 
feeds and is engendered. Freedom is not an innate state nor can it be attained through 
the abstract form of a juridical category that is listed in declarations of human rights.
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We are not bom free since, as Spinoza rightly says: ‘If men were bom free, they 
would form no conception of good and evil so long as they were free.’1
In this context of a redefined ethics, freedom is understood as a process, a 
process of liberation, a process of becoming. One that is significant in regard to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s practice is the becoming of writing: ‘l’écriture est inséparable 
du devenir.’2 Through writing their revolutionary puissance is mobilised and as a 
becoming the divide between theory and practice no longer makes any sense. 
Revolution is occurring everywhere and all the time in the interstices of power. These 
are only micro-revolutions though, happening in the various fields of the arts, sciences 
and philosophy that constantly cross over one another. They take place in invention 
but also in its propagation. Revolution is no longer a single and unitary powerful 
overthrowing of the State, nor is it a massive transformation of the State.3 It is not a 
question of the State at all. It rather works against the State and its form in thought, 
but can never replace it, can never act as a State against the State. The micro­
revolutionary forces are affects performed not by individuals and not acted on 
individuals. They are rather impersonal forces of creation, transformation and 
becoming.
But, let us come back to the notion of ‘parallelism’ itself. What can we now 
say about this notion o f ‘parallelism’? Is such a term still adequate in order to describe 
the relation between ontology and politics? Is it still helpful in order to explain 
ontological materialism? This is the first task that needs to be addressed at the end of 
this thesis. Secondly, there is another notion that needs to be developed in a second
' B Spinoza. Ethics, IV.P68. (Indianapolis. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992), p. 192.
[Writing is inseparable from a becoming ] G.Deleuze. Critique et Clinique, (Paris: Minuit, 1993),
p' 1
Deleuze and Guattam describe these two forms of revolution as belonging one to the history of the 
East and the other to that of the West : Tl est vraie que l’idée de révolution est elle-même ambigüe: elle
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time. Although this notion was never approached directly and did not in any way form 
part of the original thesis it has nevertheless worked implicitly from within the very 
title of the thesis itself. That is the notion of ‘problem’. Lastly, it is of the utmost 
importance to pick up the concept o f ‘life’, which was alluded to at the very end of the 
last chapter. What is the link between this ‘life’ and philosophy? Does it lead us back 
to a sort of teleology? If not, how can we still speak of a f in a l  aim  of philosophy.
Parallelism
Let us first of all briefly follow the development of this notion throughout this 
thesis. This thesis started with Spinoza and the parallelism of the ontological and the 
political. As the thesis moved on to the analysis of AO the language was transformed 
and the parallelism was re-framed in terms of desiring production and social 
production. Then, in the fourth chapter we saw how this ‘parallelism’ was broadened 
out as we passed from AO  to MP This ‘broadening out’ did not discredit this 
parallelism though and it was still important to assert that materialist ontology is 
already political. The ultimate consequence of this lesson was to understand that 
writing is political before any representation of the political: writing is political as 
writing and not because it is about the political. In the third chapter, the vocabulary 
changed once more and the discussion took place in terms of the relation between the 
abstract machine, machinic assemblages and the plane of consistency. It seemed now 
that ‘parallelism’ was no longer the appropriate word. This is due to the subtle shift 
from AO  to MP  in the change of status of the unconscious and capitalism. Thus, the
est occidentale pour autant qu'elle renvoie à une transformation de l’Etat; mais elle est orientale pour 
autant qu'elle projette une destruction, une abolition de l’Etat.' Op. Cit. MP. p.478, TP. p.385.
184
term of ‘parallelism’ was replaced by such terms as ‘combinatory’ or ‘combinations’ 
that occurred within an interactive field. The question turned to bodies and 
becomings; that is to say, to mixed states, or zones of indeterminacy. Therefore, 
linking two distinct terms through one sole notion, as it was done at the beginning of 
this thesis by using the strategy of ‘parallelism’, was now no longer helpful. The 
notions o f ‘body’, becoming and ‘milieu’ now made more sense. Also, the notions of 
doubling and the fold became more significant such that the notion of parallelism was 
altogether abandoned in the last chapter. Instead there was a talk of differences, 
variations and metamorphosis, of becoming-imperceptible and the impersonal and 
beatitude and the final aim of philosophy.
Having drawn the trajectory of this notion let us now return to it in Deleuze’s
Spinoza, et le problème de I 'expression. By the end of this book Deleuze develops an
argument that many agree marks the originality of his reading of Spinoza. There are
two Ethics, affirms Deleuze, one that has to do with definitions, axioms and
propositions, but there is also the more subterranean one of the scholiums. It is the
scholiums, Deleuze argues, that are the pivots or ‘turning’ points of the Ethics itself :
En vertu de leur indépendance à l’egard des proposition qu’ils 
doublent, on dirait que l'Ethique a été simultanément écrite 
deux fois, sur deux tons, sur un double registre. En efet il y a 
une double manière, discontinue, dont les scolies sautent des 
uns aux autres, se font échos, se retrouvent dans la préface de 
tel livre de VEthique ou dans la conclusion de tel autre, 
formant une ligne brisée qui traverse toute l’œuvre en 
profondeur, mais qui n’affleure qu’en tel ou tel point (les 
points de brisure).4
If we borrow the language of M P then, these points can be called remarkable 
or singular for they effectuate breaks and represent the lines of flight of the text. They 
are little ‘war machines’ inside the text, its most revolutionary and creative aspect.
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They mark the passages, transformations and metamorphosis of the Ethics. Of course, 
it is not that simple. It is not as though Spinoza had found the formula for inserting 
revolutionary potential in any and every text. Even here the scholiums can only 
function within a certain context. They are part of a composite mix with various 
vectors of speed that take it in so many directions.* 5 Yet, it is their force that, as great 
gusts of wind, produces change and accelerations in the movement. For Deleuze the 
most important example of this operation is the scholium of ‘parallelism’ in 
proposition seven of the second book. Its function is to reverse the direction of the 
demonstrations in order to establish the equality of puissances and the identity of 
order.6 The effects of this operation ultimately separate Spinoza from any form of 
transcendent thought starting with his contemporary Leibniz. Curiously enough, 
although it is Leibniz who coins the term ‘parallelism’ and in spite of all they share, 
this term is only properly at work in Spinoza for, as Deleuze argues in the conclusion: 
‘C’est que, chez Spinoza, le rapport d’expression ne s’établi qu’entre égaux. C’est là 
le vraie sens du parallelism: il n ’y a jamais éminence d’une série.’7
The main idea to retain here is equality. The other word for it is univocity. As 
we already know this has immediate practical consequences: an action in the mind is 
an action in the body and vice versa. Ontological parallelism is doubled by an 
epistemological parallelism that becomes the basis for Spinoza’s ‘common notions’. 
And as Michael Hardt rightly points out: ‘the common notions constitute for Deleuze 
the ‘ontological rupture’ of Spinoza’s thought that marks the completion of the
1 Op. Cit. G.Deleuze. Spinoza et le problème de l'expression, p.317.
5 For more on the three different aspects of the scoliums. the axiomatic. paradigmatic and casuistic. see: 
Ibid. pp. 319-21.
6 ‘alors que la démonstration va de l’effet à la cause pour conclure que l'ordre de la connaissance est le 
même que celui des choses, alors que l'ensemble de la démonstration et du corollaire s’élève de cette 
identité d’ordre dans les Iodes à une égalité de puissances en Dieu, le scolie au contraire part de l'unité 
ontologique de la substance pour conclure à l ’égalité des puissance et à l’identité d’ordre.’ Ibid, p.318.
7 Ibid, p.308.
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transformation from speculation to practice.’8 This transformation occurs on the basis 
of a rigorous ‘parallelism’. Once more, what is truly important here is not that the 
body and the mind are strictly equal. In itself this idea would prove quite bland and 
would be readily assimilated into Hegel’s ‘black night of the undifferentiated’. 
Rather, it is about discovering in parallel to the puissances of the body the puissances 
of thought that escape consciousness: ‘il s’agit d’acquérir une connaissance des 
puissance du corps pour découvrir parallèlement des puissances de l’esprit qui 
échappent à la conscience.’ Consequently, this parallelism that doubles itself posits a 
form of an idea that is referred as such to the power of thinking.9 This, as has already 
been explained, leads Spinoza to formulate a third kind of knowledge or beatitude. On 
the other hand, following the line of the ontological and political parallelism, this 
thesis arrived at the singular point where philosophy and ethics meet, an encounter 
that was seen to be of the same nature as Spinoza’s beatitude. Do we, from this new 
perspective of the absolute coincidence of philosophy and ethics, still have any use for 
the notion of parallelism? Are we still correct at this point to talk of a ‘parallelism’? 
One way of answering this question is to turn to another term
Problems
In the title of this thesis we can read the term ‘problem’ twice: once in the 
sense of the ‘problematic’ relation between ontological materialism and the political, 
and the other, in that the political itself is posed as a problem. But, what precisely do 
we understand by problem? What is the nature of the relations in the problematic? Is
1 Op. Cit. M.Hardt, An Apprenticeship in philosophy, Gilles Deleuze, p.99.
9 Op. Cit. MP  p. 111, TP. p. 126.
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there just a difference of degrees between problems and the problematic? First of all, 
problems are linked to questions and to solutions. In Différence et Repetition, Deleuze 
describes problems in terms of a relation to their solutions as having three aspects: 
they are different from their solutions, thus they transcend them, yet they are 
immanent to the solutions themselves. Then, the movement of thought itself is 
described as going from the problematical to the question. And questions are 
understood in terms of imperatives, not the moral Kantian imperative for this is 
exactly what is under attack here. Imperatives are events that present themselves as 
questions. They are inseparable from an evaluation: ‘Le problème de la pensée n’est 
pas lié à l’essence, mais à l’évaluation de ce qui a de l’importance et de ce qui n’en a 
pas, à la répartition du singulier et du régulier, du remarquable et de l’ordinaire[.]’10 
Thus, Deleuze considers the determination of problems to be the highest task for they 
carry our most decisive and creative power. However, this must not be interpreted as 
an act of consciousness. Problems are unconscious, that is to say they are extra- 
propositional and sub-representative. In fact, it belongs to consciousness to be false 
consciousness. This affects the life of problems such that each is always doubled by a 
false problem The questions that are brought about by the problem are confounded 
with the problem itself such that their solutions are confused with them and are 
thought in propositional terms. This explains why the problems of society are too 
often so badly posed and are almost always immediately rejected as having no 
solutions. Yet, problems solve themselves despite the doubling of the falsification. No 
law can stop the flows of population from moving across the globe.11 This is the real 
sense and force of imperatives: ‘Les impératifs sont de l’être, toute question est
10 G.Deleuze. Différence et Répétition. (Paris: puf, 1968), p.245, Difference and Repetition, (London:
Athlone Press. 1994), p. 189.
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ontologique, et distribue “ce qui est” dans les problèmes. L’ontologie, c’est le coup de 
dés -  chaosmos d’où le cosmos sort.’12 13
Thus, we can return to the questions asked at the beginning. What links the 
relation between materialist ontology and the political as problematic and the political 
itself as a problem to the idea of parallelism? Is there a ‘problem’ of this thesis? 
Problems are never singular rather they are multiplicities. They cannot be located in 
the political or in the idea of parallelism for example. They always come in 
constellations and it is ideas (such as the political or ‘parallelism’) as singularities that 
people them. Problems work at a micro-logical level. Can we at least say that the 
political is a problem in itself? From the perspective of ontological materialism even 
to ask this question is to fall into a false problem. There is no such thing as the 
political standing apart from politics. Then, what is the imperative that forces us to 
repeatedly ask this question in so many different guises? Deleuze in a short but 
powerful text tells us that: ‘Il n’y a pas de psychologie, mais une politique du moi. Il 
n’y a pas de métaphysique, mais une politique de l’être. Pas de science, mais une 
politique de la matière, puique l’homme est chargé de la matière même.’11
A work is itself a problem that is born out of an imperative. Problems are of 
the order of events that present themselves as questions. For this reason ‘les 
problèmes ne sont pas séparables d’un pouvoir décisoire, d’un fiat, qui fait de nous, 
quand il nous traversent, des êtres semi-divins.’14 This decision, once again, must not 
be interpreted as a reflexive act that a consciousness reaches after some deliberation. 
On the contrary, it needs to be understood in terms of a dice throw: ‘Il s’agit plutôt
"  For an excellent account of the unstoppable nature of massive migrations world wide see: T.Negri 
and M. Hardt, Empire, (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 2000), 
pp396-400.
12 Op. Cit. DR, p.257, DRb. p.199.
13 G.Deleuze, Périclès et Verdi, la philosophie de François Châtelet, (Paris: Minuit, 1988), p. 10.
M Op. Cit. DR(a), p.255, DR(b), p.197.
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d’un coup de dés, et de tout le ciel comme espace ouvert, et du lancer comme espace 
unique. Les points singulier sont sur le dé; les questions sont les dés eux-mêmes; 
l’impératif est le lancer.’15 This throw of the dice does away with the arbitrary nature 
of chance and instead affirms the whole of it all at once. The nature of this absolute 
affirmation has the same flavour as Spinozist beatitude.
A life
The idea of life in Deleuze’s last written work is the question of immanence. 
Thus, it is intimately linked to Spinozist substance. A life is everywhere, in all the 
moments that traverse individuals and that measure objects. It is when the life of the 
individual makes room for the impersonal. It is pure immanence: ‘On dira de la pure 
immanence qu’elle est une vie et rien d’autre. Elle n’est pas immanence à la vie, mais 
l’immanence qui n’est en rien est elle-même une vie Une vie est l’immanence de 
l’immanence, l’immanence absolue: elle est puissance, béatitude complètes.’16
Thus, immanence is described in terms of life. As Agamben rightly points out 
this text in a way represents Deleuze’s peak moment in his project of going beyond 
the cogito. It marks the point where consciousness is finally liberated from all subject 
and object determinations and returned to life. But, life here is not to be understood in 
terms of nature. In this article Agamben’s own definition of life follows that of Bichat 
as the set of functions that resist death. Furthermore, he affirms that the philosophy to 
come will have to start with the notion of life as this theme has already let itself be
15 Ibid., DRb. p. 198.
16 G.Deleuze. ‘Immanence: une vie... ’ in Philosophie, (Paris: Minuit, September. 1995), n° 47, p.4.
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announced in the late philosophy of both Deleuze and Foucault.17 18Thus, Agamben 
retakes this theme for himself but this time in terms of what he calls ‘naked life’. Not 
surprisingly Agamben also returns to the Greeks in order to unfold this notion.
Homo sneer vs homo tantum
In his book Homo sacer, Agamben begins by remind us that the Greeks used 
two terms to designate life: zoe and bios '8 Politics could only be attached to the latter 
of these terms for it related to qualified life. Like Aristotle in his Nichomachean 
Ethics, one can speak of a bios politikos but not of a zoe politikos. To this extent, 
politics has always been biopolitics. Thus, it is not enough to talk of the introduction 
of life as bios into politics in order to define its modem form, he argues.19 Instead, it is 
the introduction of life as zoe, that is to say as ‘naked life’ that describes modernity. 
The politisation of ‘naked life’ is the decisive event of modernity that radically 
transforms all the political and philosophical categories of the classics. Thus, 
sovereignty is the main site of this transformation. The sovereign is, in Schmitt’s 
words, he who decides of the state of exception. Therefore, the power of the sovereign 
is paradoxical in nature for he is both interior and exterior to juridical order.20 The 
sovereign holds the ultimate decision over life but this one is itself ambivalent. In the 
simplest of terms ‘naked life’ is that life that can be killed but not sacrificed.21 The 
ambivalence resides in the root of the term sacrifice: sacer. This one is explained
1 G.Agamben, 'L’immanence absolue', Gilles Deleuze une vie philosophique, edited by Eric AUiez, 
(Paris: Institut Synthelabo, 1998), pp. 165-188.
18 G.Agamben Homo sacer, lepouvoir souverain et la vie nue. (Paris: Seuil. 1997).
19 He thus can see the necessity for the completion of Foucault’s project whose work on the notion of 
biopolitics appears now to be somehow incomplete.
20 Ibid., p.23.
21 Ibid., p. 16.
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through the double capture of the apparatus of the state of exception as the 
conjunction of the impunity of homicide and the exclusion of sacrifice.22 Thus, a 
correction or completion of Foucault’s work must here be accomplished according to 
Agamben
Sacred life is neither political bios nor natural zoe but the zone of their 
indifference. This zone of irreducible indifferentiation becomes the paradigm of 
Western political space where ‘naked life’ describes that life that is only included in 
the shape of its exclusion. Thus, Agamben concludes that the biopolitical paradigm of 
the West is the camp and not the City in comparison to Athenian democracy. The 
camp as the paradigm of modern political space holds true beyond totalitarian regimes 
and applies to all forms of democracy that conform our modem states. Exception 
tends to become the rule. A camp is any such zone of indifferentiation whether we are 
thinking of waiting zones (to be deported) in international airports or of Pinochet’s 
stadiums in all of which the structure of a state of exception is at work. Thus, 
Agamben can reverse the nazi formula of “everywhere there is naked life there will be 
a people” into “everywhere there is a people there will be naked life”.23 The capitalist 
democratic project only transforms class struggle into the ‘naked life’ of the 
populations of the third world. Therefore, Agamben draws a further distinction 
between pure life that is referred back to the enigma ontology must work through and 
‘naked life’ as our subjection to political power. Thus, pure life is understood as the 
limit where metaphysics becomes politics and ‘naked life’ as the threshold where 
politics transmutes into theory.24
22 Ibid., p.9l.
23 Ibid., p. 193.
24 Ibid., p. 196.
192
Despite Agamben’s pursuit of the point of reversibility between politics and 
ontology, ‘naked life’ still works too much as a negative limit.25 Homo sacer as a 
nonhumanised ethics, as the identity “l’homme est le non-homme” still bears the 
complexion of the sad face of human passivity. We seem to be quite far away here 
from Deleuze’s homo tantum as he describes it in his last work which Agamben so 
well analysed. In the nonhumanised ethics of Deleuze there is a Nietzschean 
inspiration that relates man to the uberman and here even death is only thought as an 
opening to the flows of life. It is the event of the impersonal. It is “a life” as 
expression: homo tantum.26
Amor fati
There is a time, say Deleuze and Guattari in Qu 'est-ce que la philosophie? that 
is the time of philosophy proper. They name it amor fati and describe it in terms of 
the dignity of events as being inseparable from philosophy: s’égaler à l’événement, ou 
devenir le fils de ses propres événements.[] Il n’y a pas d’autre éthique que l’amor fati 
de la philosophie. La philosophie est toujours entre-temps.’27 This time of philosophy 
is not the time of history but the time of becoming. It is the relation of philosophy to 
non-philosophy, their double becoming. The aim of philosophy is not to tell us about 
the end of history. Just as Spinoza’s beatitude, it does not announce the arrival of 
absolute enlightenment. The relation of the philosopher or the intellectual to others is
25 There is a short but interesting discussion on the negaitvity of the notion of ‘naked life’ in T.Negri 
and M.Hardt. Empire. (Cambridge. Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press. 2000), pp. 
366-67.
:f> For more on the notion of homo tantum see: René Schérrer. Regards sur Deleuze, (Paris: Kimé. 
1998), pp.30-44. Also. Op. Cit., ‘Homo tantum, l’lmpersonel: une politique’ in Gilles Deleuze une vie 
philosophique, pp.25-42.
193
not that of the sage to the people. Rather, in the impersonal puissance of thought their 
relation follows the logic of the fold.27 8 In this way philosophy resists death, servitude, 
and the intolerable. .. This it does with its own war machine. The war machine of 
writing that does not have the battle as its object for, on the contrary, ‘on écrit 
toujours pour donner la vie, pour libérer la vie là où elle est emprisonnée, pour tracer 
des lignes de fuite.’29
27 G.Deleuze and F.Guattari, Qu'est-ce que ta philosophie?, (Paris: Minuit, 1991), p. 151, What is 
Philosophy?, (London, New York,: Verso, 1994), p. 159.
28 ‘Le peuple est intérieur au penseur parce que c’est un "devenir peuple”, pour autant que le penseur 
est intérieur au peuple, comme devenir non moins illimité.'Ibid., QP, p. 105, WP. p. 109.
25 G.Deleuze. Pourparlers. (Paris. Minuit, 1990), p. 192.
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